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I. INTRODUCTION

Government employees' First Amendment right to freedom of
speech is much more limited in 1993 than was the case twenty-five
years ago when the Supreme Court first set out the basic framework
for analyzing claimed violations of that right. Under that framework,
employees' speech interests were to be weighed or "balanced" against
the government's interest in suppressing their speech. Many important
questions remained to be considered and resolved as the lower federal
courts, and, in four more major decisions, the Supreme Court, itself,
confronted new fact situations and new issues. Some questions were
resolved in ways that enhanced the constitutional protections accorded
public employees' speech. Several decisions during the past decade,
however, have made it less likely that public employees can speak
without risking retaliation by higher-ranking employees who, for whatever reason, are displeased by what the former have said. According
to current Fifth and Eleventh Circuit dicta, public employees cannot
expect courts to even hear their claims except in rare or extraordinary
cases.
Among the issues the courts have addressed are the following.
What are a public employee's free speech "interests" or rights? Are
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some kinds of speech more important than others? Should the social
utility or importance of an employee's speech to the public be weighed
along with the employee's own speech interest in a court's "balancing"?
What kinds of governmental interests justify suppressing or punishing
employee expressions? How much interference with such interests
should be permitted before such suppression or discipline is appropriate? How much weight is to be assigned to the respective competing
interests, and what factors should courts consider when evaluating a
public employee's speech and its effects in special contexts of one sort
and another? How is a case to be analyzed when an agency or agency
official disciplines an employee both for her constitutionally protected
expression and for constitutionally permissible reasons? Are words
spoken in private entitled to as much protection as those uttered
publicly? Should there be a "threshold" test of some sort, and if so,
what should it be? At what point should defendant agency officials be
entitled to qualified immunity from suits by employees alleging violation of their free speech rights?
In order to trace the ways the Supreme Court and, eventually,
the Eleventh Circuit responded to these questions, this article attempts to proceed in both logical and chronological sequences. Two
major developments are at the center of the picture. One was the
emergence of the Eleventh Circuit from the matrix of the former Fifth
Circuit in 1981. The other was a momentous Supreme Court decision
in 1983. The Eleventh Circuit inherited binding precedent both from
the former Fifth Circuit and, of course, from all Supreme Court's
decisions, the latest of which was in 1987. The court thus was obliged
to keep in mind three sets of precedent each time it was confronted
with a public employee First Amendment speech claim: the former
Fifth Circuit's, the Supreme Court's, and its own. Its task was further
complicated by the facts that the meaning of some Supreme Court
holdings was obscure at key points, and that it was often unclear
whether or to what extent Supreme Court decisions might have superseded earlier Fifth and Eleventh Circuit precedents.
Part II, below, examines relevant pre-1983 decisions by the Supreme Court and the issues and doctrines that were taking shape in
Fifth and Eleventh Circuit case law as these courts construed and
applied those decisions. Part III focuses on the substance and implications of the Supreme Court's 1983 and 1987 decisions. Part IV, identifies a number of serious problems in the Eleventh Circuit's post-1983
public employee free speech jurisprudence. It is noted that some of
these problems appear to derive from neglect of binding Fifth Circuit
precedent, and even, occasionally, of prior Eleventh Circuit decisional
law.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' SPEECH RIGHTS

II.

BACKGROUND AND PRECEDENT: SUPREME COURT AND FIFTH
AND ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS BEFORE CONNICK

In the fourteen years preceding the birth of the Eleventh Circuit,
the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the central issues relevant to the
2
present topic in five major decisions: Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
Pickeringv. Board of Education,s Perry v. Sindermann,4 Mt. Healthy
City School District v. Doyle, 5 and Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District.6 All five cases concerned First Amendment
speech rights of college or secondary school teachers. Perry and
Givhan had come up through the Fifth Circuit, 7 the Eleventh Circuit's
parent court.
In addition, a substantial body of Fifth Circuit case law had
emerged prior to October 1, 1981. These Fifth Circuit cases are important because the Eleventh Circuit itself determined at the outset that
they would constitute binding precedent unless the Eleventh Circuit,
sitting en banc, determined otherwise. 8 Later Supreme Court decisions

1. The Eleventh Circuit came into existence on October 1, 1981, pursuant to an act of
Congress passed the year before. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980,
Pub.L. No. 96-452, § 12, 94 Stat. 1995 (1980). For several years previously, the growing size
of the Fifth Circuit and its enormous case load had prompted proposals for splitting it into
either two divisions or two separate circuits. See HARVEY C. COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT 186-98 (1980). To relieve these conditions, the Act carved the new Eleventh
Circuit out of the former Fifth. The new Eleventh Circuit had federal appellate jurisdiction in
the states of Alabama, Florida and Georgia. The new Fifth Circuit retained such jurisdiction
in Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and for a brief interval, the Canal Zone. Id. at 191. "In May,
1980, as an interim measure pending Congressional action, the Fifth Circuit reorganized itself
into two administrative units, effective July 1 of that year. Unit A comprised Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas; Unit B included Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, thereby foreshadowing the
appearance of the Eleventh Circuit fifteen months later." Id. Cf. Howell Heflin, Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980 - Overdue Relief For an Overworked Court, 11
CUMB. L. REV. 597-616 (1980)

2.

385 U.S. 589 (1967).

3. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
4. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
5. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
6. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
7. Perry v. Sindermann, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970); Ayers v. Western Line Consol. Sch.
Dist., 555 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated in part sub nom. Givhan v. Western Line Consol.
Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
8. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207, 1209-10 (11th Cir. 1981)(en banc)(the
first case heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit). The Eleventh Circuit
also determined that Fifth Circuit Unit B decisions rendered after September 30, 1981 were
binding precedent unless overruled by the Eleventh Circuit en banc. Stein v. Reynolds Securities,
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might over-rule such precedent; however, the precise effect of some
of these Supreme Court decisions on Fifth and Eleventh Circuit precedent was often uncertain.
A. Early Supreme Court Decisions: Keyishian, Pickering, and Perry
The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." 9 Notwithstanding conventional law school reference to the "incorporation" of Bill of Rights protections into the
Fourteenth Amendment,1° no trumpets sounded when the Speech
Clause was first held to apply to state limitations on expression.
Though disclaiming any intent to decide whether it so applied, the
Supreme Court proceeded to balance state interest (characterized as
"a simple exertion" of its police power) against an individual's "natural
and inherent" right of free speech as early as 1920.11 Dissenting in
the same case, Justice Brandeis expressly argued that the Speech
Clause applies against state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. 12
Five years later, without bothering to justify so concluding, the
Court simply stated, as if it were already established law, that freedom
of speech was among the "fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States. "'1 Justice Holmes offered the following
rationale: "The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must
be taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the

667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982). See Allen v. Autaga County Bd. of Educ., 685 F.2d 1302, 1304
(11th Cir. 1982). Such Unit B precedent includes 'the firm rule" that the court "cannot disregard
the precedent set by a prior panel, even though [it] perceive[s] error in the precedent. Absent
an intervening Supreme Court decision which changes the law, only the en banc court can make
the change." Wilson v. Taylor, 658 F.2d 1021, 1034 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I (religion clauses omitted).
10. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 475-88 (1980).
11. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 331-33 (1920) (affirming conviction under state law
for speaking against enlistment in armed services during first world war).
12. Id. at 334-43 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
13. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (affirming conviction under state law for
advocating overthrow of government by force or other unlawful means). As in Gilbert, the Court
construed the state's restrictions on free speech as an exercise of the latter's "police power."
Id. at 666. More recently, the Court has held that since the First Amendment restrains only
governmental conduct, 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) affords no protection against wholly private conspiracies
to abridge First Amendment rights. Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1983).

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' SPEECH RIGHTS

scope that has been given to the word 'liberty' as there used . . .,.
Implicitly, the Court seemed to have concluded that free speech interests - whether grounded in the First Amendment or in "natural
law" - are liberty interests subject to protection against state intrusion under the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Keyishian
The Court directly addressed the First Amendment speech rights
of state employees for the first time in Keyishian v. Board of Regents.15
Although some earlier decisions anticipated Keyishian, they were decided primarily on other constitutional grounds.1 6 Professor Keyishian
was one of several faculty at a New York state university who declined
to sign a non-Communist affidavit as required by a state law popularly
known as the "Feinberg law" and regulations implementing it. 17 The
Court had visited the Feinberg law fifteen years earlier and sustained
it in Adler v. Board of Education.1
In Adler, the Court had concluded, "Teachers . . . 'may work for
the school system upon the reasonable terms laid down by the proper
authorities of New York. If they do not choose to work on such terms,
they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go

14. Id. at 632 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Curiously, Holmes did not refer here to the First
Amendment, but rather, somewhat like the "natural law" majority in Gilbert, to "the general
principle of free speech." Id. See generally, Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235
(1963), citing Gitlow and subsequent Supreme Court decisions for the proposition that speech
and other First Amendment "freedoms are prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment from
invasion by the States." Id. Necessarily, First Amendment freedoms, applied to the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment, do not protect against actions by private parties. For a
thorough review of protections under the National Labor Relations Act, see Cynthia L. Estlund,
What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression
under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 921-1004 (1992).
15. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
16. See, e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)(police officers could not be compelled to chose between self-incrimination and loss of employment rights); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960)(a requirement that school teachers name all organizations to which they
had belonged or contributed held to violate right of free association); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957)(college professor's contemit conviction for refusing to answer attorney
general's interrogation pursuant to state loyalty law held to violate due process clause); id. at
261-67 (Frankfurter, J.. concurring)(addressing importance of unfettered academic inquiry, political autonomy and privacy, apparently based on the First Amendment, but without mentioning
it); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (state loyalty oath indiscriminately classifying
innocent with knowing activity offends due process).
17. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 593-605.
18. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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elsewhere. ' '19 The Adler Court's theory was not unlike that enunciated
in the late 19th century by then state supreme court Justice Holmes,
"[A policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he
has no constitutional right to be a policeman."- The Keyishian Court
noted that Adler had been undermined by a series of subsequent
decisions beginning with Weiman v. Updegraff,21 and endorsed the
Second Circuit's conclusion that, "The theory that public employment
which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions,
regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected. '" This
awkwardly phrased dictum was quoted frequently in subsequent public
employee speech cases.2
Keyishian emphasized the importance of academic freedom as a
"transcendent value" important not only to teachers, but also to "all
of us," indeed, to the survival of "our Nation" and "our civilization."Academic freedom is, therefore, the Court wrote, "a special concern
of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall
of orthodoxy over the classroom."- Arguably, Keyishian applied only
to state laws and regulations limiting freedom of expression.Y
Whether teachers' speech could justify state officials' ad hoc decisions
to terminate their employment without violating the First Amendment
was the central theme of the next four Supreme Court decisions.

19. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605 (quoting Adler, 342 U.S. at 492).
20. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E 517 (1892), quoted in Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378, 395 (1987)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 606 (citing a series of Supreme Court decisions beginning with
Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)).
22. Id. at 605-06.
23. See, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
24. "Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned." Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
25. Id.
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost
self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is
played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon
the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of
our Nation. . . . Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die.
Id. (quoting Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
26. Id. at 683.
27. The Court held the Feinberg Law "unconstitutional," implicitly for vagueness and overbreadth. Id. at 604; see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565 n.1.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' SPEECH RIGHTS

2. Pickering
Pickering v. Board of Education2 was the Court's landmark decision in the area of public employee free speech. Though supplemented
and modified in later Supreme Court jurisprudence, Pickering remains
good law and continues to provide the basic components for judicial
analysis of alleged violations of public employees' First Amendment
speech rights.
Mr. Pickering taught in an Illinois public high school. The county
school board had proposed a tax rate increase to raise funds for educational purposes. A local newspaper had published the superintendent's letter supporting the tax increase shortly before the tax referendum was held. The proposal was defeated at the polls.2 Responding
to these developments, Pickering wrote a letter to the editor in which
he criticized the school board's handling of earlier school bond proposals
and its allocation of funds for athletic programs and charged that the
superintendent had tried to prevent teachers from opposing or criticizing the earlier bond issuess After the letter was published, the board
dismissed Pickering, charging at a subsequent hearing that some of
the statements in his letter were false, and that the false statements
''would be disruptive of faculty discipline and would tend to foment
'controversy, conflict and dissension' among teachers, administrators,"
the board, and local residents. 3 1 The Illinois Supreme Court rejected
Pickering's First Amendment claim "on the ground that his acceptance
of a teaching position in the public schools obliged him to refrain from
making statements about the operation of the schools 'which in the
absence of such position he would have an undoubted right to engage
in.'"32
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, citing Wieman, Shelton v.
Tucker, and Keyishian for the proposition that teachers may not
"constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters
of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools
in which they work." Although not phrased as the Pickering Court's

28.
29.
30.
31.

391 U.S. at 563.
Id. at 564-66.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 567.

32.

Id.

33.
34.

364 U.S. 479 (1960); see supra note 16.
Pickeing, 391 U.S. at 568.
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holding in the case, the following language set out certain considerations that were frequently treated as its holding in later cases citing
Pickering:
[T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the
speech of its employees that differ significantly from those
it possesses in connection with the regulation of the speech
of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to
arrive at a balancing between the interests of the teacher,
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.m
The Court did not attempt to identify the constitutional nature or
source of the state's "interests" that might outweigh the First Amendment rights of the "citizenry" in general or a teacher in particular.3
As read, those "interests" apparently boil down to the state's "interest
....
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees." The statement could mean the
Court presumed that employees' speech interests necessarily conflict
with such state interest. But more likely the Court meant merely that
balancing would be required only in those instances where it was
determined that an employee's speech actually did adversely affect a
state agency's delivery of public services.37 There would be no need
to weigh the importance of an employee's speech absent some such
adverse impact. It is important to observe that Pickering refers to
the "matters of public concern" factor only in the context of balancing,
where it functions to offset or counter-balance any adverse effects the
speech might have had upon agency efficiency. According to this for-

35. Id.
36. The Court made no reference to the state's "police powers." Compare Gilbert and
Gitlow, supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text with Burnside v. Byers, 363 F.2d 744 (5th
Cir. 1966). The Burnside court, which upheld the speech rights of students wearing "freedom
buttons," characterized the state's interest "in maintaining an educational system" as "a compelling one, giving rise to a balancing of First Amendment rights with the duty of the state to
further and protect the school system." Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748.
37. In a later decision, Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the Court's majority appeared
to presume that any employee speech would run counter to governmental interests, and therefore
should be tolerated only if it served some public purpose. See infra text accompanying notes
411-17, 424-30; see generally Richard Hiers, First Amendment Speech Rights of Government
Employees: Trends and Problems in Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit Decisions, 45 Sw. L.J.
741-824 (1991).

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' SPEECH RIGHTS

mula, even if an employee's speech had some adverse effect, the employee's speech right would prevail so long as the matters of public
concern it addressed outweighed or, perhaps, equaleds the speech's
detrimental effects on agency operation.
If the quoted statement were read to say that a teacher's First
Amendment speech rights are limited to his interest as a citizen in
commenting on matters of public concern, it would mean that a teacher
has no rights as teacher, but only "as a citizen." 9 But that evidently
was not what the Court intended, for later in the opinion, it emphasized
the importance of expression by teachers "as a class" regarding school
operations.40 Nevertheless, even here, the Court implied that teachers'
speech rights are important only because of their social utility.
[T]he question whether a school system requires additional
funds is a matter of legitimate public concern on which the
judgment of the school administration... cannot, in a society
that leaves such questions to popular vote, be taken as conclusive. On such a question free and open debate is vital to
informed decision-making by the electorate. Teachers are,
as a class, the members of a community most likely to have
informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to
the operation of the schools should be spent. Accordingly,
it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such
questions without fear of retaliation.41
The Court did not say here that the First Amendment protects only
the right to speak about "matters of public concern" - though it
would later so decree.42 In its terms, the First Amendment does not
purport to protect only such speech. Evidently the Pickering Court
simply meant that if an employee's speech is found to affect a state

38. Even though the Pickering formula refers to "balancing" rather than "weighing," none
of the Supreme Court, pre-partition Fifth, or subsequent Eleventh Circuit cases say what the
result would be if the interests, in a court's judgment, "balanced" evenly. What would happen
in such a case apparently is an open question.
39. Pickering had signed his letter "as a citizen, taxpayer, and voter, not as a teacher,"
because, he stated, his and other teachers' speech "freedom" had been "taken" from them by
the school administration. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 578.
40. "Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed
and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent.
Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely, on such questions without fear
of retaliatory dismissal." Id. at 572.
41. Id. at 571-72.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 484-93.
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agency's performance adversely, such speech may nevertheless be
protected provided it addressed a matter of public concern. In that
case, speech on other matters would be protected under the First
Amendment so long as such speech did not interfere with the agency's
performance of public services.
The Court did not clearly specify whether the First Amendment
accords special weight to an employee's speech on matters of public
concern because such speech is of special importance to the speaker,
or only because of its social utility in providing the electorate with
information useful in its decision-making. If only the latter, the employee-speaker would have no speech rights of her own. The Court
may have intended that the employee's own speech interest should be
weighed in the balance. But to the extent that the Pickering formula
refers only to the public's concern, it appears to neglect the speaker's
own interests in her expression. 43 The Supreme Court did not explain
why, in this formula, it refers only to the teacher's "interests" in
speaking, not to his right of free speech, a right the Court itself had
earlier characterized as "fundamental."- In its actual holding, the Pickering court did refer to a teacher's "right to speak."The Pickering Court directed the greater part of its attention to
the school board's contention that it was justified in dismissing Pickering because some statements in his letter were factually inaccurate
or false. 46 In what purports to be the case's holding, the Court stated:
"In sum, we hold that, in a case such as this, absent proof of false
statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's exercise
of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish
the basis for his dismissal from public employment. ' '1 7 In a footnote,
the Court observed that situations might arise in which a teacher's
public statements could be "so without foundation as to call into question his fitness to perform his duties in the classroom," in which case

43. See Developments in the Law - Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1769
(1984) (criticizing the "Court's consistent failure to identify and elaborate public employees'
interests in expression").
44. See supra text accompanying notes 13 and 35.
45. See infra text accompanying note 47. The Supreme Court again referred to public
employees' First Amendment speech rights in its most recent decision, Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987). See infra text accompanying notes 474-507.
46. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-72.
47. Id. at 575. In a footnote, the Court noted that it had concluded that Pickering's statements were not knowingly or recklessly false and that it therefore need not decide whether
even statements that were knowingly or recklessly false might also be protected, so long as no
harmful effects could be shown or reasonably presumed. Id.
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such statements would merely be evidence of the teacher's general
lack of competence. Dismissal on that basis would not violate the First
Amendment.4 The Court concluded that Pickering's erroneous public
statements, though critical of his ultimate employer, 49 were "neither
shown nor [could they] be presumed to have in any way either impeded
the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom
or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally."5o

In the course of its discussion, the Court observed that there could
be a wide range of "fact situations in which critical statements by
teachers and other public employees may be thought by their superiors
to furnish grounds for dismissal."51 It therefore did not attempt "to
lay down a general standard" against which all such statements might
be judged, but instead undertook to "indicate some of the general
lines along which an analysis of the controlling interests should run"
when balancing First Amendment claims against state interests.52 The
Court identified a number of situations in which an employee's criticisms could impact adversely on agency operations. (1.) Where the
speaker would normally be in daily contact with those toward whom
his statements were directed. In such a situation, there could be
some "question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors
or harmony among coworkers." 54 (2.) The Court noted that Pickering's
relationships with the board and superintendent were "not the kind
of close working relationships for which it can persuasively be claimed
that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper
functioning." 5 (3.) Finally, the Court observed that there are "positions in public employment in which the relationship between superior
and subordinate is of such a personal and intimate nature that certain
forms of public criticism of the superior by the subordinate would

48. Id. at 573; see, e.g., Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976).
49. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572. The Court referred, implicitly, to the School Board. Arguably, the ultimate employer of both Pickering and the Board was the district's tax-paying
"citizenry." Often both Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit opinions tend to equate officials or
supervisory personnel with "the government" and fail to recognize that such officials and personnel are merely higher ranking employees whose concerns or interests do not necessarily coincide
with those of "the government." Id.
50. Id. at 572, 573.
51. Id. at 568.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 570.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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seriously undermine the effectiveness of the working relationship between them. " In common, these are all situations where the employee's speech interferes with working relationships necessary for the
agency's efficient performance. The Court carefully distinguished between merely offending superiors and actually impairing such relationships: although Pickering's letter tended to anger the board, "there
'' 57
was no evidence that it interfered with working relationships.
On the side of Pickering's speech "interests," the Court characterized the question of school funding as "a matter of legitimate public
concern" regarding which "free and open debate is vital to informed
decision-making by the electorate." Since teachers are in a position
to contribute to such debate by virtue of having "informed and definite
opinions" as to school funding and operations, it is "essential that they
be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory
dismissal. 5 9 Because the Court found protected speech on the one
hand, and no evidence that this speech had adversely affected the
efficient performance of public services, it did not actually have to
engage in "balancing" or weighing competing interests. Pickering's
speech interest easily prevailed. In addition, the Court suggested that
the board could have used less intrusive means in promoting its interests: "The Board could easily have rebutted appellant's errors by
publishing the accurate figures itself, either in a letter to the same
newspaper or otherwise." 6° Pickering's "less intrusive means" test
presumably remains good law even though it has seldom been applied,
61
or even mentioned, in subsequent public employee free speech cases.
Necessarily, Pickering became the basis for later Fifth and
Eleventh Circuit analysis of public employee speech claims. In addition, three other pre-partition Supreme Court decisions - Perry, Mt.
Healthy, and Givhan - form the backdrop for subsequent lower federal court cases applying Pickering. This article considers each of
these decisions, noting their effects on Fifth Circuit jurisprudence.

56.

Id.

57. Id. at 569-70.
58. Id. at 571-72.
59. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.
60.

Id.

61. Cases that do mention or apply the test include McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936,
939 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding "no less restrictive means of dealing with problem plaintiff presented"); Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 779 (5th Cir. 1979). The test also may have been
utilized implicitly in Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 774-75 (11th Cir. 1991)(finding
discharge constitutional based, in part, on special need for discipline in police forces).
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Attention is next directed to Fifth Circuit and then to early Eleventh
Circuit application of Pickering.
Both Keyishian and Pickering concerned teachers with tenure or
continuing contract whose employment was terminated because of
their speech. In both cases, the Supreme Court found that these
retaliatory terminations violated the teachers' First Amendment
speech rights or interests. Might a teacher without tenure be terminated for exercising his or her speech rights?
3. Perry v. Sindermann:6 Before and After in the Fifth Circuit
Professor Sindermann was a faculty member at Odessa Junior College in Texas. None of its faculty had been accorded formal tenured
status, but the official college handbook indicated that all faculty could
consider themselves tenured informally.63 Moreover, Sindermann
might have been entitled to tenure under Texas law. 64 During the
1968-69 academic year, Sindermann was president of the Texas Junior
College Teachers Association. As such, on several occasions he testified
before Texas legislative committees, despite College officials' refusal
to grant him permission to do so. He also associated with a group
that advocated changing the college from a two-year to a four-year
institution, a change opposed by the College Board of Regents. In
May 1969, the Board voted not to renew Sindermann's contract. It
provided him neither a statement of reasons nor a hearing to challenge
its non-renewal decision.
Sindermann sued in federal district court claiming that the Board's
decision not to rehire him was in retaliation for his exercise of First
Amendment rights, and that the Board's failure to provide a hearing
violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights.5 The
Fifth Circuit held that even if Sindermann did not have a contractual
right to continuing employment, he had a constitutional "right not to
be punished by the State or to suffer retaliation at its hand because
[he persisted] in the exercise of First Amendment rights. .. "6 The

62. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
63. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 940 (5th Cir., affd, 408 U.S. 593 (1970).
64. Perry, 408 U.S. at 600, 600 n.6.
65. Numerous Supreme Court, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit cases have addressed Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights of teachers and other public employees. These issues are not
considered in this article, except where the employees' First Amendment speech rights are
implicated.
66. Sindermann, 430 F.2d at 942 (quoting Pred v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 415 F.2d
851, 856 (5th Cir. 1969)). The Sindermann court went on to specify that if a teacher without
tenure or contractual expectancy of re-employment believes that non-renewal "is really a form
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court dismissed the Board's claim that it could constitutionally refuse
to renew Sindermann's contract on the ground that he had deliberately
disobeyed administrative directions refusing him permission to testify
before the legislature:
We reject the sophistry which would recognize that the college could not withhold renewal of Sindermann's contract
because of his association with the Committee to Elevate
Odessa College or because of his exercise of a reasonable
right to petition the legislature by attending committee hearings but, at the same time, recognize a right in the college
administration to direct him not to exercise these rights
[and] then refuse
to renew his contract for disobedience of
67
their orders.
The Supreme Court affirmed, citing Pickering for the proposition
that "a teacher's public criticism of his superiors on matters of public
concern may be constitutionally protected and may, therefore, be an
impermissible basis for termination of his employment. "6 Perry'sprincipal contribution to developing Supreme Court public employee First
Amendment free speech jurisprudence is expressed in the following
excerpt:
[E]ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may
deny him the benefit for any number or reasons, there are
some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected interests - especially his interest in freedom of speech.69
Thus the Court made clear that the state could not deny continuing
employment to a non-tenured teacher, or one without "expectancy"
of continuing employment, for constitutionally impermissible reasons. 70

of punishment for his exercise of constitutional rights," he may seek administrative review of
his claim with appropriate due process. Id.
67. Id. at 943.
68. Perry, 408 U.S. at 599 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). The Supreme Court did not
specifically address Sindermann's right of association and petition claims. See Sinderman, 430
F.2d at 940. It did examine closely Sindermann's procedural due process claim. Perry, 408 U.S.
at 600-03. That aspect of its decision is not reviewed here.
69. Perry, 408 U.S. at 597.
70. The court cited Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960) as authority for "application" of the principle here articulated. Perry, 408 U.S. at 597.
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The quoted language evidently covers other types of public employees besides teachers. In due course, the Supreme Court and the Fifth
Circuit would extend its application accordingly.71 The greater number
of public employee speech cases nevertheless continued for some time
to arise in the context of schools and colleges. The next two Supreme
Court decisions, Mt. Healthy and Givhan, were no exceptions. Before
turning to these late 1970s cases, this article will first review a number
of Fifth Circuit decisions related to Perry.
The Fifth Circuit anticipated the Supreme Court's Perry doctrine
in other earlier cases involving teachers: Ferguson v. Thomas72 and
Pred v. Board of Public Instruction.73 The Ferguson court held:
While he has no right to continued public employment...
a teacher may neither be dismissed [n]or not rehired for
constitutionally impermissible reasons such as race, religion,
or the assertion of rights guaranteed by law or the Constitution. This rationale would even apply to a74teacher without
tenure or an expectancy of reemployment.
Subsequent Fifth Circuit decisions proceeded to apply Perry in a variety of school and college cases where teachers without tenure or continuing contract alleged that they had been punished for exercising
First Amendment rights or interests. Such cases included, for example, fact situations where a spouse was transferred to another department ostensibly because of a new anti-nepotism policy that applied
only to her; 75 where teachers' dismissal was held to have violated their
freedom of association; 76 where teachers disobeyed orders to avoid
racial or other controversial topics in the classroom; 7- where a school
principal asked the local newspaper to print a retraction in order to

71. See infra notes 110, 118-19 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 169-73,
371-507.
72. 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
73. 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969).
74. Ferguson, 430 F.2d at 857. The Ferguson court went on to describe with exceptional
clarity the further inquiries as to causation and balancing appropriate under Pickering in such
circumstances. Id. at 858-59.
75. Lewis v. Spencer, 468 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1972).
76. Hastings v. Bonner, 578 F.2d 136, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Professional Ass'n
of College Educators v. El Paso County Community College, 730 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984) (a post-partition case).
77. Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980); Kaprelian
v. Texas Woman's Univ., 509 F.2d 133, 139 (5th Cir. 1975).
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make clear that he had not attended a controversial meeting; 7 and
where a school superintendent's recommendation concerning classroom
construction differed from the school board majority's plans.- More
recently, since partition, the Fifth Circuit clarified this basic principle
in terms that distinguish between First Amendment and procedural
due process claims:
First Amendment employment termination cases are unlike
cases that arise out of transgressions of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. In Fourteenth Amendment [due
process] wrongful discharge cases, both rights and remedies
depend upon the individual's having a property interest in
his job. Here, however, [the employee] need not show a
property interest in order to assert his constitutional rights
to freedom of speech and freedom of association 0
Implicitly, the court seemed to be saying that First Amendment speech
and association rights are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment
as liberty interests, whether or not property interests are implicated.
Perry itself seemed to say that under Board of Regents v. Roth,81 a
nontenured teacher who could show that a decision not to rehire him
deprived him of a liberty interest was entitled to a due process hearing
before the non-renewal decision was effectuated. 2
B. Mt. Healthy, Givhan, and Fifth Circuit Precursorsand Progeny
Pickering laid out the basic components for proof and appellate
review in cases where public employees claimed that superior officials
had retaliated against them for exercising First Amendment speech
rights. But Pickering had been silent on two important questions.
Suppose a public employee was dismissed (or otherwise penalized) not
only for exercising her protected speech right, but for constitutionally
permissible reasons as well. Would she still be entitled to some kind
of relief? Or suppose a public employee who was concerned about his
agency's operations expressed those concerns privately to his adminis-

78. Stapp v. Avoyelles Parish Sch. Bd., 545 F.2d 527, 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1977)(finding that
minimum due process must be afforded where principal was discharged for his "failure to keep
his mouth shut and follow whatever direction he [the School Board President] chose" (alteration
in original)).
79. Roane v. Callisburg Indep. Sch. Dist., 511 F.2d 633, 636-37, 640 (5th Cir. 1975).
80. Professional Ass'n, 730 F.2d at 267.
81. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).

82.

Id. at 599.
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trative superior instead of raising them for public debate in the media
or before public gatherings. Would such privately communicated statements or concerns be protected under Pickering's reading of the First
Amendment? The court took up these questions in two late 1970s
cases, Mt. Healthy, and Givhan, respectively.
1. Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle '
Mr. Doyle, an untenured high school teacher in Ohio, served several
years under a series of one- or two-year contracts. During 1969-70,
he was president of the local Teachers' Association, and served as a
member of its executive committee in 1970-71. Evidently he would
have received tenure if he had been re-hired for the 1971-72 school
year . 5 During 1970 and early 1971, Doyle figured in a series of episodes
unrelated to his Teachers' Association responsibilities. He called some
students "sons of bitches" in one incident, and directed "an obscene
gesture" at two other students while serving as cafeteria supervisor.
Another time, he telephoned a local radio station and described the
substance of the principal's recently circulated memorandum setting
forth a dress code for teachers. The Court found that the code "was
apparently prompted by the view of some in the administration that
there was a relationship between teacher appearance and public support for bond issues."8 The station immediately reported the dress
code as a news item. A month later, the School Board accepted the
superintendent's recommendation not to rehire Doyle. Its statement
of reasons referred only to the "radio station" and "obscene gesture"
incidents. 8
The district court held that Doyle's call to the radio station "was
'clearly protected by the First Amendment'," and that because it had
played a "substantial part" in the Board's decision not to rehire him,
Doyle was entitled to reinstatement with back pay. 89 The Sixth Circuit
affirmed.-

83. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
84. Id. at 281. The lower court opinions were not published. Doyle v. Mt. Healthy Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1975).
85. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 286. "[T]he current decision to rehire will accord 'tenure'."
Id. The Court did not explain whose "decision" "will" (or would) have had that effect or why
it would have done so. Id.
86. Id. at 282.
87.

Id.

88.
89.
90.

Id. at 282-83, 283 n.1.
Id. at 283.
Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1975):
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The Supreme Court accepted the district court's conclusion that
"Doyle's action in making the [dress code] memorandum public" was
protected by the First Amendment.91 But it did not agree that the
Board's violation of Doyle's constitutional rights necessarily entitled
him to reinstatement with back pay9 or other "remedial action."9 The
district court had stated, "If a non-permissible reason, e.g., exercise
of First Amendment rights, played a substantial part in the decision
not to renew - even in the face of other permissible grounds - the
decision may not stand." The Supreme Court rejected this "substantial part" rationale and, instead, set out a two-part causation theory
for application in future public employee speech rights proof and
analysis: First, the employee has the burden of showing "that his
conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a
'substantial factor' - or, in other words, that it was a 'motivating
factor' in the [agency superior's] decision not to rehire him." 95 If the
employee meets this requirement, the burden then shifts to the defendant-superior or agency to show "by a preponderance of the evidence"
that it would have reached the same decision as to [the plaintiffs]
reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct." Thus
the central holding in Mt. Healthy is that a governmental superior
may constitutionally retaliate against an employee for exercising his
First Amendment speech rights so long as the superior can show that
she would have taken the same disciplinary action anyway on other,
but constitutionally permissible, grounds.Y
The Court maintained that it was necessary to give a governmental
superior opportunity to prove that she would have reached the same
conclusion anyway. Otherwise, the Court feared, an employee who
deserved to be dismissed might somehow, by engaging in constitutionally protected conduct, "prevent his employer from assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of

91. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 284.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 285.
94. Id. at 284.
95. Id. at 287. The Court oddly refers to Doyle's "conduct" rather than his "speech" or
"expression." Id. at 287.
96. Id. at 287.
97. The Mt. Healthy Court referred only to termination or non-renewal of employment;
but it presumably meant this two-part causation formula to apply to other types of retaliation
or discipline, such as suspension, demotion, re-assignment to other duties, and salary reduction.
At all events, later Fifth and Eleventh Circuit cases so applied the formula. See infra notes
122-23 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 198, 291.
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that record"; such an employee would thereby be placed "in a better
position as a result of the exercising of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing." The Court
was concerned that the "substantial part" standard articulated by the
district court "would require reinstatement in cases where a dramatic
and perhaps abrasive incident is inevitably on the minds of those
responsible for the decision to rehire, and does indeed play a part in
that decision - even if the same decision would have been reached
had the incident not occurred." Evidently the Court doubted that
under such circumstances the employee's superiors would be able to
ground their decisions solely on constitutionally permissible grounds. °
Commentators have sharply criticized the Court's holding and reasoning in Mt. Healthy.10 1
Mt. Healthy presents the lower courts with certain conceptual
difficulties. In theory, retaliation against an employee for exercising
her speech right would violate the First Amendment if the superior's
decision was based on an aggregate of constitutionally permissible
reasons, none of which, separately, or all together, would have prompted the superior to act, but which, when combined with offense at the
employee's constitutionally protected speech, did in fact cause the
employer to terminate her employment. Such would be the case even
if the employee's constitutionally protected speech was only the "last
straw." In Mt. Healthy itself, and in most cases involving both constitutionally permissible and impermissible reasons, superiors typically
have not listed two sets of alternative grounds: constitutionally permis-

98. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285.
99. Id.
100. Cf. Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding that the employersupervisors had based their decision not to re-hire solely on constitutionally permissible grounds,
notwithstanding various dramatic and abrasive incidents).
101. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public
Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 3, 18-20 (1987)(criticizing Mt. Healthy for inviting governmental superiors to punish employees for exercising First Amendment rights and then invent
pretexts for so doing); Michael S. Wolly, What Hath Mt. Healthy Wrought?, 41 OHIO ST. L.J.
350, 394-95 (1980)(for failing to put governmental superiors on notice that their decision-making
process is constitutionally defective and trivializes such constitutional violations 'to the point of
irrelevancy"); Theodore F. Haas, Note, FreeSpeech and Impermissible Motive in the Dismissal
of PublicEmployees, 89 YALE L.J. 376, 393 (1979)(arguing that Mt. Healthy requires fact-finders
to speculate as to what superiors would have done if the latter had not violated employees'
rights); Note, The NonpartisanFreedom of Expression of Public Employees, 76 MICH. L. REV.
365, 378 (1977) (disapproving Mt. Healthy's failure to recognize that it was the governmental
superiors' "attempt to punish constitutionally protected behavior, not the employee's exercise
of a constitutional right" that placed the employee "in a better position").
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sible, and the employee's speech. Instead, their decisions generally
appear to have been prompted by particular conglomerations of
reasons. It seems unnecessarily deferential to governmental agencies
or superiors in such circumstances to permit them, in effect, to re-write
the record by introducing evidence, after the fact, in order to show
that they would have terminated1° (or otherwise disciplined) plaintiff
employees on only constitutionally permissible grounds when it has
already been established that they acted, in part, on the basis of
constitutionally impermissible reasons. The government's or superior's
task here is to make the court (or trier of fact) accept as the reason
for taking disciplinary action what had been in fact, only a reason,
namely, the constitutionally permissible grounds. Where such agencies
or superiors then succeed in so doing, the effect is to leave plaintiff-employees whose First Amendment rights have been violated without
relief - other, perhaps, than nominal damages.103
As a matter of policy, it would be better to deny governmental
agencies or superiors this opportunity to escape liability for violating
employees' speech rights, and instead, to require that they act in the
first place only on constitutionally permissible grounds. The Court's
concern that an employee who is otherwise a candidate for proper
dismissal could, by exercising his free speech rights, prevent his agency
superiors from appraising the adequacy of his performance and thereby
save his job is far-fetched. 104 Even if such a situation should arise,
there is nothing to prevent a governmental employer or superior from
basing disciplinary actions entirely on constitutionally permissible
grounds, as was found to have been done in earlier cases reviewed
by the Fifth Circuit. 105 Mt. Healthy unnecessarily affords governmental
"employers" or superiors free license to violate employees' First
Amendment rights with impunity.
A public employee's First Amendment speech rights are "sufficiently vindicated," the Court concluded, "if such an employee is placed

102. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
103. See Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 493 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 654 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1981)(en banc).
104. A post-partition Fifth Circuit opinion picturesquely visualizes an extreme instance of
such a scenario: "One does not always insure his own retention in his employment by wrapping
oneself in the First Amendment and launching attacks on one's employer from within its folds."
Truly v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 673 F.2d 763, 767 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982).
Notwithstanding this rhetorical flourish, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the
employee was not dismissed because of his speech, but because of his constitutionally unprotected
conduct. Id. at 766-67.
105. See, e.g., Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976); Moore v. Winfield
City Bd. of Educ., 452 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1971).
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in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct." 1 0"
On remand, the district court found on the basis of the original record
that the Board had established by a preponderance of evidence that
it would not have re-hired Doyle because of the other incidents. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the "obscene gesture" and "s.o.b." incidents.1- Mt. Healthy necessarily had the effect of making it more
difficult for public employees to obtain relief when their superiors
dismissed or otherwise punished them for exercising First Amendment
rights. The decision impacted directly upon developing Fifth Circuit
case law.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Mt. Healthy, it was established law in the Fifth Circuit that if a person's employment was
terminated even partly on the basis of his having exercised constitutionally protected rights, the entire process was defective, and the
employee was entitled to relief.'- It was already clear, of course, that
plaintiff-employees had the burden of showing that any sanctions or
penalties imposed on them resulted from the exercise of their speech
rights. 9 Fifth Circuit case law thus made explicit what was implicit
in Keyishian, Pickering,and Perry, and then identified in Mt. Healthy
as the first level of causation proof and analysis. Under Pickering, of
course, an employee's exercise of speech rights might be so disruptive
as to be overbalanced by governmental interests adversely affected
it.110 Thus even without Mt. Healthy's second-level causation test, a
disruptive employee could be terminated lawfully.
Often in pre-Mt. Healthy employee speech cases, the Fifth Circuit
determined that the defendant's reasons for taking disciplinary action

106. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285-86.
107. Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 670 F.2d 59, 61 (6th Cir. 1982).
As noted supra in text accompanying note 88, the Board had not included the "s.o.b." incident
in its statement of reasons for Doyle's termination.
108. Megill, 541 F.2d at 1080; Fluker v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 441 F.2d 201, 210
(5th Cir. 1971).
109. Megill, 541 F.2d at 1078; Moore v. Winfield City Bd. of Educ., 452 F.2d 726, 727 (5th
Cir. 1971); Fluker, 441 F.2d at 205.
110. See, e.g., Duke v. North Texas St. Univ., 469 F.2d 829, 837-38 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973)(university's interest in maintaining a competent faculty and public
confidence); Moore, 452 F.2d at 728 ("the need for orderly school administration"); Ferguson v.
Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 859 (5th Cir. 1970)(state's interest in providing public services efficiently
through its employees); Pred v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 415 F.2d 851, 859 (5th Cir. 1969)(the
reasonable demands of a system of organized, responsible learning); see also Battle v. Mulholland,
439 F.2d 321, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1971)(first Fifth Circuit case applying Pickering to employees
other than teachers).
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both were adequate and had not violated the teacher's First Amendment speech interests.1" In these cases, therefore, balancing was not
required because there had been no constitutional violation. Sometimes, however, the court oddly concluded that it was unnecessary
even to hear evidence supporting a discharged public employees constitutional claim where the defendants had presented sufficient constitutionally neutral grounds. 112 "Otherwise," the Fifth Circuit
explained, "we would be placed in the anomalous position of ordering
the reinstatement of an unsuitable employee merely because he has
exercised his freedom of speech.11 In this latter line of cases, the
Fifth Circuit anticipated the Mt. Healthy Court's concern lest a government agency might not be able to discharge an employee if its
reasons for so doing embraced both constitutionally permissible and
impermissible reasons.
In summary, before Mt. Healthy, Fifth Circuit jurisprudence had
established that a public employee could not be terminated for exercising her First Amendment speech right even if the termination was
based on constitutionally permissible reasons as well - unless Pickering balancing revealed that governmental interests outweighed that
right. On the other hand, the court sometimes held that it was not
necessary to consider an employee's constitutional claim if the employer had proven that its termination decision was based on constitutionally neutral grounds. These two lines of cases appear inconsistent.
Everything seemed to depend on whether the defendant-employer
could convince the court as to the validity of its reasons before the
plaintiff-employee could introduce evidence that she was discharged,
even in part, for exercising her speech rights. This inconsistency was
dissipated by Mt. Healthy, which clarified the order and attendant
shifting burdens of proof.
Several early post-Mt. Healthy Fifth Circuit decisions turned on
the first-level causation question: whether plaintiff-employees had

111. See, e.g., Megill, 541 F.2d at 1082; Bradford v. Tarrant County Jr. College Dist., 492
F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1974); Moore, 452 F.2d at 727.
112. Robison v. Wichita Falls & N. Tex. Comm. Action Corp., 507 F.2d 245, 254-56 (5th
Cir. 1975) (employee's submission of fraudulent travel vouchers); see also Stapp v. Avoyelles
Parish Sch. Bd., 545 F.2d 527, 534 (5th Cir. 1977)(evidently decided before Mt. Healthy, but
reported six days after the latter was announced); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 858-59
(5th Cir. 1970)(holding that constitutional claims "may and should be avoided if valid... grounds
are shown to have been the basis of the institution's action"). In these cases the court appears
to have overlooked the possibility that the agency superiors' "neutral" grounds may have been
pretextual.
113. Robison, 507 F.2d at 254.
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shown that they were discharged or otherwise sanctioned because of
their speech. For example, in Carmichaelv. Chambers County Board
of Education,114 the court upheld the district court's grant of summary
judgment for defendants, holding that the plaintiff's evidence did not
establish that "retaliation was a 'motivating' factor" in their determination to terminate her employment. Carmichael is of particular interest in that it maintains that Mt. Healthy endorsed the court's earlier
doctrine enunciated in Fluker to the effect that "a decision not to
renew a teacher's contract violates constitutional rights even if it is
only 'partially in retaliation' for the exercise of those rights.'115 Since
Mt. Healthy, of course, that doctrine would only apply to the first
level of causation inquiry. Significantly, Carmichael specified that an
employee's First Amendment rights are violated at the time her
1 16
superior retaliated against her for exercising them.
Mt. Healthy's second-level causation analysis also came into play
in early Fifth Circuit progeny. An easy case is presented either where
the state agency's sole reason for non-renewal is found to have been
the employee's exercise of First Amendment speech rights, or, conversely, where the agency superior submitted unrebutted evidence
that he would have taken the same action wholly apart from the
employee's speech.17 In what evidently was its first case applying Mt.
Healthy's second-level causation analysis, Garza v. Rodriguez,18 the
court observed that the district court had found that the employee
could have been fired for both constitutionally permissible and impermissible reasons, and therefore vacated its pre-Mt. Healthy holding

114. 581 F.2d 95, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Stewart v. Bailey, 556 F.2d 281, 287 (5th
Cir. 1977)(Goldberg, J., dissenting). "A dismissal even partially based on the exercise of First
Amendment rights is unconstitutional." Id.
115. Carmichael, 581 F.2d at 97; see also Hastings v. Bonner, 578 F.2d 136, 141 (5th Cir.
1978). Even if the defendant's decision not to renew plaintiffs contract "was only 'partially in
retaliation' for her exercise of her freedom of association, he has violated her constitutional
rights." Id.
116. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. The question when speech rights are said
to be constitutionally protected and therefore subject to violation is critical in connection with
the question whether or when defendant agency superiors can claim qualified immunity. See
infra text accompanying notes 910-45.
117. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Board of Regents, 607 F.2d 672, 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1979); Tanner
v. McCall, 625 F.2d 1183, 1195-96 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 907 (1980).
118. 559 F.2d 259 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 877 (1977)(county probation officer
discharged for announcing that he intended to sue police for their alleged misconduct while
arresting him for drunkenness).
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in his favor. 1 9 In another case, Stone v. Board of Regents,120 the Fifth
Circuit concluded that even if it assumed that the Board had retaliated
against the plaintiff for exercising his speech rights, the Board "would
have reached the same decision as to Stone's salary ... in the absence
of the protected conduct," inasmuch as the salary schedule in question
applied to all faculty similarly situated.'12 Stone is also of interest
because it is the first Fifth Circuit decision applying Perry and Mt.
Healthy, and thus, implicitly, Pickering,to cases of alleged retaliation
other than termination of employment:
For the sake of this discussion, we will assume that the
denial of any increase in salary, or the granting of an allegedly inadequate raise, if done in retaliation for the exercise of a professor's First Amendment rights, is an actionable
injury, although we do not decide that question here.- =
Later Fifth Circuit cases have held that other forms of retaliation
were actionable. 12 In the great majority of public employee speech
cases in the Fifth, and later in the Eleventh Circuits, the challenged
retaliation took the form of discharge or nonrenewal.
All three subsequent Supreme Court public employee speech cases
arose in the Fifth Circuit. One, Givhan, was handed down prior to
October 1, 1981. The others, Connick and Rankin, were decided after
partition. The issue in Givhan was relatively simple: whether communications between employees and administrative superiors made pri-

119. Id. at 261-62. Garza is another relatively early decision applying Perryand Mt. Healthy
to public employees other than teachers.
120. 620 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980).
121. Id. at 529-30. Here it appears that the court actually decided the case on the basis of
first-level causation analysis. Id.
122. Id. at 529. In a footnote, the court observed that the Circuits were then split on the
question whether retaliation in forms other than non-renewal or discharge was actionable. Id.
at 529 n.7. Later Supreme Court cases, Givhan, Connick, and Rankin, all involved non-renewal
or dismissal. The pre-partition Fifth Circuit held that even placing a letter of reprimand in an
employees' personnel file could violate his speech rights..Swilley v. Alexander, 629 F.2d 1018,
1019-21 (5th Cir. 1980); accord, Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833, 837 n.9 (11th Cir. 1982).
123. See, e.g., Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1980) (denial of promotion);
Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1003 (1989)(temporary
suspension without pay and demotion); Allaire v. Rogers, 658 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1981) (denial
of salary increase). The court had earlier held that transferring a faculty member from one
department to another in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment speech rights could
be redressed. Lewis v. Spencer, 468 F.2d 553, 554, 557 (5th Cir. 1972).
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vately were entitled to the same protection as those offered before
the media or at public gatherings.
2. Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 24
Ms. Givhan taught in a rural Mississippi school district. 125 Pursuant
to recommendation by her principal, Mr. Leach, her contract was
terminated in 1971.126 There had been a number of "encounters" between Givhan and Leach during the 1970-71 school year. In particular,
Leach complained that she had "hampered" his work "by making petty
and unreasonable demands."'- She had given him a number of lists
of various "demands" or "requests" which the court described as follows:
These requests all reflect Givhan's concern as to the impressions on black students of the respective roles of whites and
blacks in the school environment. She "requested," among
other things: (1) that black people be placed in the cafeteria
to take up tickets, jobs Givhan considered "choice"; (2) that
the administrative staff be better integrated; and (3) that
black Neighborhood Youth Corps

. .

. workers be assigned

semi-clerical office tasks instead of only janitorial-type
work. 8
Leach considered these requests unreasonable, viewing them as "manifestations . . . of Givhan's antagonistic and hostile attitude" toward

the school administration.19 The district court held that the school
authorities' decision to terminate Givhan's employment was in retaliation for her First Amendment expressions, and ordered her reinstated
with back pay.1 ' The Fifth Circuit reversed, among other reasons,
on the ground that the First Amendment speech clause only protected
'
employee expressions uttered in "the arena of public discussion."131

124. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
125. Ayers v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 555 F.2d 1309, 1311 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated
in part sub nom. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
126. Ayers, 555 F.2d at 1312.
127. Id. at 1312-13.
128.

Id. at 1313.

129. Id.
130. Id. at 1311; Ayers v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 404 F. Supp. 1225, 1227 (N.D.
Miss. 1975), rev'd 555 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated in part sub nom. Givhan v. Western
Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
131. Ayers, 555 F.2d at 1317, 1319-20.
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The court felt justified in so holding because the "three leading Supreme Court cases on teacher dismissals and freedom of speech,"
Pickering, Perry, and Mt. Healthy, all concerned public debate, comment, or criticism.132
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth
Circuit's judgment and remanded so that the district court could apply
Mt. Healthy second-level causation inquiry. 133 Here the Court for the
first time characterized that inquiry as a "but for" test: the main
question to be considered on remand was whether Ms. Givhan "would
have been rehired but for her criticism."' 34 The Court also may have
remanded for Pickering balancing.-3 The gist of Givhan is expressed
as follows: "The First Amendment forbids abridgment of the 'freedom
of speech.' Neither the Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate
that this freedom is lost to the public employee who arranges to
communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his
views before the public."',- As will be seen, later lower court decisions
37
did not always bear this declaration in mind
The Supreme Court's opinion in Givhan also is important because
it added some special considerations or "factors" that could be applied
when balancing private expression against governmental interests.
Although the First Amendment's protection of government
employees extends to private as well as public expression,
striking the Pickering balance in each context may involve
different considerations. When a teacher speaks publicly, it
is generally the content of his statements that must be assessed to determine whether they "in any way either impeded
the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the
classroom or . . . interfered with the regular operation of
the schools generally. . . ." Private expression, however,
may in some situations bring additional factors to the Picker-

132. Id. at 1316-18. The court noted that its own prior cases carried 'the strong implication
. that private expression by a public employee [was] not constitutionally protected." Id. at
1318. The opinion cited no conflicting case law in other circuits. Evidently Ayers presented a
case of first impression.
133. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 417-18.
134. Id. at 417.
135. Id. at 414 n.4. It is unclear whether the Court here intended that the district court
should engage in further balancing, or instead meant only to set out considerations for balancing
in other cases that might arise. Id.
136. Id. at 415, 416.
137. See infra note 547 and text accompanying notes 547-58.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' SPEECH RIGHTS

ing calculus. When a government employee personally confronts his immediate superior, the employing agency's institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of the employee's message but also by the manner,
time, and place in which it is delivered. 13
Here these "factors" are said to be relevant only in the case of private
expression, and then only when a government employee personally
confronts his immediate superior. Later, without explanation, the Supreme Court would apply these "manner, time, and place" factors to
139
public expression and in the absence of personal confrontation.
The Fifth Circuit promptly proceeded to apply Givhan in other
cases. In Kingsville Independent School District v. Cooper,'14 the court
found that a teacher's in-class discussion of subject-matter was private
expression, and thus protected by the First Amendment.' 41 In another
case, the court held that a college faculty member's private expressions
as a member of a dean search committee would be protected under
Givhan, provided they addressed a matter of public concern.142 As will
be seen, whether an employee's speech related to matters of public
issue in later public employee First
concern was to become a critical
43
Amendment jurisprudence.1
Pickering intentionally refrained from laying out a step-by-step
format for analyzing public employee speech claims.- Perry, Mt. Healthy, and Givhan clarified some matters and added a few further considerations; but none of these later cases set out a systematic analytical
framework either. It is understandable, therefore, that the Circuit
Courts had to try to resolve a number of unanswered questions as
best they could.
M

C. Fifth Circuit Case Law from Pickering to Partition
The effects of Perry, Mt. Healthy, and Givhan on Fifth Circuit
decisional law have already been reviewed, but consideration of that
court's application of Pickering's various factors has been deferred
until now. No single analytical model emerged in the Fifth Circuit's

138. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415 (citations omitted).
139. See infra text accompanying notes 458-59, 495-98.
140. 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980).
141. The court noted that in so holding, it joined two other circuits that had reached the
same conclusion before Givhan. Id. at 1113.
142. Stone v. Board of Regents, 620 F.2d 526, 528 (5th Cir. 1980).
143. See infra text accompanying notes 165-95, 519-615.
144. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
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approach to public employee speech litigation in the period between
Pickering and the court's partition in 1981. A number of issues were
resolved, however, and several new factors, doctrines and tests were
developed. Because the Fifth Circuit's decisional law as of October 1,
1981, has precedential importance for the Eleventh Circuit, 145 it is
appropriate to examine that law closely. Which of its features may
have been overruled by later Supreme Court decisions, of course, is
146
another question.
1. The Analytical Model or Framework
Pickering primarily had to do with balancing, on one hand, the
employee's interests "as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern," and on the other, the State's interest, as employer,
"in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees. '' 147 Perry made clear that untenured teachers' speech
was entitled to First Amendment protection. Mt. Healthy added a
two-level causation inquiry: first, whether the employee's constitutionally protected speech was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the
agency superior's decision to take disciplinary action; and second, if
the first test was met, whether agency officials could show that they
would have taken the same disciplinary action for constitutionally permissible reasons anyway. 8 Givhan added that private speech - that
is, a public employee's speech privately communicated to her agency
superior - was within the First Amendment, and then enumerated
some further considerations that might indicate whether private
speech uttered in the context of a "personal confrontation" with an
immediate superior would adversely affect governmental interest.
But where should analysis begin, and in what sequence should it
proceed? Should it begin with first-level causation inquiry, that is, by
determining whether the complaining employee was in fact punished
for speaking? Or should analysis begin by asking whether the employee's speech actually interfered with the agency's performance of public
services? 149 Or by determining whether the employee's speech was
protected under the First Amendment? Did Pickering mean that a
public employee had a First Amendment speech right only if his speech

145. See supra note 8.
146. See infra parts III and IV of this article.
147. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
148. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
149. See Roane v. Callisburg Indep. Sch. Dist., 511 F.2d 633,640 (5th Cir. 1975), quoted
infra text accompanying note 201.
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addressed a matter of public concern? And if all these questions were
resolved, should the court proceed with balancing, or should it first
give the agency superior opportunity to show that she would have
taken the same disciplinary action even if she had not violated the
employee's First Amendment speech rights?
As has been noted, one line of pre-Mt. Healthy Fifth Circuit cases
held that inquiry should begin with the question whether the agency's
action was based on constitutionally neutral grounds, and insisted that
if so, the court should avoid considering the employee's constitutional
claims.- 5 In Van Ooteghem v. Gray,'51 a post-Mt. Healthy decision,
the court evidently approved the district court's formulation of a
"tripartite inquiry" beginning with the Mt. Healthy level-one causation
test:
1. Was Van Ooteghem's speech to the Commissioners' Court a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in his being dismissed;
2. Was this speech constitutionally protected; and
3. Would Van Ooteghem have been fired, in the absence of his
152
decision to address the Commissioners Court?
The Van Ooteghem panel focused particularly on the second of these
points and added certain refinements. The question as to whether a
given speech is "constitutionally protected," it wrote, "is more properly
phrased as to whether the government's regulation of constitutionally
protected speech is justified by a compelling state interest."'3 The en
bane court vacated the part of the panel's opinion which stated that
governmental regulation of constitutionally protected speech must be
justified by "a compelling state interest," on the ground that this issue
was not presented in the case, and so need not be decided. - The en

150. Robison, 507 F.2d at 254-55; Ferguson, 430 F.2d at 858-59; see supra notes 112-13
and accompanying text.
151. 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980), affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 654
F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1981)(en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982).
152. Van Ooteghem, 628 F.2d at 491.
153. Id. at 493 n.4 (citations omitted.); see also Battle v. Mulholland, 430 F.2d 321, 324-25
(5th Cir. 1971). The Eleventh Circuit later so held but without citation to this supposedly binding
Fifth Circuit precedent. Kurtz v. Vickrey, 855 F.2d 723, 730-31 n.5; Eiland v. City of Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953, 956-57 n.4 (11th Cir. 1986).
154. Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 654 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1981)(en banc). The court wrote, "[H]ere
the balance so clearly strikes in favor of allowing the citizen-employee to speak that no need
exists to delineate a particular standard for testing [his] rights." Id. at 306.
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bane court endorsed the panel's analytical framework and its conclusions on all other matters.As will be seen, however, pre-partition Fifth Circuit cases sometimes structured analysis otherwise; for instance, by first inquiring
whether the speech in question was constitutionally protected. For
present purposes, however, Van Ooteghem's analytical format provides
a useful framework for reviewing issues as treated in pre-partition
Fifth Circuit decisional law. This article will consider such cases
shortly.
Van Ooteghem also dealt with another aspect of public employee
speech analysis: the appropriate standards of review at each step of
the process. First, it held that whether an employee's speech was a
substantial or motivating factor in his being disciplined is ordinarily
a question of fact, subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard. 1- Second, the ultimate determination whether an employee's
speech was constitutionally protected is a question of law, implicitly
open to de novo review by the appellate court.157 However, in balancing
the affected interests "in order to assess the protected nature of a
given speech, an appellate court is constrained, absent clear error, to
follow the trial court's findings as to the amount of disruption in the
workplace caused by the employee's speech."' 1 Whether there was
such disruption and its extent, thus appeared to be questions of fact
subject to clearly erroneous review. 159 Third, Van Ooteghem specified
that Mt. Healthy's second-level or "but for" causation test is, like the
first, a question of fact subject to review under the clearly erroneous
standard. 160
In the thirteen years between Pickering and partition, it was already clear that the issues framed in Van Ooteghem as the second
question for inquiry would be the most problematic. Was the speech
constitutionally protected; and if so, was the government's regulation

155. Thus, in theory, it appeared to be settled that the question whether an employee's
speech rights had been violated is determined before the court proceeds to Pickeringbalancing.
See infra text accompanying notes 904-45.
156. Van Ooteghem, 628 F.2d at 491-92; see also Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d
915, 920 (5th Cir. 1980); Berdin v. Duggan, 701 F.2d 909, 911 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 893 (1983).
157. Van Ooteghem, 628 F.2d at 492; see also Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th
Cir. 1980); Berdin, 701 F.2d at 911.
158. Van Ooteghem, 628 F.2d at 492.
159. In its more recent decisions, the Supreme Court was particularly vague as to the
fact-law distinction and attendant standards of review in connection with determining whether
speech was protected and with Pickering balancing. See infra text accompanying note 670.
160. Van Ooteghem, 628 F.2d at 493.
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of that speech justified? 1 1 These questions would become even more
complicated after partition, and, particularly, after the next Supreme
Court decision two years later. 162
2. Protected Speech and Pickering Balancing
Several steps are implicit in this second question as formulated by
Van Ooteghem. Is the speech in question protected under the First
Amendment? If not, inquiry need proceed no further. If so, the employee's speech interests are to be "balanced" against the state's interest
in suppressing or punishing that speech. But before the interests can
be balanced, they must be identified and their importance somehow
measured or "weighed." Only then can it be determined which is of
greater importance. Issues arising in Fifth Circuit cases during this
period will now be examined following this analytical framework.
a. Is the Employee's Speech within the First Amendment?
Not all uttered words are entitled to First Amendment protection.
"Lewd, obscene, profane, slanderous 'fighting words' are excluded.'Moreover, a public employer can properly conclude that an employee
is unfit for continuing employment on the basis of employee speech
that evidences lack of requisite professional maturity, character, or
intellectual responsibility without encroaching upon the employeespeaker's constitutional rights.' 6" These points appeared to be clearly
established. The cases are much less definite with respect to another
question, however: must the employee's speech address a "matter of
public concern" in order to be accorded First Amendment protection?
Pickering had referred to "the interests of the teacher, as a citizen,
in commenting upon matters of public concern."', Did the Court mean
that it was necessary for a teacher's speech to address a matter of
public concern in order to be protected? Or did the Court mean to
leave open the question whether speech on other matters might also
come under the First Amendment's umbrella?-

161. Id. at 491, 493. The only part of the panel's decision vacated by the en banc court
was its conclusion that such regulation is justified only if the countervailing state interest is
"compelling." The balance of the panel's judgment was affirmed. Van Ooteghem, 654 F.2d at 304.
162.
163.
164.
(5th Cir.
165.
166.

See infra text accompanying notes 292-347, 519-877.
Garza v. Rodriguez, 559 F.2d 259, 260 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 877 (1977).
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573; see also Lindsey v. Board of Regents, 607 F.2d 672, 765-76
1979); Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 1085 (5th Cir. 1976).
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
"Pickering specifically referred to 'matters of public concern' because the speech at
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The holding in Pickeringdid not preclude other categories of speech
from such shelter.167 Several pre-partition Fifth Circuit cases do not
apply any "matter of public concern" test. On the other hand, some
do seem to say that the speech in question must relate to a matter
of public concern in order to qualify for constitutional protection. But
none treat this issue as "the threshold question."
i. No "Matters of Public Concern" Requirement
Numerous public employee speech cases from 1971 to 1980 either
make no mention of Pickering's "matters of public concern" language,
or merely recite the formula without applying it. 168 In two cases, the
court cited Pickering's balancing formula, but omitted its reference
to "matters of public concern." One of these was Smith v. United
States.16S9 Smith apparently was the first Fifth Circuit post-Pickering
speech case applying its formula to a federal employee. Smith was a
Veterans Administration Hospital staff psychologist who insisted on
wearing "a peace pin" while on duty. The court determined that wearing such an emblem constituted symbolic expression within the First
71
Amendment under Tinker.170 The other was Battle v. Mulholland.1
Battle was a black police officer in Carthage, Mississippi from 1966
to 1969. He and his wife had permitted two white women working in
an anti-poverty program to board at their home. City officials were
concerned that the situation might stir controversy and racial tension,

issue concerned a highly publicized local referendum. The Pickering Court had no reason to
discuss other issues about which employees might speak." The Supreme Court, 1982 Term Constitutional Law -

Freedom of Speech, Press and Association, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 167

(1983).
167.

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574; see supra text accompanying note 47; see also supra text

accompanying note 35.
168. Post-Pickeringdecisions as to public employees' First Amendment rights of association
likewise do not mention or apply a "matters of public concern" test. See Hastings v. Bonner,
578 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1978)(teacher's contract terminated after she asked the superintendent
to allow her husband and a teachers' association representative to be present when she discussed
her renewal); Lewis v. Spencer, 468 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); Orr v. Thorpe, 427 F.2d 1129
(5th Cir. 1970); see also Wilson v. Taylor, 658 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)(police officer
fired for dating daughter of a convicted felon).
169. 502 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1974) "[I]t is necessary to strike a balance between the interests
of the employee as a citizen and the interests of the government in promoting the efficiency of
the services it performs through its employees." Id. at 516-17.
170. Id. at 516 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Com. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
171. 439 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1971). "The problem is to balance the rights of the employees
as citizens against the interest of the state in promoting efficient public service." Id. at 324.
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and terminated his employment. 172 The district court entered summary
judgment for defendants. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
Battle should have opportunity to show that his termination resulted
from this violation of his right to freedom of expression.173 Neither
Smith nor Battle mentioned, much less applied, a "matters of public
concern" criterion.
Several other public employee speech cases likewise neither mentioned nor applied a "matters of public concern test." One involved a
college teacher who had testified before the state legislature in support
of a tenure bill opposed by her college's administration, and in so
testifying, criticized the college's demotion of another teacher.174
Another concerned a county probation officer who was fired after
stating that he intended to sue the police who had arrested him for
1 76
being drunk. 75 In Kingsville Independent School District v. Cooper,
the court considered a high school teacher's claim that her contract
had been terminated because school trustees objected to her controversial method of teaching the history of the post-Civil War Reconstruction era. The method involved students in role-playing, and "evoked
strong student feelings on racial issues. "177 Here again the court neither
mentioned nor applied Pickering's"matters of public concern" formula.
In some other cases, the court recited the formula, but did not consider
or determine whether the speech in question addressed a matter of
public concern. 178 From such cases as these, it could be concluded that
the Fifth Circuit did not require that a public employee's speech relate
to some matter of public concern in order to be secure under the First
Amendment against retaliatory punishment or discipline. A few cases
could be read to the contrary, however.

172. Id. at 322-23.
173. Id. at 324-25.
174. Lewis v. Spencer, 468 F.2d 553, 556-57 (5th Cir. 1972); see also D'Andrea v. Adams,
626 F.2d 469 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1980).
175. Garza v. Rodriguez, 559 F.2d 259, 260-61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 877 (1977).
176. 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980).
177. Id. at 1111.
178. See, e.g., Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1980) (fireman
complained about department's defective equipment, operation, and morale); Duke v. North
Tex. St. Univ., 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972) (teacher assistant made derogatory remarks as to
university officials and criticized the manner in which it was operated); Ferguson v. Thomas,
430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970) (college professor argued with department chair as to status and
operation of department and used classroom periods to discuss subject matter unrelated to
course).
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ii. "Matters of Public Concern" - A Requirement?
In Lindsey v. Board of Regents, 179 the Fifth Circuit accepted the
district court's finding that Prof. Lindsey's employment had been terminated because he (and other faculty) had circulated a fifteen-item
questionnaire asking fellow University of Georgia faculty's views on
a variety of issues pertaining to faculty participation in university
governance and the adequacy of the administration's decision-making
processes. 18 It then affirmed the lower court's holding that this termination violated Lindsey's First Amendment rights. Characterizing the
questionnaire, the Fifth Circuit stated:
The questionnaire solicited the views of faculty on a broad
range of issues, such as the degree of mutual confidence
existing between administration and faculty, the extent to
which good teaching and good research were rewarded, the
extent to which faculty opinions were listened to and respected, the effectiveness of the administration in dealing
with grievances, the accuracy and completeness of information used to evaluate teachers, and other matters. These are
matters of public importance and concern. Comment upon
them is protected speech under Pickering . . .and similar
cases. 181
Here, it seems, the court considered it important that the questionnaire related to "matters of public concern," but like Pickering, the
court does not say here that the questionnaire would have been unprotected if it could not have been so characterized.'2 It is noteworthy
that the court considered "speech" on matters of administrative policy,
including its handling of grievances, within the sphere of matters of
public concern.'8 In another University of Georgia case the following
year, Stone v. Board of Regents,'8 the court reiterated the "matters
of public concern" test in terms suggesting that it was a requisite for
First Amendment protection: "Stone's speech and conduct as a member
of the search committee would be constitutionally protected if addres-

179. 607 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979).
180. Id. at 673.
181. Id. at 674.
182. Id. at 675.
183. Cf. Connick and its post-partition Fifth Circuit progeny. See infra text accompanying
notes 428, 471, 563-78; Hiers, supra note 37, at 784-91.
184. 620 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980.); see also Swilley v. Alexander, 629 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir.
1980). "Professional conduct" of school principal is a matter of public concern. Id. at 1021.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' SPEECH RIGHTS

sed to a matter of public concern, even if expressed privately."111 The
court went on to state that for purposes of its analysis, Prof. Stone's
disagreement with the journalism dean concerning the former's efforts
to find "qualified minority and female dean candidates" and the latter's
interference with such efforts had "sufficient 'public' flavor to merit
protection. "18
In yet another University of Georgia case the same year, Williams
v. Board of Regents, 1' the court again factored the "matters of public
concern" consideration into its balancing analysis. Williams, a university police officer, was discharged after he complained to his superior
that an accident report he had filed was altered in order to protect
the reputation of a city official and after information about the cover-up
was "leaked" to the press.1 S While recognizing the importance of "discipline" and of avoiding "disharmony" in working relationships, the
court found these state interests outweighed by the public's interest
in knowing about matters of such importance:
Most importantly, the appellee was communicating regarding
a matter of public concern. Although it has been often stated
that First Amendment protection is not dependent upon the
"social worth" of ideas.... the nature of the communication
is relevant to the balancing of the interests of the employee
as citizen against the interest of the governmental unit.
When the matter is as important to the public as that involved here, the employee's right to speak must be vigorously protected if the public is to be informed. . . . The
falsification of an official document by one official for the
protection of another official is such a grave miscarriage of
the public trust that such conduct must be disclosed to the
public if the people are to remain the true sovereigns in this
country. 1 9
Here the fact that Williams' speech related to "a matter of public
concern" was not understood as requisite to his having a First Amendment interest in that speech; instead, the fact that the speech related

185. Stone, 620 F.2d at 528 n.3 (citing Givhan and Lindsey, but not Pickering). The court
did not explain how Stone's conduct, apart from his speech, would thereby be protected. Id.
186. Id.; see also Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1979). "If true, her charges
would be matters of current and legitimate employee and public concern." Id. at 779.
187. 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980).
188. Id. at 995-98.
189. Id. at 1003 (citations omitted).
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to a matter of public importance was a critical factor weighed in the
balance against purported state interest in suppressing that speech.
Swilley v. Alexander 9° concerned an Alabama school teacher who
was disciplined for drawing public attention to a principal's having
"allegedly caused young children to go outdoors for tornado drills
during lightning storms" and sending small children home without
notifying their parents. 191 The court read Pickering's"language regarding the need for superior-subordinate discipline and harmony" as "intended to prevent public airing of obnoxious personal vendettas," but
not to stifle discussion of such important matters as physical safety
and well-being of school children. 19 Here again, the court weighed the
importance of the matters of public concern against the speech's adverse effects on agency functioning. It had no difficulty determining
that the balance tipped in favor of the employee's speech rights. In
so doing, the court made clear that adverse effects on superior-subordinate relationships would not necessarily prove dispositive:
[O]ur experience tells us that the more important the subject
matter is to the public, the sharper the reaction will be by
those whose conduct may be called into question. It is precisely the probability of oppressive over-reaction by the powers that be which requires our constant vigilance of the First
Amendment protections accorded all public employees.93
Later Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Court decisions, unfortunately, were
not always so vigilant.'9
Taken together, these cases indicate that prior to partition, the
Fifth Circuit had not yet come to regard the question whether an
employee's speech addressed a matter of public concern as the
"threshold test" or sine qua non for First Amendment protection of
that speech. Instead, true to the apparent intent of Pickering95 these
cases show that the court considered whether employee speech implicated matters of public concern, together with the importance of such
concern as factors to be weighed in balancing employees' speech in-

190.

629 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1980).

191.
192.

Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1021.

193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Hiers, supra note 37, at 782-91, and infra text accompanying notes 552-58,
683-92, 810-14.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
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terests against any adverse effects such speech might have had on
government agency operations.
b. Interests on the Side of Free Speech
Neither the Supreme Court nor pre-partition Fifth Circuit cases
gave much attention to identifying or characterizing the interests government employees themselves might have in free exercise of their
First Amendment speech rights. Perhaps the courts simply assumed
that employees' right to freedom of expression was self-evident and
that it would be protected so long as its exercise did not interfere
with their own work or with their agency's performance of public
services. 19 Typically, as in Pickering and its progeny, where reference
is made to "matters of public concern," the implication is that the free
exercise of employee speech rights is important only because of its
social utility - that is, its contribution to the "marketplace of ideas"
197
or public debate.
Fifth Circuit cases, however, do sometimes hint that public employees might have a First Amendment interest in their own speech rights.
Porter v. Califano9 concerned a situation in which a federal employee
had been suspended for criticizing agency superiors who were running
a private business on government time and providing special favors
to other employees who joined in these business activities.- The court
stated that under the First Amendment, government employees have
the right to hold and express their own opinions as to the propriety
of their superiors' conduct. In the same discussion the court declared
that "[i]f true, her charges would be matters of current and legitimate
employee and public concern." 2°° Here, perhaps, the court meant to
suggest that an employee whose own interests may be affected by
the corruption of higher agency officials has a First Amendment interest in speaking out against such corruption in order to protect
herself. In the Porter context, the employee's own interests could
have been adversely affected by being punished for not joining the
enterprise, or, if she had joined it, by becoming a party to illegal

196. See infra text accompanying notes 311-19, 618-38.
197. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72 ("[o]n such a question free and open debate is vital to
informed decision-making by the electorate"); Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 779 (5th Cir.
1979). "The First Amendment generally favors the marketplace testing of ideas and information
rather than their arbitrary control by the government." Id. at 779.
198. 592 F.2d 770 (1979).
199. Id. at 774-76.
200. Id. at 779. (emphasis added).
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activity. In Williams the court expressly stated that the employeeplaintiff had a right to make known his superior's malfeasance "both
21
for his own protection and as his duty as servant to the people." 0
Two separate employee interests are indicated here: (1) interest in
avoiding being implicated by silence as an accessory to the superior's
misconduct;2- and (2) interest in performing one's work properly as a
conscientious public employee.
Commentators have suggested some additional types of employee
speech interests:
Among such interests are the right of public employees not
to share the majoritarian views of their employers and the
interest of employees in speaking their professional or
vocational conscience on work place affairs without fear of
reprisal. In particular, public employees have legitimate interests in the efficiency and fairness of their work environments: a harshly managed or poorly run work place can
breed disharmony and inefficiency, and thus the efforts of
employees to address these concerns may merit strong judicial protection.m
So, to some extent, the Fifth Circuit did recognize that public employees themselves had interests in their First Amendment speech right
as employees, and apart from any social utility their speech might
have.
c. Countervailing Governmental Interests
Two general points regarding governmental interests emerged in
the Fifth Circuit's post-Pickering cases. One was that, under certain
conditions, an agency superior could remove an employee whose speech
was likely to disrupt working relationships necessary for its functioning, even though such disruption had not yet occurred. The other was
that, in order to justify violating an employee's speech rights, the

201.

Williams, 629 F.2d at 1004.

202. Id. at 1003. "[T]he alteration of the records involved Williams, as employee, intimately:
because he was the officer on duty and signed the original report, the alteration appeared to
contain his imprimatur and would have implicated him in the fraud." Id.
203. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1611, 1769 (1984);
see also infra text accompanying notes 620-22. Correcting workplace problems in house would
not only be likely to benefit the public, but also the employee-speaker by providing improved
working conditions such as better morale, safety, and reduced stress on the job. These improvements would be likely to result in increased efficiency and productivity.
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defendant agency or official must show that the employee's speech
had a "materially and substantially" adverse effect on governmental
interests.
i. The Nature of Governmental Interests
The principal state interest identified in Pickering was continued
efficient operation of the governmental agency.2 ° Applying Pickering
in 1975, the Fifth Circuit wrote: "[A] state agency may not restrict
an employee's freedom of expression by discharge or other means
unless that employee's statements are shown to substantially impede
the legitimate operation of that agency. '' - 5 The following year, in
Abbott v. Thetford, the en banc court had occasion to consider whether
an agency must refrain from discharging an employee whose speech
might potentially damage working relationships until after such disruption actually occurred . 2 ° Adopting the panel's dissent, the en banc
court held that it need not so refrain, provided the record facts present
"an adequate objective foundation" for the agency official's "conclusion
that disruption was likely."2 The dissent and the en banc court apparently agreed with the panel's conclusion that "[t]he mere fear or [subjective] apprehension of a disturbance is not enough to justify denial
of the freedom of expression."m
Thetford was judge of the county juvenile court. Abbott was its
chief probation officer. As such, Abbott functioned as "the link between
Judge Thetford and the probation staff '12 - and with various agencies
and private homes where dependent or neglected children were often
accepted.210 Despite the judge's instructions to the contrary, Abbott
sued in federal district court on behalf of three black children seeking
admission to various then still all-white child care institutions, and for

204. See supra text accompanying note 35.
205. Roane v. Callisburg Indep. Sch. Dist., 511 F.2d 633, 640 (5th Cir. 1975).
206. Abbott v. Thetford, 534 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976)(en banc). The en banc court adopted
the dissenting opinion from the panel decision in Abbott v. Thetford, 529 F.2d 695, 702-09 (5th
Cir. 1976) (Gewin, J., dissenting). The panel majority's judgment was "reversed, vacated, and
set aside." Abbott, 534 F.2d 1101, 1102-03. Citations, therefore, are to the panel decision (for
facts) and the panel dissent (for the en banc opinion).
207. Abbott, 529 F.2d at 708 (Gewin, J., dissenting).
208. Id.; see also Battle v. Mulholland, 439 F.2d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 505, 508 (1969)). "Undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Id.
209. Abbott, 529 F.2d at 697.
210. Id. at 704-05 (Gewin, J., dissenting).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 5

increased state agency support for black children. 2, Abbott was then
discharged pursuant to Thetford's recommendation. 212 The panel dissent held that Thetford had a sufficient basis for concluding that under
these circumstances Abbott's continued employment would be likely
to disrupt the court's operations, inasmuch as his suit was filed against
"the chief resources of the Juvenile Court," which might then be less
cooperative if Abbott were reinstated.213
Abbott also appears to have been the first Fifth Circuit decision
applying Pickering's language as to the effects of employee speech on
"close working relationships" where the statements would be in any
"way directed towards [a] person with whom [the speaker] would
normally be in contact in the course of his daily work" where "personal
'
loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper functioning. 214
The court read this language to stand for the proposition that, "[i]n
considering First Amendment rights the court is always required to
look at the place, time, and circumstances involved in striking the
necessary delicate balance between the interests of the government
and the constitutional rights of the individual. "215 On this basis, as
well, the court concluded that the district court had properly concluded
that Abbott's "speech" (filing suit) had adversely affected state interests represented by the proper functioning of Judge Thetford's
court.2 16 To what extent must the government tolerate such adverse
effects?
ii. "Material and Substantial" Interference
Beginning as early as 1971, the Fifth Circuit began reading Pickering to say that once an employee had established that his First Amendment speech rights had been violated, the state (or agency superior)
defendant had the burden of showing that such speech had "materially
and substantially" interfered with agency operations or "materially
and substantially" impeded the employee's performance of his duties

211. Id. at 698.
212. Abbott, 534 F.2d at 1103 (Clark, J., concurring).
213. Abbott, 529 F.2d t 708 (Gewin, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 707 (Gewin, Jr., dissenting) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-70 (emphasis
in dissent)).
215. Id. at 706 (emphasis in original). "In Pickering . . . the Supreme Court emphasized
the 'time, place and circumstances' concept when dealing with the First Amendment rights of
employees." Id. at 707. Actually the Court had not mentioned these considerations in Pickering,
but did invoke them later in Givhan (1979) and Connick (1983). See supra text accompanying
note 138, and infra text accompanying notes 458-62.
216. Abbott, 529 F.2d at 708.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' SPEECHRIGHTS

as an employee. 217 Two lines of Fifth Circuit cases emerged, one relating to possible interference with agency operations, the other with
possible impeding of the employee's performance. Both lines applied
the Court's "materially and substantially" test.
The first case applying this test to interference with agency operations was Fluker v. Alabama State Board of Education,218 which
involved a school teacher's First Amendment rights of speech and
association. Here the court held, once the employee has established
that a constitutional violation occurred, "the State assumes the burden
of justifying its action by showing that the complainant's activities
'materially and substantially' interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the schools. '' 219 In Hastings v.
Bonner22° the court applied the same test somewhat more broadly in
another school teacher case, remanding to the district court to determine whether the teacher's associational activities "materially and substantially disrupted the operation of the school." The following year,
the court invoked the formula in a case involving the speech rights
of a federal agency employee, framing the issue as "whether and to
what extent [the employee's] speech 'substantially and materially' interfered with . . . the maintenance of discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers, or with the operation of the office generally,"' considerations likewise deriving from Pickering.- The court
again applied the "substantial and material interference" test the next
year in Van Ooteghem v. Gray,2 a case concerning a county official's
speech rights. The Van Ooteghem panel wrote:
The state cannot prevent the speech of its citizens absent a
compelling state interest. . . . In the employment context,
this compelling state interest standard is satisfied only upon
proof that the regulation of speech was necessary to prevent

217. Pickering had indicated that a public employee's erroneous public statements critical
of his employer might "impede the proper performance of . . .duties" or "interfere . . . with
the regular operation of [the agency] generally." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572, 573. The "materially
and substantially interferes" test evidently derived from Burnside v. Byers, 363 F.2d 744, 749
(5th Cir. 1966), a student free speech case. See also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
218. 441 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1971).
219. Id. at 206 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509) (other citations omitted).
220. 578 F.2d 136, 143 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
221. Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 1979).
222. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568-70.
223. 628 F.2d 488, 492-93 (5th Cir. 1980), affd in part and vac'd in part (en banc), 654
F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1981).
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"a material and substantial interference" with the operation
of the public department.In an en banc, per curiam decision announced five weeks before partition, the court "affirmed in part and, in part, vacated" the Van
Ooteghem panel's decision.2 5 But which part was affirmed and which
part vacated? In particular, did the en banc court affirm or vacate
the "material and substantial interference" standard? What it did write
was the following:
The court took this case en banc to resolve the question
which divided the panel: must government regulation of constitutionally protected speech of public employees be justified
by a compelling state interest? .... .The court en banc
determines that the issue is not presented by the facts in
this case. We affirm that portion of the judgment of the
district court holding Van Ooteghem's constitutional right of
freedom of speech was violated without reaching or expressing any view on the question which brought us en banc.It is clear that the court wished to keep open the question whether
the state was required to come forward with a "compelling state interest" if it wished to curtail or punish public employee expression.
But did the court also mean to set aside the "substantial and material
interference" test? It did not Say that. From this silence, it probably
should be concluded that the "materially and substantially interfered"
test was still good law in the Fifth Circuit on October 1, 1981.
That test had been applied in several previous cases where there
2 7
was no mention of a "compelling state interest" requirement.
Moreover, a number of cases had applied the "substantially and materially" language to Pickering's "impeded the employee's performance
of his duties" criterion. Thus in Battle, the Fifth Circuit held that
once the employee had established a constitutional violation, the state
(or agency superior) would-have the burden of showing that his expression "materially and substantially" impeded his usefulness as an em-

224. Van Ooteghem, 628 F.2d at 492 (citing Hastings v. Bonner, 578 F.2d 136 (5th Cir.
1978)) (citations omitted).
225. Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 654 F.2d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane).
226. Id. at 304 (citations omitted).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 218-22.
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213

ployee.22 Here the employee was a police officer. Subsequent Fifth
Circuit cases applied the "materially and substantially" impeded test
in a wide range of contexts involving, for instance, a V.A. Hospital
staff psychologist,m and the chief probation officer in Abbott .31 In
adopting the Abbott panel's dissent as its opinion,- 2 the en banc court
necessarily adopted its statement that, "in order to justify the slightest
interference with First Amendment rights there must be a showing
that the exercise of such rights "materially and substantially" interfered with the duties required to be performed by an employee."The "materially and substantially" test is applied in numerous
cases, but is associated only once with the "compelling state interest"
standard, namely, in the Van Ooteghem panel's opinion.3 In vacating
the panel's compelling state interest requirement, the en banc Van
Ooteghem court did not even mention the "materially and substantially
interfered" or "impeded" test. Thus it appeared that under Fifth Circuit jurisprudence as of partition, once a public employee had established that her First Amendment speech rights had been violated, the
defendant government or agency superior must then shoulder the
burden of proving that the speech in question "materially and substantially" interfered with the agency's performance of public services, or
with the speaker's performance of her duties as a public employee.
d. Balancing the Interests and Special Situations
Once the interests have been identified, the next step, theoretically,
is the "balancing" or weighing of these interests: on the one side, the
employee's First Amendment rights; on the other, the state's interest
in suppressing or punishing her speech. As has just been noted, Fifth
Circuit cases prior to partition held that only "material and substantial"
interference with the agency's performance of public services or with
the employee's performance of her duties as employee, would justify

228. Battle v. Mulholland, 439 F.2d 324-25 (5th Cir. 1971). Battle clearly specifies that the
constitutional violation occurs when governmental superiors retaliate against employees for the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Pickering balancing then follows, in order to determine whether such constitutional violation is justified. Id. See also Flucker, supra, text accompanying notes 218-19.
229. Id.
230. Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 1974).
231. Abbott, 529 F.2d at 707.
232. Abbott v. Thetford, 534 F.2d 1101, 1102 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
233. Abbott, 529 F.2d at 707 (Gewin, J., dissenting).
234. Van Ooteghem, 628 F.2d at 492.
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restricting a government employee's First Amendment rights. If the
interference was slight or negligible, the employee's speech interest
then would outweigh the government's interest in suppressing it. In
an easy case, where there was no showing that the employee's speech
had had any actual detrimental impact on agency operations, the balance came down on the side of the employee's speech rights.Likewise, in Porterv. Califano, where agency officials advanced only
a "vague claim that the employee's speech hurt agency efficiency,"
the court found in favor of the employee's speech rights.- 6 In Porter,
the court noted that the government had failed to use less restrictive
means to counter any possible adverse effects of the speech,2 7 and
that the means employed themselves had adversely affected agency
efficiency.The difficult cases arise where the evidence shows that the speech
had some significantly adverse impact on working relationships, the
agency's performance of services, or the speaker's performance of her
proper duties as an employee. The government's or agency superiors'
interests do not necessarily prevail even in such circumstances. The
Fifth Circuit developed some special considerations applicable in different kinds of situations, notably in cases involving "whistle-blower"
speech, speech by school teachers, speech by police officers, political
speech, and knowingly or recklessly false speech.
i. "Whistle-Blower" Speech
The court accorded special weight to the importance of speech that
drew attention to possibly illegal or corrupt practices on the part of
fellow-workers or agency superiors. In such cases, the court discounted
the speech's disruptive effect:2 9
The First Amendment test can hardly be controlled by a
finding that disruption did occur. An employee who accu-

235. See, e.g., Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1256-57 (5th Cir. 1980); D'Andrea v.
Adams, 626 F.2d 469, 474-77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1980).
236. 592 F.2d 770, 780 (5th Cir. 1979).
237. Id. at 779. Pickering also had suggested that whether the government had utilized
less restrictive means would be relevant in balancing. See supra text accompanying note 60.
238. Id. at 780. "Thus by suspending Porter instead of neutralizing or balancing her speech
with rebuttal management speech, management has deprived the government of 30 days work
of one of its otherwise competent and productive employees." Id.
239. At the same time, the court also noted that it might be relevant whether the employee
could have achieved his purposes by speaking in some less disruptive way. See Porter, 592 F.2d
at 773 n.4.
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rately exposes rampant corruption in her office no doubt
may disrupt and demoralize much of the office. But it would
be absurd to punish subordinates who blow the whistle simply because the[ir] speech somewhat disrupted the office. 240
In whistle-blower cases the court generally gave great weight to
the public's need to know about officials' alleged misconduct. In such
a context, the court has written, "When the matter is as important
to the public as that involved here, the employee's right to speak
must be vigorously protected if the public is to be informed." 24 Implicitly, perhaps, the court recognized that public agency officials themselves are ultimately employed by and politically accountable to the
public. At any rate, in the whistle-blower cases, the court recognized
that the government's interest is not necessarily the same as that of
officials engaged in malfeasance or corruption.
ii. Speech by School and College Teachers
Keyishian, Pickering, Perry, Mt. Healthy, and Givhan all concerned the rights of school or college teachers. As has been noted,
the Fifth Circuit applied the "materially and substantially interfered"
test in school teacher cases. 242 In Kingsville Independent School Dis-

240. Id. at 773-74. "[I]t seems rather disingenuous to accuse a whistle-blower of injuring
employee morale by showing no more than that an accurately exposed fellow employee is
unhappy about being exposed." Id. at 778 n.12. See also Williams v. Board of Regents, 629
F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980) ("We do not read Abbott and its progeny as establishing disruption
and disharmony as a per se defense to dismissal no matter how egregious the complained of
conduct of the superior might have been. Of course, the disruption could be cured if the working
relationship were extinguished. What [state officials] have failed to address is why the innocent,
perhaps praiseworthy, [employee] should lose his job."), cert. denied sub nom. Saye v. Williams,
452 U.S. 926 (1981).
241. Williams, 629 F.2d at 1003; see supra text accompanying notes 187-89; see also Williams, 629 F.2d at 1004 n.19.
Sound First Amendment analysis requires that the quality and nature of the speech
be balanced with the exigencies of the work place but with the far greater weight
attached to the interest of the public .... Here, although the working relationship
of the parties is damaged, this exigency pales before the need of the public to
know of the malfeasance involved.
Id.; see also Porter, 592 F.2d at 773 ("[T]he First Amendment also concerns the right and need
of the society's citizens to receive information helpful to their economic, social, and political
activities.")
242. Fluker v. Alabama St. Bd. of Educ., 441 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1971); see also
Hastings v. Bonner, 578 F.2d 136, 143 (5th Cir. 1978) (a freedom of association case).
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trict v. Cooper,m however, the court seemed to apply a somewhat
different formula. Here, it wrote, the question "is not whether substantial disruption occurs, but whether such disruption overbalances the
teacher's usefulness as an instructor.' ' Earlier cases in this line had
phrased the test somewhat more strongly: "Exercise of First Amendment rights, unless carried to such a point as clearly to overbalance
one's usefulness as an instructor, is a basis of discharge intrinsically
impermissible."24 Absent en banc review, the Kingsville court's omission of "clearly" has no legal effect. It may be that Kingsville concluded
that in school teacher cases the "materially and substantially" interfered test no longer applied. Fluker and Hastings had both used that
test in school teacher cases. However, the language from Kingsville
quoted above 6 more likely meant that, in order to avoid liability for
restricting or punishing a school teacher's speech, government officials
must show not only that "substantial disruption" had occurred, but
also that such substantial disruption was so great as to overbalance
the teacher's "usefulness." Under either the "substantially and materially" interfered (or impeded) test or the "clearly overbalanced one's
usefulness" test, and all the more under the apparent combination of
these two tests set out in Kingsville, school and college teacher's
speech was accorded a high level of protection in pre-partition, Fifth
Circuit case law.
iii. Speech by Police Officers
The Supreme Court in Pickering noted that there the school
teacher's statements criticizing the school board's allocation of funds
were not directed against anyone with whom he would ordinarily be
in daily contact in the course of his work, so that there was, therefore,
"no question of maintaining ... discipline by immediate superiors. ''1 7
"Discipline" is rarely a consideration in school and college teacher
speech cases. But the Fifth Circuit has held that it could be in important factor in police officer contexts: "[D]iscipline is a necessary component of a smoothly-operating police force. Although this necessity
of discipline does not rise to the same level as required by the military,
.. discipline must be maintained among police officers during periods

243. 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980).
244. Id. at 1113 n.4 (citing Kaprellian v. Texas Woman's Univ., 509 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1975)).
245. Kaprellian, 509 F.2d at 139 (citing Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 859 (5th Cir.
1970)) (emphasis added).
246. See supra text accompanying note 244.
247. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-70.
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of active duty. "2 This consideration is not, however, dispositive, particularly in whistle-blower cases where the public has special interest
in being informed about official misconduct.2 9 But absent the whistleblowing element, police officers' First Amendment speech rights might
be less likely to enjoy a high level of protection than those of college
and school teachers.
iv. Political Speech
In Hobbs v. Thompson,- the Fifth Circuit showed special solicitude
for public employees' right to freedom of political expression, so long
as that expression had no adverse effects on the performance of their
duties as employees. The City of Macon, Georgia, had enacted an
ordinance barring fire department employees from any involvement
in political campaigns.2 1 Pursuant to this ordinance, city officials required all firemen to remove from their cars any bumper stickers
endorsing a candidate for State General Assembly.- 2 The Fifth Circuit
found the ordinance's provisions unconstitutionally overbroad and
vague. 23
The court enunciated the following doctrine as to governmental
limitations on employee political expression:
It is true that the government may have a greater interest
in regulating the political activities of its employees than it
would have in regulating the political activities of the
citizenry in general. For example, the government, as employer, has a legitimate interest in prohibiting public officials
from using their authority to coerce their inferior employees
into contributing to their campaigns .... Similarly, the government should be able to regulate activities which directly
interfere with the proper performance of its employees'
duties. However, since political speech has been referred to
as "the essence of se[I]f-government," . . . restrictions upon
it should not lightly be imposed. The public should generally

248. Williams, 629 F.2d at 1003. The Williams court's balancing analysis is summarized
supra text accompanying notes 187-89 (citations omitted).
249. Williams, 629 F.2d at 1003; see, e.g., post-partition Fifth Circuit cases, Brawner, 855
F.2d at 189-90; Thomas v. Harris County, 784 F.2d 643, 653 (5th Cir. 1986).
250. 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971).
251. Id. at 457.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 474. The court also held the ordinance unconstitutional as applied, 'there being
no intimation of a compelling state interest for the blackout of a fireman's bumper sticker, the
resulting infringement upon political activity is unjustified." Id. at 475.
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be able to speak on public issues free from fear of resulting
criminal or civil penalties.... New York Times and related
cases, of course, did not determine the precise extent to
which the political expression and activities of public employees may be curtailed, but those cases do stand for the proposition that absent exceptional circumstances, "debate ' on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open. "
Applying these doctrines, the Hobbs court found neither type of governmental interest affected by the bumper stickers. "We might ask
whether a fireman's bumper stickers are so politically inflammatory
that they would inhibit his firefighting ferocity or does the proscription
of bumper stickers prevent extortion of political contributions? We
think not."- Traditional overbreadth analysis was appropriate here,
the court found, because of Pickering's "teaching," namely, that
"where the political activities of a public employee are unrelated to
the performance of his duties he is to be treated for purposes of
adjudicating his First Amendment rights as a 'member of the general
public.' 12 But it may not always be so clear when an employee's
political activities do or do not interfere with performance of his duties.
The Supreme Court addressed closely related matters. in Elrod v.
Burns2 7 and Branti v. Finkel.- In the former, the Court ruled that
a "nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee" could not
properly "be discharged or threatened with discharge from a job that
he is satisfactorily performing upon the sole ground of his political
beliefs. ''259 Similarly, Branti held that such an employee's continuing
employment could not constitutionally be conditioned upon his al26
legiance to a particular political party.2 6 In McCormick v. Edwards, 1
the Fifth Circuit had occasion to consider "whether a non-civil service
state employee, engaged neither in policy-making nor confidential
duties, is constitutionally protected from being discharged for becoming actively involved in a partisan election campaign. 262 Mr. McCormick, a state planning director, was discharged by Louisiana Governor

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 470 (citations omitted).
Id. at 471.
Id. at 475.
427 U.S. 347 (1976).
445 U.S. 507 (1980).
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Branti, 445 U.S. at 519.
646 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 175.
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Edwards and others, in retaliation for actively supporting a Baton
Rouge mayoral candidate. 26 Citing Perry and prior Fifth Circuit school
teacher cases, 2r the Fifth Circuit panel majority noted that McCormick
could not be "fired for exercising constitutionally protected rights unless some governmental interest outweighs the employee's interest in
exercising those rights. ' '2- However, the panel majority held that
McCormick's reliance on Elrod and Branti was misplaced because,
while those cases referred to protection of political beliefs or affiliations, McCormick was discharged because of his participation in a
political campaign.2 Curiously, the McCormick panel did not mention
Hobbs, under which the defendants would have been required to show
that McCormick's political activities directly interfered with the performance of his duties.2 7 Instead, the majority held that McCormick's
activities were subject to regulation under various Supreme Court
cases dealing with statutory limitations upon government employees'
political conduct.268 In reaching this conclusion, the panel majority not
only ignored Hobbs; it also ignored its own initial determination that
McCormick could not be fired for exercising his constitutionally protected rights "unless some governmental interest" outweighed his interest in exercising those rights, 269 for the panel made no finding to
the effect that any such governmental interest in fact did "outweigh"
his speech rights. As the dissent pointed out, the appellate majority
recognized that the district court had found as a matter of fact that
McCormick's discharge was motivated solely by political pressures,
and the panel majority itself had held this finding not clearly erroneous . 70 The panel majority ignored the district court's finding that
McCormick's political activity had not impaired his ability fairly and
effectively to perform his duties. 271 Indeed, the majority simply as-

263. Id. at 174-75. The district court held that McCormick's dismissal violated his constitutional rights and awarded damages. McCormick v. Edwards, 479 F. Supp. 295, 297 (M.D. La.
1979).
264. McCormick, 646 F.2d at 175.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 178; see also Tanner v. McCall, 625 F.2d 1183, 1191 (5th Cir.) ("Plaintiffs'
contention can only be that retention or appointment coincided with support and loyalty for a
man, not for a political party."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 907 (1980).
267. Hobbs, 448 F.2d at 470.
268. McCormick, 646 F.2d at 178-79 (citing United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973)); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973);
United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
269. McCormick, 646 F.2d at 175.
270. Id. at 180 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
271. Id.
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sumed the contrary.2 2 Moreover, the dissent pointed out, the McCormick case did not involve the application of statutory or regulatory
prohibitions against political activity; consequently, the majority's invocation of cases relating to such prohibitions as authority was inap2

posite . 73
In view of its faulty assumptions and analysis, McCormick's meaning and precedential weight for subsequent Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence must be in some doubt. Hobbs, on the other hand, presumably
remained good law.
v. Knowingly or Recklessly False Speech
In Pickering, the Supreme Court found that some of the teacher's
public statements had been false. The Court held that a public school
teacher could not, constitutionally, be discharged for exercising his
right to speak on matters of public importance even if his statements
were incorrect or false, absent proof that he had made such false
statements knowingly or recklessly. 4 In a footnote, the Court added
that it remained an open question whether even knowingly or recklessly false speech might still be protected so long as that speech
had no harmful effect on school operations. 275 In reaching this conclusion, the Court pointed out that the School Board itself could have
rebutted Pickering's erroneous statements by publishing accurate
data. Several subsequent Fifth Circuit cases also dealt with the constitutional status of false speech.
Megill v. Board of Regents276 concerned an assistant professor who
was denied tenure and promotion for several reasons, including some
involving his speech.2- The Fifth Circuit found that none of Mr.
Megill's speech-related activities was constitutionally protected. The
court held that some instances of Megill's false speech were unprotected because, in effect, he had made them knowingly or recklessly:
"On each occasion when Dr. Megill made public remarks, the Board
found that he made statements he either knew to be false, or that he

272.

Id. at 179.

273.

Id.

274.

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.

275.
276.

Id. at 575 n.6.
541 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976).

277. Id. at 1081.
278. Id. at 1082. The case was decided prior to Mt. Healthy, at a time when the law of
the Circuit was that when a person was dismissed even partially for reasons that violated his
constitutional rights, the entire action was defective. Id. at 1081.
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could have easily investigated for accuracy."- 9 Though the Megill court
cited Pickering,m it did not specifically address the question Pickering
left "open," that is, whether even knowingly or recklessly false speech
might be protected if there had been no harmful effects on agency
operations.m1 Instead, the court evidently concluded, sub silentio, that
recklessly false speech was unprotected, even in the absence of any
showing of harm to agency operations, at least where, as here, the
speaker's false speech evidenced "a lack of character and intellectual
responsibility" needed for continued employment in a given capacity.2
A subsequent Fifth Circuit case held that a public employee's knowingly or recklessly false speech, as such, is constitutionally unprotected.28
Thus in Fifth Circuit pre-partition jurisprudence, the question
whether such speech might be protected absent a showing of harm to
agency operations was no longer open. Knowingly or recklessly false
speech by employees was not protected under the First Amendment.2
3. Remedies
In all of the Supreme Court cases considered so far, the Court
found that the plaintiff-employees were dismissed (or denied continuing
employment) in violation of their constitutionally protected rights.2
In these cases, ordinarily, the plaintiff-employee sought reinstatement
and back-pay.- Where agency officials' retaliation took the form of

279. Id. at 1085. The Board, the court found, had "looked to Megill's inability to make
accurate public statements concerning university affairs rather than the fact that he made public
statements. Such action," the court concluded, "does not constitute First Amendment violation."
Id. Nevertheless, the opinion goes on to conclude that in "any balancing" of Megill's "First
Amendment interests" against the Board's interests, "the Board's interests outweigh those of
Dr. Megill." Id. It is unclear why the court referred to such "balancing" in view of its determination that Megill's First Amendment rights had not been violated. Perhaps this mention of
"balancing" was merely dicta.
280. Megill, 541 F.2d at 1081, 1086.
281. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 575 n.6. The court did observe at one point that the Board
had found that some of Megill's untrue statements were "likely to cause divisional strife within
the university campus and between the school and the state's political leadership," but did not
draw any legal conclusions from this observation. Megill, 541 F.2d at 1082.
282. Megill, 541 F.2d at 1085.
283. D'Andrea v. Adams, 626 F.2d 469, 473-74 n.2 (5th Cir.) (citing Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 73 (1965), but not citing Pickering), cert. denied 450 U.S. 919 (1980).
284. See also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 582-83 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Neubauer v. City of McAllen, 766 F.2d 1567, 1579-82 (5th Cir. 1985)(a post-partition
Fifth Circuit case).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 15-70, 83-110, 124-39.
286. See, e.g., Givhan, 439 U.S. at 410; Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 274-75.
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dismissal, the Fifth Circuit insisted that reinstatement was the appro2 7
priate remedy, even where such relief might displease such officials. 8
Back pay also normally would be available to cover the period between
wrongful termination and reinstatement,88 along with attorneys' fees
for initial trial, appeal and remand proceedings. 9 Where reinstatement
is inappropriate for other reasons, loss of earnings, other damages,
and attorneys fees might be awarded.m In cases where retaliation
took other forms such as suspension without pay, plaintiff employees
could seek injunctive relief and also, presumably, back pay as well as
reinstatement.291
D. Eleventh Circuit Case Law Prior to Connick
As will be seen, the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Connick v.
Myers - 2 resolved certain questions that had surfaced in pre-partition
Fifth Circuit case law, but at the same time, placed some previously
settled issues in doubt. Connick also, of course, impacted on emerging
Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence. This article now reviews the relatively
small number of Eleventh Circuit public employee First Amendment
speech cases decided between partition and Connick. Issues are discussed in the same sequence as with the Fifth Circuit cases examined
above, 3 except that cases turning on causation analysis will be noted
after consideration of those involving "balancing" issues and the new
question of qualified immunity.
i. "Matters of Public Concern"
Pre-partition Fifth Circuit case law did not explicitly or consistently
require that, in order to come within the protection of the First
Amendment, an employee's speech must have addressed a "matter of
public concern."- In Waters v. Chaffin29 5 the court specifically re-

287. "Enforcement of constitutional rights frequently has distasteful consequences. Relief
is not restricted to that which will be pleasing and free of irritations." Sterzing v. Fort Bend
Indep. Sch. Dist., 496 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1974).
288. Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir. 1980).
289. Id.
290. McCormick v. Edwards, 479 F. Supp. 295, 302-03 (M.D. La. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 646 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1981).
291. Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 781 (5th Cir. 1979).
292. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 147-73.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 168-93. The same was true of pre-Connick Eleventh
Circuit case law.
295. 684 F.2d 833, 838 n.11 (11th Cir. 1982).

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' SPEECH RIGHTS

pudiated the "matter of public concern" "litmus test." Waters concerned a police officer who, while privately conversing with a fellow
officer at a local bar, alluded to the police chief disparagingly, inter
al., as a "bastard" and a "back-stabbing son of a bitch."- Citing
Williams v. Board of Regents,27 the court pointed out that the Fifth
Circuit had rejected the "restrictive view" that accorded First Amendment protection only to speech concerning matters of public interest. 2 s
Instead, the court read Pickering to require striking "the proper balance between the interests of th[e] employee in speaking freely and
the interests of the state, as employer, in promoting the efficient
delivery of public services. '" In some cases, public interest in an
employee's speech might be relevant as "one factor in Pickering
analysis. '" 0 But in the present case, the public had little or no interest
in the officer's remarks distinct from the interests of the parties themselves; consequently, the court concluded, "the Pickeringbalance must
turn solely on the respective weights of the interests of Waters and
the department." 301
The court's holding in another case, Berdin v. Duggan °2 is somewhat ambiguous as to the importance of a "matter of public concern"
requirement. The facts present a classic example of retaliation based
entirely on an imagined affront to a governmental superior's inordinately sensitive ego.
Thomas Berdin was employed by the city of Florida City as
a worker on its maintenance crew for many years. Berdin's
job consisted of maintaining certain areas of the city by
mowing grass, cleaning streets, picking up trash, and trimming hedges and trees. In December 1973, the crew was
assigned to maintain the baseball field and the city hired no
new employees.
Appellant John Duggan was the mayor of Florida City
at the time in issue. On April 11, 1974, Mayor Duggan visited
the baseball field and approached the three-man maintenance
crew, saying, "How you boys doing?" Berdin replied that
they could do much better if they had a couple of more

296. Id. at 834, 837-38.
297. 629 F.2d 993, 1003 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926 (1981); see supra text
accompanying notes 187-89.
298. Waters, 684 F.2d at 838 n.11.
299. Id. at 836.
300. Id. at 838 n.11 (citing Foster v. Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
301. Id.
302. 701 F.2d 909 (11th Cir. 1983).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 5

workers. Mayor Duggan responded, "What, is it too much
for you?" Berdin replied that the crew was doing all it could
but that they could make a better showing if they had more
workers.
At this point, Mayor Duggan walked away. He stood
aside for a moment, returned to where Berdin was working,
and stated, "You don't run my job. I am going to show you
who the boss is. You is fired." Berdin subsequently collected
his final check from the city clerk.303
The court did not specifically state that in order to be accorded First
Amendment protection, Berdin's speech would have had to address a
matter of public concern.- It noted, however, that the district court
had ruled that Berdin's speech had addressed a matter of public concern and was therefore protected.- ° The Eleventh Circuit found this
ruling not clearly erroneous,s but then cited Waters to the effect that
"First Amendment protections do not turn on the social worth of the
statements. '" Presumably, under Waters, the appellate court would
have found Berdin's speech constitutionally protected even if the district court had not found that it addressed a matter of public concern.
The importance and scope of a "matter of public concern" test would
figure prominently in Eleventh Circuit public employee speech jurisprudence after Connick."
2. Interests on the Side of Free Speech
With few exceptions," prior Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit cases
generally treated public employee speech as having value only because

of its social

utility.310

The Eleventh Circuit placed more emphasis on

303. Id. at 910. For other instances of this phenomenon, see, e.g., such post-partition Fifth
Circuit cases as Noyola v. Texas Dept. of Human Resources, 846 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1988);
Page v. DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1987); Gomez v. Texas Dept. of Mental Health, 794
F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1986). These cases are reviewed, in Hiers, supra note 37, at 786-90.
304. As in Waters, the court's summary of Pickering's test made no mention of such a
requirement: "Whether a public employee's speech is constitutionally protected is determined
by a balancing of the employee's interest in free speech and the state's interest in promoting
the efficiency of the public services performed through its employees." Berdin, 701 F.2d at 912.
305. Id. at 912.
306. Id. at 912-13.
307. Id. at 913 n.ll.
308. See infra text accompanying notes 519-614.
309. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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employees' own interest in speaking freely. Waters v. Chafin3s" is the
leading case. Waters, a police officer assigned to work with an F.B.I.
investigation, while relaxing off-duty at a bar with another officer,
spoke disparagingly of Police Chief Chester. The other officer reported
Waters' remarks to the chief, and Waters was initially discharged,
then reinstated at a lower classification.312 The Eleventh Circuit found
that Waters' First Amendment speech right had been violated.
Waters, like every citizen, has a strong interest in having
the opportunity to speak his mind, free from government
3
censorship or sanction. 13
Although the actual words Waters
spoke cannot be said to be valuable to the public at large,
the First Amendment's protections do not turn on the social
worth of the statements, save in a few exceptions not relevant here ...
In addition to Waters' fundamental interest in speaking
as he chooses, he has an interest in being free from unneces4
sary work-related restrictions while off-duty.31
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit evidently was prepared to accord public
employees as such a "strong," indeed, "fundamental" interest in their
own right to free speech. Whether the content of his speech had any
social utility was irrelevant.3 15 Fifth Circuit cases had not so broadly
31 6
articulated the importance of public employees' own speech rights.
Moreover, the Waters court here identified a further specific employee's right: namely, to speak freely about work conditions while offduty, at least "[a]bsent significant countervailing governmental in-

terests."1117

In addition, though recognizing, as did the Fifth Circuit, that police
officers might properly be subject to special restrictions or "discipline"
in view of the nature of their duties,318 the Waters court viewed police

311. 684 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1982).
312. Id. at 834; see supra notes 294-301 and accompanying text.
313. Waters, 684 F.2d at 837. Here the court cited Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977)(school board and union could not require teachers to contribute for
political purposes to which they were opposed as a condition of employment) and Police Dept.
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)(First Amendment bars governmental restriction on content
of picket sign messages).
314. Waters, 684 F.2d at 837 (citations omitted).
315. Id.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 196-203.
317. Waters, 684 F.2d at 837-39.
318. Id. at 836; cf. Williams v. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d 993, 1003 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 5

officers' rights more expansively: "[P]olicemen, like teachers and
lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional
rights. '' 3 19 In general, it seemed that the Eleventh Circuit was taking
public employees' speech rights more seriously than the Fifth Circuit
ordinarily had done. Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit seemed prepared
to require a greater level of governmental interest in order to justify
restricting or punishing public employee speech.
3. Nature and Weight of Governmental Interests
In Van Ooteghem v. Gray, ° the Fifth Circuit had expressly ruled
that it was not yet ready to decide whether, in order to justify restricting or punishing public employee expression, the government must
demonstrate that it had a compelling interest in so doing. 2 ' The
Eleventh Circuit panel in Waters seemingly resolved that question in a footnote: "It is . . . a fundamental tenet of First Amendment
jurisprudence that content based restrictions on speech are almost
invariably impermissible absent a particularized inquiry demonstrating
that a compelling state interest outweighs the citizen's interest in
speaking freely. "1
This language, taken with the Waters' court's characterization of
public employees' speech interests as "fundamental,"- might suggest
that the court here determined that the "strict scrutiny" standard was
to be applied in analyzing restrictions on, or retaliation against, public
employee speech.32 However, in the main text of its opinion, the Waters court referred to "significant countervailing governmental interests," but not to "compelling" ones.- This language is more suggestive of the "intermediate" level of constitutional scrutiny26

denied sub nom. Saye v. Williams, 452 U.S. 926 (1981); see supra text accompanying note 248.
319. Waters, 684 F.2d at 836 (quoting Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500, 87 S. Ct.
616, 620 (1967)(requiring police officer to choose between loss of job and possible self-incrimination
constituted unconstitutional coercion)).
320. 654 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1981)(en banc).
321. See supra text accompanying note 226.
322. Waters, 684 F.2d at 838 n. 11 (citing Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).
323. See supra text accompanying note 314. The Supreme Court had earlier so characterized
the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. See supra text accompanying note 13.
324. As to "strict scrutiny" see generally GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

676-73 (10th ed. 1980).

325. Waters, 684 F.2d at 839. "Absent significant countervailing governmental interests,
we are loathe to sanction the intrusion of the government's ear into the private lives of its
employees." Id.
326. See supra note 324, at 674.
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Probably the Waters panel did not intend to resolve the question
left open by the en banc Fifth Circuit in Van Ooteghem327 The Waters
opinion does not even mention Van Ooteghem. Whether or not the
Waters court intended to hold that intermediate level scrutiny should
apply in such cases, it did say, in effect, that merely some governmental interest would not suffice to justify restricting or punishing employee speech. Instead, to outweigh the employee's speech interest,
the countervailing governmental interest would have to be at least
"significant."
Eleventh Circuit cases decided between October 1, 1981, and the
Supreme Court's decision in Connick3 8 did not invoke the "materially
and substantially interfered" or "impeded" standard commonly evoked
in prior Fifth Circuit jurisprudence.3s Perhaps the court found it unnecessary in these cases to determine the extent to which a public
employee's expression interfered with agency performance of public
services or impeded the employee's performance of her duties. ° Presumably, under Bonner v. City of Pritchard,31 in order to justify
restriction or retaliation aimed at employee speech, government officials within the jurisdiction of the Eleventh Circuit would still have
to show that such speech "materially and substantially" interfered
with either the agency's performance or that of the employee-speaker.
In Abbott v. Thetford,32 the Fifth Circuit had held that agency
officials need not wait to sanction an employee whose speech
threatened agency operations until such interference actually occurred,
provided the officials could present an adequate objective, factual basis
for concluding that such interference was likely to occur.- The Waters
court reached essentially the same conclusion, in dicta, though without
mentioning Abbott.
Under binding Fifth Circuit precedent, the
Eleventh Circuit would, presumably, continue to require that in such
instances agency superiors demonstrate an objective basis for apprehension of harm, and reject mere subjective fear as basis for restrictive or retaliatory action against employee-speakers.-

327. See supra text accompanying notes 223-26.
328. See, e.g., Harem v. Board of Regents, 708 F.2d 647 (l1th Cir. 1983); Berdin v. Duggan,
701 F.2d 909, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983); Waters, 684 F.2d at 833 (1982).
329. See supra notes 217-34 and accompanying text.
330. See infra text accompanying notes 336-47.
331. 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc); see supra note 8.
332. 534 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976)(en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977).
333. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
334. 684 F.2d at 839 n. 12. "Because lives are often at stake, the danger of harm to a police
department's discipline is too great to insist on waiting for the harm to result." Id.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 206-08.
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4. Balancing
Few Eleventh Circuit cases during this period reached the balancing phase of analysis. Those that did were relatively easy to resolve,
for in every instance the government officials-defendants were unable
to show any discernible interference with agency operations or working
relationships. Perhaps this is the reason that none of these cases refers
to the "substantially and materially interferes or impedes" test commonly applied in earlier Fifth Circuit jurisprudence. 3 6
Thus in Waters, the court rejected defendants' claim that the plaintiff-officer's off-duty derogatory remarks about Chief Chester interfered with working relationships or threatened to disrupt the department's chain of command. At the time of the incident, Waters and
Chester did not work together closely, and the officer to whom Waters
made the remarks was not in Waters' chain of command.- 7 The court
therefore concluded that the department had failed to make a showing
of actual harm or a reasonable likelihood of prospective harm to its
efficiency, discipline, or harmony.-3 Likewise, the Berdin court observed that there was no close working relationship between the Mayor
and plaintiff-Berdin, and that there was no evidence that the latter's
response to the Mayor's question had led to any problem of discipline
or disharmony in maintenance crew operations.3 9 The court readily
concluded that the city's interest in "efficiency" did not outweigh Berdin's free speech interest.3 °
One possible exception is anomalous in this respect, Hamm v.
Board of Regents.31 Ms. Hamm was hired to assist University of
South Florida officials administering the university's affirmative action
program. 3 " On several occasions she undertook initiatives without obtaining prior approval from her administrative superiors. Once she
gave a case report to the student newspaper, possibly before transmitting it to her supervisor." Another time she distributed information
on employment discrimination which the administration considered
"negative in tone. '" What is anomalous is that the court did not even

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
because
342.
343.

See supra text accompanying notes 217-34.
Waters, 684 F.2d at 839-40.
Id. at 840.
Berdin v. Duggin, 701 F.2d 909, 912 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983).
Id. at 913.
708 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1983). Hamm was announced two months after Connick, but
it does not refer to Connick, it is treated here as a pre-Connick decision.
Harm, 708 F.2d at 651.
Id. at 652.

344. Id.
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mention, let alone "weigh," any actual or prospective harm to agency
efficiency, discipline or harmony that might have resulted from
Hamm's speech activities. Instead, in conclusionary fashion, it simply
35
stated, "Such activity is not protected by the First Amendment."
As authority for this proposition, the court cited Abbott; but the Abbott
court had specifically based its conclusion on record evidence that the
plaintiff employee's "speech" would have been likely to disrupt agency
operations. 3 6 Evidently the main basis for the court's rejection of
Hamm's appeal was its acceptance of the district court's finding that
she had failed to prove a causal nexus between her speech and the
university's decision to transfer her.4 7 During this period, however,
the Eleventh Circuit decided several other cases expressly on the
basis of Mt. Healthy causation. Before turning to these cases, we
must consider a new issue: whether and when defendant agency
superiors in First Amendment speech actions might be entitled to
qualified immunity.
5. Qualified Immunity: When Does the Violation Occur?
In its 1982 landmark decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,3 the Supreme Court held that government officials who perform discretionary
functions are shielded from liability for civil damages through qualified
immunity provided their conduct did not "violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known. '"3 9 Berdin v. Duggan- evidently was the first Eleventh
Circuit case applying Harlow in the context of government retaliation
against employees' exercise of First Amendment speech rights.

345. Id. at 653.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 206-13.

347. Hamm, 708 F.2d at 653. The court did not, however, cite to Mt. Healthy. See supra
text accompanying notes 83-110.
348. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
349. Id. at 818 (emphasis added). Although Harlow concerned only federal officials, the
Court indicated that the same principles should apply in suits against state officials. Id. at 818
n.30. Earlier, the Court had held that "in the specific context of school discipline" as to students,
a school board member is not immune from liability for damages under Sect. 1983
if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his
sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the students
affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation
of constitutional rights or other injury to the student.
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
350. 701 F.2d 909, 913 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1988); see supra text
accompanying notes 302-307.
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The Berdin court found that at the time the plaintiff was fired,
Supreme Court decisions left no room for doubt but that disciplining
a public employee "for exercising his First Amendment right to speak,
clearly contravenes established law."' 1 Consequently, the court held
that Mayor Duggan "should have known in 1974 that his action of
firing Berdin was an impermissible exercise of his discretionary power,
violative of this employee's First Amendment rights."- 2 Here the court
seemed to understand that the constitutional violation occurred at the
time Duggan retaliated against the employee for exercising his right
of free speech.
Other language in Berdin, however, introduces a source of possible
confusion on this point. Without mentioning pre-partition Fifth Circuit
precedent to the contrary, the court wrote, "[W]hether a public employee's speech is constitutionally protected is determined by a balancing of the employee's interest in free speech and the state's interest
in promoting the efficiency of the public services performed through
its employees. '" Does this mean that the constitutional violation occurs only if judicial balancing determines that the employee's speech
interest outweighed the government's "efficiency" interest? If that
were the case, then, as a few later Eleventh (and Fifth) Circuit panels
concluded, it might be supposed that agency superiors-defendants
would nearly always be entitled to qualified immunity since they would
hardly ever know in advance how a court's balancing analysis would
turn out.
Later Eleventh Circuit case law addressing this issue
explicitly determined that an employee's speech is "protected" if it
addressed a matter of public concern.
Whether such an employee
can obtain relief from such a violation then depends on the outcome
of the judicial balancing of conflicting interests. It should follow, as

351. Berdin, 701 F.2d at 913; see supra text accompanying notes 15-27, 62-70. Curiously,
the court did not cite Pickering.
352. Berdin, 701 F.2d at 913. The pre-partition Fifth Circuit had earlier rejected a defendant's claim of qualified immunity in Williams v. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied sub nom. Saye v. Williams, 452 U.S. 926 (1981). See supra text accompanying
notes 187-89. There the court based its decision on the "second prong" of Strickland analysis
[see supra note 349] inasmuch as the evidence demonstrated defendants' malicious intent to
injure Williams. Williams, 629 F.2d at 1004-06.
353. Berdin, 701 F.2d at 912 (emphasis added). For prior Fifth Circuit precedent, see supra
notes 115-16, 153, 228 and accompanying text. The post-Connick court addressed the question
when speech is "constitutionally protected" in Kurtz v. Vickrey, 855 F.2d 723, 730-31 n.5 (11th
Cir. 1988). See infra text accompanying notes 914-19.
354. See infra text accompanying notes 923-31.
355. See infra text accompanying notes 913-22.
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in Berdin, that agency superiors who so retaliate are not entitled to
the defense of qualified immunity. This issue remained somewhat in
doubt, however.
6. Causation
Pre-partition causation analysis in Fifth Circuit decisional law was
reviewed earlier in connection with consideration of the Supreme
Court's decision in Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle. 5 Early
Eleventh Circuit cases faithfully followed Fifth Circuit, post-Mt. Healthy precedent. Thus in one case, the court affirmed the district court's
finding that the plaintiff-employee had failed to prove first-level Mt.
Healthy causation, namely, that he had been forced to resign because
of his speech.3 7 Conversely, where an employee had been discharged
solely because of his protected speech, the court held that second-level
Mt. Healthy analysis was not required: "[T]he sole reason for the
nonrenewal decision was the protected activity, so it follows afortiori
that the same employment decision would not have been reached for
any permissible reason absent that protected conduct." ' As in the
case of at least one earlier Fifth Circuit opinion,- 9 the Eleventh Circuit
did not always carefully distinguish between first- and second-level
Mt. Healthy causation analysis. In one such case where it found the
record evidence sufficiently clear, the panel decided the causation question without remanding to the district court.m
7. Remedies
Following Fifth Circuit precedent, the new Eleventh Circuit agreed
that reinstatement was an appropriate remedy when public employees
had been discharged in violation of their First Amendment speech
rights. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit declared, "except in extraordi-

356. 429 U.S. 274 (1977); see supra text accompanying notes 108-13.
357. Paschal v. Florida Pub. Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 666 F.2d 1381, 1384-85 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1109 (1982).
358. Allen v. Board of Educ., 685 F.2d 1302, 1305, 1305 n.6 (11th Cir. 1982). The court
did not, however, cite Lindsey v. Board of Regents, 607 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979), an earlier
Fifth Circuit holding directly on point. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
359. Stone v. Board of Regents, 620 F.2d 526, 529-30 (5th Cir. 1980).
360. Hamm v. Board of Regents, 708 F.2d 647, 653 (11th Cir. 1983). "In any event, the
evidence supports the finding that defendants would have transferred plaintiff regardless of her
disputed activity. ... Such articulated reasons provide a sufficient basis for the [district] court's
finding that plaintiff failed to establish a connection between her activity and the transfer." Id.
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nary cases," reinstatement under such circumstances "is required." 361

Likewise, in accordance with Fifth Circuit precedent, the Eleventh
held that the mere existence of an "antagonistic relationship," "personal friction," or failure to "get along" 362 with the principal; would
not justify refusal to reinstate a teacher who was wrongfully dismissed
3
for exercising his First Amendment rights. 6

In addition to citing precedent, the Eleventh Circuit offered the
following policy rationale:
When a person loses his job, it is at best disingenuous to
say that money damages can suffice to make that person
whole. The psychological benefits of work are intangible, yet
they are real and cannot be ignored. Yet at the same time,
there is a high probability that reinstatement will engender
personal friction of one sort or another in almost every case
in which a public employee is discharged for a constitutionally
infirm reason. Unless we are willing to withhold relief from
all or most successful plaintiffs in discharge cases, and we
are not, we cannot allow actual or expected ill-feeling alone
to justify nonreinstatement. We also note that reinstatement
is an effective deterrent in preventing employer retaliation
against employees who exercise their constitutional rights.
If an employer's best efforts to remove an employee for
unconstitutional reasons are presumptively unlikely to succeed, there is, of course, less incentive to use employment
decisions to chill the exercise of constitutional rights.Here the court was concerned to assure both that government employees' speech rights be fully vindicated, and that their superiors be
deterred from chilling such rights through wrongful discharge. The
court's position is not contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in
Pickering to the effect that employees' criticisms of agency superiors
or their conduct might adversely impact agency operations and that
such impact on government interests could outweigh the employees'
speech rights. 3

65

For one thing, Pickering distinguished between

361. Allen, 685 F.2d at 1305 (citing, inter alia, Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611
F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir. 1980)); see also Williams v. Roberts, 904 F.2d 634, 639 (11th Cir. 1990).
362. Id. at 1305, 1306.
363. Id. at 1305 (citing Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974)).
364. Id. at 1306.
365. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56. Cf. a later Fifth Circuit decision, Professional
Ass'n of College Educators v. El Paso County Comm. College Dist., 730 F.2d 258, 276 (5th
Cir.) (Rubin, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984).
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speech that merely offended or angered superiors and speech that
effectively interfered with agency performance or working relationships. Moreover, even where some such interference was found, if
the court determined that its effect on government efficiency did not
outweigh the employee's speech interest, it would make no sense for
the court to permit the superior to punish the employee anyway by
denying reinstatement.
Reinstatement, of course, would not be required if the discharged
employee did not seek it. In such a circumstance, damages might
include back pay (less income earned elsewhere), punitive damages,
costs, and attorney's fees .- 7 Such damages, of course, might also be
available in addition to reinstatement.3
Based on Pickering, Mt. Healthy, Givhan, and Fifth Circuit precedents, Eleventh Circuit public employee free speech jurisprudence
was beginning to take shape along the lines just indicated. Employees
could not always count on being able to vindicate their speech rights,
for the court might find them outweighed by governmental interests.
But the emerging line of cases indicated that often employees could
succeed. Case law contained no built-in biases in favor of arbitrary or
tyrannical superiors. The situation was about to change.
III. THE SUPREME COURT RIDES AGAIN: CONNICK AND RANKIN
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court again addressed the nature and
extent of public employee free speech. Its 1983 decision in Connick
v. Myers 9 severely limited the speech rights of public employees in
favor of the authority of agency superiors. Four years later, in Rankin
v. McPherson,370 though holding in favor of the employee-plaintiff, the
Court, perhaps inadvertently, placed another major obstacle in the
path of employees who wished to vindicate their First Amendment
free speech rights. Together, Connick and Rankin resolved some
issues that had previously been unsettled in Fifth and Eleventh Circuit
jurisprudence. These decisions also presented new quandaries with
which the lower courts would have to wrestle. Connick was particularly problematic.

366.
367.
(1983).
368.
369.
370.

See supra text accompanying note 57.
See, e.g., Berdin v. Duggan, 701 F.2d 909, 911 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893
Allen, 685 F.2d at 1304, 1306.
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
483 U.S. 378 (1987).
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A. Connick v. Myers7
Mr. Harry Connick was District Attorney in Orleans Parish,
Louisiana. Ms. Sheila Myers was one of several assistant district attorneys. She had served in that capacity for more than five years,
and was "a competent, conscientious and effective" prosecutor.3 72 For
several of these years, she participated in a probation program for
youthful offenders in Judge Augustine's section of the Parish court,
known also as Section One of Criminal Court. Myers' work as prosecutor was in a different section of the court 73 Early in October,
1980, she learned that her superiors planned to transfer her to Section
One. She was reluctant to accept this transfer because she anticipated
conflict of interest if called on to prosecute persons she had counseled
3 74
in Judge Augustine's offenders program.
Myers discussed her objections with two supervisors, Mr. Waldron
and Ms. Bane, and with Connick, only to be informed shortly afterwards by memo that the transfer would be ordered anyway.3 75 She
then discussed the matter again with Waldron, mentioning other concerns she had about office conditions. Waldron told her that others in
the office did not share these concerns. Myers replied that she would
further research the points they had discussed 76 That night she prepared a questionnaire regarding these issues. It read as follows:
PLEASE TAKE THE FEW MINUTES IT WILL REQUIRE TO
FILL THIS OUT. YOU CAN FREELY EXPRESS YOUR OPINION
WITH ANONYMITY GUARANTEED.
*

*

1.
2.
3.
by
4.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

How long have you been in the Office?
Were you moved as a result of the recent transfers?
Were the transfers as they effected you discussed with you
any superior prior to the notice of them being posted?
Do you think as a matter of policy, they should have been?

371. Connick, 461 U.S. at 138.
372. Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 753 (E.D. La.), affjd, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.
1981), rev'd 461 U.S. 138 (1983). The district court's findings of fact are listed in Myers, 507
F. Supp. at 753-56.
373. Myers, 507 F. Supp. at 753.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 753-54.
376. Id. at 754.
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5. From your experience, do you feel office procedure regarding
transfers has been fair?
6. Do you believe there is a rumor mill in the office?
7. If so, how do you think it effects overall working performance
of A.D.A. personnel?
8. If so, how do you think it effects office morale?
9. Do you generally first learn of office changes and developments through rumor?
10. Do you have confidence in and would you rely on the word of:
Bridget Bane
Fred Harper
Lindsay Larson
Joe Meyer
Dennis Waldron
11. Do you ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on
behalf of office supported candidates?
12. Do you feel a grievance committee would be a worth-while
addition to the office structure?
13. How would you rate office morale?
14. Please feel free to express any comments or feelings you may
have.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS SURVEY. 377
The following morning, Connick discussed the "transfer order" with
Myers, and urged her to accept the transfer to Section One. She said
37s Later that morning, Myers began distributing
she would consider it.
the questionnaires to other assistant district attorneys, taking care
that only they, and no other personnel, received copies. 79 Soon after
this, Waldron learned about the questionnaires and phoned Connick,
telling him that Myers was causing a "mini-insurrection" at the office.
Connick then informed Myers that she was fired as of the end of the
day, stating as the sole reason, her refusal to accept "a transfer."'
Connick also told her that he viewed her distributing the questionnaires as an act of insubordination, (but later, at trial, denied that he

377.
378.
379.
380.

Id. at 754 n. 1. (blank spaces for answers are here omitted).
Id. at 754.
Id.
Id. at 755.

381.

Id.
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had fired her because of the questionnaires).3 Myers then offered to
tell Connick what she had decided about accepting the transfer, but
Connick stated that he "did not want to hear about her decision. "3
The district court found as a matter of fact that Connick had fired
Myers because of the questionnaire, not, as he claimed, because she
had refused to accept transfer. In effect, the court determined that
the reason Connick gave Myers and claimed in court was a mere
pretext. It then proceeded to analyze the facts under Pickering v.
Board of Education,, Givhan v. School District,3 and Fifth Circuit
decisional law.38 Applying Givhan, the court held that it "matters not
. .that [Myers] chose to submit her questionnaire through private,
rather than public, channels. '" The court held that Myers' speech
was protected under the First Amendment because the issues raised
in the questionnaire "relate to the effective functioning of the District
Attorney's Office," and were, therefore, "matters of public importance
and concern."8 9 The court identified several particular items as matters
of public concern:
*

Plaintiff solicited the views of her fellow Assistant District
Attorneys on a number of issues, including office transfer
policies and the manner in which information of that nature
was communicated within the office. The questionnaire also
sought to determine the views of Assistants regarding office
morale, the need for a grievance committee, and the level
of confidence felt by the Assistants for their supervisors.
Finally, the questionnaire inquired as to whether the Assistants felt pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf
of office-supported candidates.
Taken as a whole, the issues presented in the questionnaire relate to the effective functioning of the District Attorney's Office and are matters of public importance and concern. Myers' expression constitutes protected speech. 39

382. Id. at 755, 756. "Connick objected strongly to Question No. 10 ... which he felt
impugned the integrity of the supervisors within the office, and to No. 11 which he felt would
be damaging if discovered by the press." Id. at 755.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 755-56.
385. 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see supra text accompanying notes 28-61.
386. 439 U.S. 410 (1979); see. supra text accompanying notes 124-44.
387. The district court's conclusions of law are set out in Myers, 507 F. Supp. at 756-60.
388. Id. at 757.
389. Id. at 758.
390. Id.
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The district court noted that prior Fifth Circuit cases also had found
public employees' speech regarding agency functioning related to matters of public concern.391 One of these cases likewise concerned employee speech in the form of distributing a questionnaire to fellow-employees.

392

Turning to balancing, the court invoked the "substantial and material interference" standard employed in numerous earlier Fifth Circuit
decisions. 39 The court held that Myers' speech had not substantially
or materially interfered with office operations or with Myers' performance of her duties. Indeed, it found that Connick had failed to show
that Myers' questionnaires had any adverse effect on delivery of public
services or on her own work performance. 394 Moreover, the district
court held that Myers' distribution of questionnaires had not adversely
affected her relationship with her superiors: "Unlike a statement of
fact which might be deemed critical of one's superiors, plaintiffs questionnaire was 'not a statement of fact but the presentation and solicitation of ideas and opinions."'s- The court concluded that Myers' interests outweighed Connick's,w and ordered her reinstated 39 with
back pay and other compensatory damages.m
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding in Myers'
favor. 39 By a 5-4 majority, the Supreme Court reversed.4 The major-

391. Id. at 758 n.5 (citing Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1980)); see, e.g.,
Lindsey v. Board of Regents, 607 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979).
392. Lindsey, 607 F.2d at 672; see supra text accompanying notes 117, 179-83.
393. Myers, 507 F. Supp. at 757, 757 n.4, 759; see supra text accompanying notes 217-34.
The Myers court observed that the Fifth Circuit had also applied other balancing tests: e.g.,
"whether or not the employee's exercise of constitutional privileges 'clearly over-balanced' the
employee's 'usefulness' as an employee," Myers, 507 F. Supp. at 757 n.4, "'whether a public
employee's statements unduly interfere with the efficiency with which governmental services
are provided,"' and whether the defendant succeeds in "'clearly demonstrat[ing] that the employee's conduct substantially interferes with the discharge of duties and responsibilities inherent
in [governmental] employment'." Id. at 757, 757 n.4, 758.
394. Myers, 507 F. Supp. at 759.
395. Id. (citing Lindsey, 607 F.2d at 675).

396.

Id.

397. Id. at 760. The court recognized that "acrimonious circumstances" surrounding Myers'
departure along with "adverse feelings" resulting from her recourse to judicial relief would make
it difficult for her "to achieve a harmonious working relationship" with the district attorney's
office upon her return, but concluded that reinstatement was nevertheless an appropriate remedy. Id. This conclusion accords with prior Fifth Circuit case law. See supra note 287 and
accompanying text.
398. Myers, 507 F. Supp. at 760.
399. 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981)(unpublished opinion), rev'd, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
400. Connick, 461 U.S. at 138.
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ity opinion by Mr. Justice White has been analyzed by numerous
commentators who, with virtual unanimity, find its reasoning seriously
flawed. 401 Only a few critical points will be noted here.
The issue framed by Justice White at the beginning was "Whether
the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the discharge of a
state employee for circulating a questionnaire concerning internal office
affairs. ' ' 4°- The Court's stated holding, however, curiously failed to
resolve, or even address this issue. Instead, in peculiarly contorted
language, Justice White stated:
We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a
citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an
employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the
most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to
the employee's behaviour .... Our responsibility is to ensure
that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue
of working for the government; this does not require a grant
of immunity for employee grievances not afforded by 4the
3
First Amendment to those who do not work for the State. 0
The precise import of this holding is uncertain, since elsewhere in the
opinion the Court found that Myers' questionnaire had addressed at
least one matter of public concern.404 Moreover, the Court seemed to
say that a questionnaire evaluating internal office affairs could constitute protected speech.405

401. See Hiers, supra note 37, at 754-67, 806-08.
402. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140; see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-86, & 386
nn.8 & 9.
403. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (citations omitted).
404. "One question in Myers' questionnaire, however, does touch upon a matter of public
concern. Question 11 inquires if assistant district attorneys 'ever feel pressured to work in
political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates."' Id. at 149. The holding quoted in
the text is odd in several other respects. For example, several items in Myers' questionnaire
about office practices and morale were obviously of more than merely personal interest: Connick
was concerned about the questionnaire precisely because such items might be of interest to
other assistant district attorneys; the issue before the Court was not the "wisdom" of Connick's
"personnel decision," but its constitutionality; that decision not only was "allegedly" taken as a
result of Myers' speech, the district court had so found as a matter of fact; it was not Myers'
"conduct" that gave rise to retaliation, but her speech. Id. Some other features of the quoted
holding will be analyzed below.
405. "While discipline and morale in the workplace are related to an agency's efficient
performance of its duties, the focus of Myers' questions is not to evaluate the performance of
the office but rather to gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors."
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239

In concluding that the district court and Fifth Circuit should be
reversed, the Connick majority introduced several new tests and doctrines. These are considered here in the sequence followed above in
analyzing Fifth and Eleventh Circuit case law: Whether the speech is
protected under the First Amendment; the nature of the interests on
the side of employee free speech; countervailing governmental interests; and balancing considerations.41. First Amendment Protection and "Matters of Public Concern"
Prior to Connick, some Fifth and Eleventh Circuit cases seemed
to say that, in order to be accorded First Amendment protection, a
public employee's speech had to relate to matters of public concern. 4 0 7
On the other hand, other Fifth and Eleventh Circuit cases did not so
require.408 Much of the language in Connick appears to agree with
the former proposition. For example, after a somewhat cursory exercise in revisionist history, the majority asserted that its relevant prePickering decisions, along with Pickering itself, Perry, Mt. Healthy,
and Givhan, all involved matters of public concern. 4 09 From this retrospect, the Court concluded, "[I]f Myers' questionnaire cannot be fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it
10
is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge."'

Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. The majority evidently felt itself competent to decide as a question
of fact that Myers was not interested in developing a basis for evaluating office performance,
but intended only to pursue controversy for the sake of controversy.
406. See supra text accompanying notes 147-273, 293-347.
407. See supra text accompanying notes 179-94, 302-08.
408. See supra text accompanying notes 168-78, 294-301.
409. Connick, 461 U.S. at 143-45. The Connick majority neglected to observe that under
Pickering, whether the employee's speech related to a matter of importance to the public was
a factor in balancing the speaker's right of expression against any harm the speech may have
caused. Pickering had not said that before a court even commenced such balancing it should
decide whether the subject of speech was of public interest. In Pickering, Mt. Healthy, and
Givhan, the administrative superiors all alleged that the employee's speech had adversely affected
their respective agency's ability to function. None of these cases had to do with agency superiors
who were merely offended because they did not like what the employee said.
410. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. This statement is not presented, however, as the holding
in the case. It is unclear how it relates to the purported holding. Under the holding, quoted
above, Myers' speech would be protected if she had spoken "as a citizen"; moreover, it would
have been protected if it had addressed anything other than a matter only of personal interest.
It is not immediately obvious that the world of speech falls into two mutually exclusive categories:
matters of public interest, and matters only of personal concern. One of the reasons that later
courts had trouble construing Connick is this gap in its "holding": what about speech that is
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The Court then went on to review Myers' questionnaire in order 4to1
determine whether or not it related to matters of public concern. '
It concluded that only one item, question 11 concerning pressure4 2to
work on behalf of office-supported political candidates, did so relate. '
Nevertheless, the majority's stated holding4' 3 does not treat matters of public concern as a sine qua non for First Amendment protection. Under that holding, if a public employee spoke as a citizen (or
as both a citizen and employee) on matters of personal interest, or as
not necessarily
an employee on matters of not merely personal (but
414
public) interest, such speech would be protected.
The Connick majority invented ad hoc a new test for determining
when or whether employee speech addressed a matter of public concern: namely, consideration of "the content, form, and context" in
which the statement was made. 4' 5 The Court cited no precedent and
offered no rationale on behalf of these newly created criteria. Implicitly
on the basis of the new "context" test, the majority proceeded to
classify most of her questionnaire "as mere extensions of Myers' dis'41 6
pute over her transfer to another section of the criminal court.

neither merely personal nor of public interest? Another reason is the contradiction between the
holding itself and this language which implies that only speech on matters of public concern
can be protected under the First Amendment. To the extent that Connick is so construed, the
door was thereby opened for employee-superiors to punish subordinates for saying any thing
they found displeasing without even having to claim that the speech had adversely affected
agency efficiency. Presumably, under Pickering, speech on matters of personal concern would
have been protected so long as it did not intrude on agency efficiency.
411. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-49.
412. Id. at 149. One commentator observed:
[The Connick Court] asserted its own competence to determine whether the public
employee's activity constituted a matter of public concern, rather than provide
broad protection for First Amendment activity, which would have enabled the
general public to evaluate the information.... Faced with the risk of losing their
jobs, government employees are likely to . . . withhold both public and private
opinions critical of their employers. As a consequence, the general public may be
deprived of inside information about the manner in which the government discharges its public services.
Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-FirstAmendment-Freedom of Speech-Public Employees-Comick
v. Myers, 30 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 417, 441-42 (1985).
413. See supra text accompanying note 403.
414. Moreover, this holding provides a further exception: namely, when "the most unusual
circumstances" are present. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
415. Id. Such determination, the Court announced, was a matter of law not fact (id. at 148
n.7), or possibly a "constitutional judgment on the facts." Id. at 150 n.10. Either way, it was
a matter for de novo review by the appellate court.
416. Id.; see also supra note 405. The text there quoted goes on: "These questions reflect
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Thus the "context" test opened the door for appellate courts to speculate as to employees' motivation or purpose in speaking, a matter that
might well have been considered a question of fact for the trier of
fact. Likewise, implicitly, on the basis of "context," the majority
doubted that Myers' questions were "of public import in evaluating
the performance of the District Attorney as an elected official." As
reasons for so doubting, the majority stated that Myers had not sought
to bring to public attention any failure by the district attorney to
discharge its prosecutorial duties or any "wrongdoing or breach of
public trust. '' 417 Here the Court seemed to say that only whistle-blowing speech would relate to matters of public concern - a strange
proposition, since none of its earlier speech cases from Keyishian to
Givhan had to do with whistle-blower speech.
The dissent in Connick was concerned that the majority had implicitly held that speech on matters of agency operations, including
employee morale, should be excluded from the realm of speech relating
to matters of public concern. 418 But the Connick majority did not go
that far. As previously noted, the majority indicated that Myers' questions as to "discipline and morale in the workplace" and agency "efficiency" would have been within the penumbra of "matters of public
concern" had her "focus" not been merely (in the Court's judgment)
to perpetuate controversy. 419 Nevertheless, other language in the
majority opinion left it unclear where the Court meant to draw the
line between protected discussions of office morale, discipline and ef-

one employee's dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to turn that displeasure into a
cause celebre." Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. At no point did the Connick Court discuss whether
the root of the "controversy," Myers' expressed concern as to possible conflict of interest if
transferred to Section One, would have constituted a matter of public interest. See supra text
accompanying notes 372-34.
417. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. The Connick majority insisted that Givhan was inapplicable
here, since Ms. Givhan's protest as to racial discrimination was "inherently a matter of public
concern," whereas Myers' speech (as construed by the majority) was focused only on "a personal
employment dispute." Id. at 148 n.8.
418. Id. at 156, 158-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., and
Stevens, J.).
419. See supra note 405 and accompanying text; see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8.
Here, however, a questionnaire not otherwise of public concern does not attain
that status because its subject matter could, in different circumstances, have been
the topic of a communication to the public that might be of general interest. The
dissent's analysis of whether discussions of office morale and discipline could be
matters of public concern is beside the point - it does not answer whether this
questionnaire is such speech.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VCol.5

ficiency, and mere personal employee complaints concerning internal
office affairs.4 ° Connick bequeathed this problem to the lower courts.
These courts would also have to decipher Connick's enigmatic holding
in order to determine whether speech on matters other than those of
purely personal concern would be protected even if it did not relate
to matters of public concern. 421 They also would have to determine,
without much guidance from the Court, what kinds of matters should
be considered within the bounds of "matters of public concern."=
2. Employees' Free Speech Interests
Fifth and Eleventh Circuit case law had previously identified a
number of constitutionally protected interests employees might be
understood to have in their own speech.4 In Porter v. Califano,for instance, the Fifth Circuit had stated, "The First Amendment
ensures that under most circumstances even the most junior government clerk typist can criticize the speech and acts of the top officials
in her office as freely as any citizen can." Myers would have supposed
that she was entitled to this right. Moreover, she might reasonably
have believed that she had a legitimate interest in the efficiency and
fairness of her environment in which she and her fellow assistant
district attorneys worked.42 She might also have thought that she had
the right to speak her mind free from governmental censorship or
sanction.4 She evidently did believe that she had a right or duty as
a conscientious employee to avoid placing herself in a situation where
her effectiveness would be impaired by conflict of interest.The Connick majority completely ignored any First Amendment
interest Myers might have had in her own speech. In Justice White's
view, the First Amendment simply should not apply to public employee

420. This lack of clarity derives in large part from the majority's tendency to indulge in
hyperbolic dicta, e.g., "[T]he First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a
roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs." Id. at 149.
421. On the Fifth Circuit's treatment of this question, see Hiers, supranote 37, at 771-97.
422. As to Eleventh Circuit determinations, see infra text accompanying notes 526-40.
423. See supra text accompanying notes 198-203, 311-19.
424. 592 F.2d 770, 779 (5th Cir. 1979).
425. See supra text accompanying note 203; see also Estlund, supra note 14, at 932-33
("[Hiad Sheila Myers been a private employee covered by the NLRA, her effort to ascertain
whether her fellow employees shared her concerns about morale, the lack of a grievance procedure, and the fairness of the transfer arrangements would almost certainly have been protected
by . . . the Act.").
426. See supra text accompanying note 313.
427. Myers, 507 F. Supp. at 753.
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grievances. Private sector employees' grievances are not protected by
the First Amendment; therefore government employees who present
grievances should not be granted "immunity" from retaliation either.4
The Court's holding could be read to mean that only speech on matters
of public concern was protected under the First Amendment.
In
that case, the only possible constitutional value that might be accorded
employee speech would be its social utility. Apparently the only kind
of interest the Connick majority considered an employee might have
as employee in her speech was in expressing merely personal matters
such as grievances. Such expressions the Court deemed unworthy of
constitutional protection, for government agencies would find it too
burdensome to go to court every time they wished to punish employees
for so speaking. "To presume that all matters which transpire within
a government office are of public concern would mean that virtually
every remark - and certainly every criticism directed at a public
official - would plant the seed of a constitutional case."- Apparently
it did not occur to the majority that government agencies could avoid
such litigation by the simple expedient of refraining from punishing
employees for expressing grievances or criticisms.
- Because the Court found one item in Myers' questionnaire that
"touched upon" a matter of public concern, it was compelled to proceed
with determining whether Connick was justified in firing her.-, That
item was question 11, which asked whether assistant district attorneys
ever felt pressured "to work in political campaigns on behalf of office

428. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147; see supra text accompanying note 403. The majority's theory
here seems to be that both public and private sector employees who dare to express grievances
ought to be punished. Commentators have criticized the majority's authoritarian labor-management relations model as archaic. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Constitutional
Law - Freedom of Speech, Press and Assembly, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 169 n.49 (1983).
429. Connick, 461 U.S. at 145-48; see supra text accompanying note 403. As noted above,
however, the holding could also be read to mean that only speech related to matters "only of
personal interest" was unprotected. In that case, only employee grievances relating exclusively
to the personal situation of the complaining employee would be unprotected. The Connick
majority's conclusion that Myers' complaint was of the latter character ignored the fact that
her questionnaire asked other assistant district attorneys for their perceptions and comments.
For example, the majority asserted that if Myers' questionnaire were released to the public, it
"would convey no information at all other than the fact that a single employee is upset with
the status quo." Id. at 147. All that was involved, according to the majority, was "one employee's
dissatisfaction" and "displeasure." Id. at 148. Significantly, the majority did not even go to the
trouble of manipulating the facts to justify these conclusion; it merely asserted them.
430. Id. at 149.
431. Id.
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supported candidates." This issue implicated both employees' own freedom of belief, and society's interest "that government should depend
upon meritorious performance rather than political service."3. Government Interests in Suppressing or Punishing Employee Speech
In Pickering and its subsequent government employee speech
cases, the Supreme Court confronted situations where government
agency superiors admittedly fired employees because of their speech.
Connick is different. Both in his stated reasons to Myers at the time
he fired her and at trial, Connick maintained that he had acted only
because of her refusal to accept "a transfer." The district court found
this reason pretextual, and determined as a matter of fact that he
had fired her because of her speech. It might be supposed that it
would have been too late in the day for Connick to claim for the first
time on appeal that he had fired Myers because he was concerned
that her speech had adversely affected office efficiency or her own
performance.4 It would have been more consistent with logic and
precedent if both the district court and the Supreme Court had initially
allowed Connick only to try to show how Myers' speech concerning
her purported refusal to accept transfer might have adversely affected
office operations, since his claim was that he had fired her only for
so refusing.
In order to find for Connick, the Court majority had to overcome
the district court's determination that Myers' questionnaire had not
substantially and materially interfered with either her performance of
her duties or the District Attorney's Office's provision of services.43
It did so by invoking a number of new tests and doctrines. Significant-

432. Id.
433. See Richard Hiers, Issues Presented for the First Time on Appeal: Fifth Circuit
Standardsfor Consideration, 8 FIFTH CIRCUIT REP. 229-37 (1991). At trial, Connick denied
that he had fired Myers because of the questionnaire, but contended 'that the distribution was
not constitutionally protected." Myers, 507 F. Supp. at 765.
434. The Connick Court further confused matters by suggesting that Myers' "reluctance
to accede to the transfer order" could have been considered as a Mt. Healthy "but for" defense.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 153. The Court evidently forgot that the sole reason Connick had given
previously for dismissing Myers was her refusal to accept transfer, and that the district court
had found as a matter of fact that this reason was pretextual.
435. Myers, 507 F. Supp at 758-59. It is unclear whether the district court and Supreme
Court treated these determinations as findings of fact or as conclusions of law. Whether or not
interference occurred appears to be more a question of fact, distinguishable from "balancing"
which the Court has come to regard as a matter of law. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150 n.10.
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ly, the Court did not reject the Fifth Circuit's "substantially and
materially impeded" or "interfered" test."3
The Court agreed with the district court's finding that the questionnaire had not impeded Myers' own performance. But it attacked the
court's holding that Myers' questionnaire had not interfered with the
Office's provision of services. In doing so, it read a variety of new
factors or criteria into Pickering'saccount of governmental interests.
To begin with, the Court cited a then one-hundred-and-one-year-old
case endorsing the value of "maintaining proper discipline" in government service. 437 The Court did not bother to point out that this ancient
4
precedent had nothing to do with public employee free speech rights. -8
The Connick majority extracted "discipline" from this entirely different context and, in effect, proclaimed it a transcendental government
interest which could be balanced against public employees' First
Amendment speech rights. 39 The Connick majority seemed to say
that discipline was a value in its own right, which could trump an
employee's speech interest even if the latter had no adverse effect
upon an agency's delivery of services to the public.
Next, the Court quoted from Justice Powell's concurring opinion
in Arnett v. Kennedy:
[T]he Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and
internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to do
so with dispatch. Prolonged retention of a disruptive . . .
employee can adversely affect discipline and morale in the
work place, foster disharmony, and ultimately impair the
efficiency of an office or agency. 440

436. See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
437. Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882).
438. Curtis concerned construction of an 1876 criminal statute prohibiting federal employees
from requesting or receiving from, or giving money or property to other federal employees for
political purposes. Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. at 371. The quoted sentence in its entirety read:
"The evident purpose of Congress in all this class of enactments has been to promote efficiency
and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper discipline in the public
service." Id. at 373 (emphasis added).
439. The Pickering Court had noted the importance of "maintaining . . . discipline by
immediate superiors" in the context of the State's interest, as employer, "in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
In none of its cases has the Court troubled to explain how, absent either statutory or common
law "police powers" authorization, purported governmental interests such as "discipline" or even
"efficiency" came to be accorded constitutional status.
440. 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
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Here again, the Court read new doctrine into Pickering. Evidently
the Connick majority was preparing to portray Myers as a "disruptive"
employee, whose retention could have led to such untoward consequences. As so read, Arnett would seem to allow governmental
superiors "wide discretion" to remove such employees lest their conduct (including speech) "ultimately" impair office or agency efficiency.
The Court neglected to mention that Arnett concerned a due process
challenge to the Lloyd-La Follette Act's" 1 termination procedures for
federal civil service employees, and that the text quoted from Justice
Powell's concurring opinion had to do entirely with whether the Fifth
Amendment obliged the federal government to provide "a prior evidentiary hearing" for allegedly disruptive (or "otherwise unsatisfactory")
employees covered under the Act." 2
The Connick majority overruled the district court's conclusion that
Myers' questionnaire had not interfered with "working" or "office relationships."- The Court did not say whether it so determined as a
matter of fact or as a question of law.-2 Instead, it introduced five
new doctrines or factors into its Pickering jurisprudence.
First, without citing any authority, the Court declared that as a
matter of policy, great deference would be accorded officials' judgment
in cases where employee speech might affect close working relationships deemed "essential to fulfilling public responsibilities."" * Implicitly, the Court was relying upon the quoted language from Arnett
6
approving government officials' "wide discretion."Second, the Connick majority stated, "[W]e do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the
disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships
is manifest before taking action."'" 7 In effect, the majority gave the
green light both for agency superiors to claim for the first time on
appeal that they had acted on the basis of their fear that the discharged
employee's speech might at some future time disrupt office activities,

441. 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1982).
442. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 163-70 (Powell, J., concurring in part). The Arnett Court specifically
held that Congress did not intend the Act to authorize discharge for constitutionally protected
speech. Id. at 163-64.
443. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-53.
444. See supra note 435 and accompanying text.
445. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52.
446. See supra text accompanying note 440.
447. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152. As authority, the Court cited two cases involving denial of
access to non-public forums. Id. at 152 n.12.
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and for appellate courts to make factual determinations as to the
reasonableness of such fears. Moreover, without citing any authority
or offering any rationale, the majority announced that courts should
accord such fears "additional weight" when the employee's speech
concerned application of office policy to the speaker.44 Prior to Connick, the Fifth Circuit had likewise held that agency officials need not
wait to act until actual disruption occurred.4 9 However, the Fifth
Circuit had insisted that such action would be valid only if the officials
could offer an adequate, objective, factual basis for concluding that
disruption was likely to occur. 450 The Connick majority said nothing
about objective, factual evidence, thereby apparently indicating willingness to credit officials' mere post hoc speculations as to possible
harm that they might have anticipated.
Third, the Court made another independent fact judgment.45 1 The
district court had concluded that Myers' questionnaire could not have
affected agency operations in view of the fact that it did not consist
of factual criticisms, but was rather "the presentation and solicitation
of ideas and opinions. ' '4 52 The Connick majority rejected this conclusion, apparently on the basis of its own knowledge of life:4 5 "Questions,
no less than forcefully stated opinions and facts, carry messages and
it requires no unusual insight to conclude that the purpose, if not the
likely result, of the questionnaire is to seek to precipitate a vote of
no confidence in Connick and his supervisors. '' 5 It appears that the
majority expected that the questionnaire's results would support such
a vote of no confidence; for no disruption would have been likely to
occur if - as the Court elsewhere maintained - the questionnaire
merely showed "that a single employee [was] upset. ' '4- The Connick
majority wished to have it both ways: in determining whether the
questionnaire as a whole related to matters of public concern, it viewed
it as only a reflection of Myers' personal "dissatisfaction" or "displea-

448.

Id. at 139.

449. See supra text accompanying notes 332-35.
450. See supra text accompanying note 333.
451. Apparently the Court felt that it was entitled to treat not only balancing as a matter
of law, but also to so treat questions of fact in regard to the impact of employee speech on
purported state interests.
452. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152.
453. The Court mentioned neither the clearly erroneous rule nor the concept of judicial
notice.
454. Id. The majority suggested that Question 10, regarding confidence in certain supervisors, carried "clear potential for undermining office relations." Id.
455. Id. at 147.
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sure";4 but in assessing the questionnaire's potential for undermining
office relations, the majority anticipated that others in the office would
4 57
share Myers' concerns to the extent of voting no confidence.

Fourth, despite the fact that Myers had not personally confronted
Connick or other supervisors, the Court invoked Givhan's "manner,
time, and place" criteria. 45 Applying these criteria, the majority concluded, "[T]he fact that Myers . . . exercised her rights to speak at

the office supports Connick's fears that the functioning of his office
was endangered."5 The majority noted that distributing and completing some of the questionnaires required Myers and others to leave
their work. 460 The district court had found that neither Myers' own

nor the efficiency of the agency's performance had been adversely
affected. 46 1 Thus again, the Court acted as super-fact-finder. Even if

the Givhan factors were properly invoked, the Court's conclusion that
the facts justified a reasonable apprehension that office functioning
was "endangered" shows excessive deference to the officials' purported
fears.46
Fifth, the majority introduced yet another criterion for appraising
the affected governmental interest: "the context in which the dispute
arose. ' 4 Again, the majority cited no authority for this new element.46
The majority used the new "context" factor to link Myers' questionnaire with the transfer order. On that basis, it concluded that her

456. Id. at 148.
457. Id. at 152. Commentators have pointed out that if the questionnaire revealed low office
morale and lack of confidence, it would obviously be of public concern to citizens "in determining
whether to re-elect the district attorney." Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Comment, Freedom of Speech in the
Public Workplace: A Comment on the Public Concern Requirement, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1118
(1988); see also Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of IndividualRights: The First
Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (1990) ("[The worker can be
removed when an employer merely anticipatesthat [the employee's speech] might get too disruptive.
Hence, the employer can prevent a grievance from spreading and capturing the public's interest.").
458. "When a government employee personally confronts his immediate superior, the employing agency's institutional efficiency may be frustrated not only by the content of the employee's message but also by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered." Connick, 461
U.S. at 153 (quoting Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415 n.4).
459. - Id.
460. Id.
461. Myers, 507 F. Supp. at 759.
462. The majority only later and incidentally mentioned that such fears should, perhaps,
be reasonable. Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
463. Id. at 153.
464. The majority cited no authority for considering "context" in determining whether
employee speech addressed a matter of public concern, either. See id. at 146-48.
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"speech" related to the office transfer policy as applied to herself.
Under that circumstance, the majority announced - again producing
new doctrine out of thin air - "additional weight must be given to
the supervisor's view that the employee has threatened the authority
'4
of the employer to run the office." 6
By means of these freshly fabricated and borrowed factors and
doctrines, the Connick majority was able to identify new governmental
interests and to assert that, in one way or another, Myers' speech
had raised reasonable [if belated] fears in Connick's mind that such
interests might have been threatened or endangered. The majority
also made some adjustments in the scales used for balancing competing
interests.
4. Balancing the Interests
The Connick Court announced a new sliding scale for use in balancing: "[A] stronger showing [of adverse effects on the office and working
relationships] may be necessary if the employee's speech more substantially involved matters of public concern. ' ' 46 It is unclear from the
context whether the Court meant this formula to apply only when
officials feared potential disruption,467 or whether it meant it applicable
in all balancing. In any case, the Court said that when the matter of
public concern is more "substantial," a greater showing of harm
(whether actual or feared) would be required. The Court did not say
what might constitute more substantial matters of public concern. The
effect of this new standard seemed to be that the federal courts would
now undertake to assess the importance of the content employee
speech. On what normative basis they would do so, the Connick Court
did not say.

465. Id. at 153. It has been suggested that the Connick Court was more concerned with
preserving the values of "managerial control and employer authority" than with protecting the
efficient performance of government agencies in rendering public services. Richard M. Fischl,
Labor, Management, and the FirstAmendment: Whose Rights are These Anyway?, 10 CARDOZO
L. REV. 729-46 (1988). Fischl points out that Myers was a professional employee, "whose work,
because of its professional nature, was deeply implicated in ... her employer's enterprise." Id.
at 744-45. Professional employees may reasonably expect to have some say in the operation of
the agencies where they work. It may not be co-incidental that in all of the first Supreme
Court's and early Fifth Circuit's employee free speech cases plaintiffs were school teachers and
college professors who, as professionals, expected to take part in determining how they should
carry out their responsibilities.
466. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152.
467. The sentence immediately preceding refers to the situation where the official or employer acts in anticipation of future adverse effects. Id. at 152.
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The other novel balancing consideration has to do with what the
Court proposed to balance. Pickering had stated simply that the task
was to "arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interests of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees.'"
4 The Connick
majority went about balancing differently. At the outset, it established
that only one item in Myers' questionnaire had addressed a matter of
public concern, namely, the question whether assistant district attorneys felt pressured to work for certain political candidates. 4 69 Pursuant

to the Pickering language just quoted, the Connick Court should then
have proceeded to weigh Myers' interest in the question of pressure
to support political candidates against Connick's interest in suppressing
that speech. Had the Court balanced these interests, there can be
little doubt that it would have had to affirm the decisions below.

470

Instead, however, the Connick majority blended Myers' interest in
this matter of public concern with the other questionnaire items, and
then -

voila! -

declared that this diluted mixture related to matters

of public concern "in only a most limited sense," and was, in short,

merely "an employee grievance concerning internal office policy. '' 471

On the other side of the scales, the majority placed not Connick's
interest in suppressing Myers' speech as to political pressures, but
rather his purported belief that the questionnaire as a whole "would
disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working

relationships. '' 472 Here, again, the Connick majority muddied the wat-

ers. Instead of balancing Myers' constitutionally protected speech
against the government's interest in suppressing it, the majority bal-

468. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (emphasis added). The term "balance" here may be misleading. Presumably, the Pickering Court did not mean that the sets of interest should "balance"
equally; instead, by "balancing" it more likely meant weighing or prioritizing, in order to determine which set of interests in a given case were more important. "Balancing" suggests a scientific
measuring process; but in reality the Court was talking about making a normative judgment.
469. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148-49.
470. The Court cited prior cases to the effect that "official pressure upon employees to
work for political candidates not of the worker's own choice constitutes a coercion of belief in
violation of fundamental constitutional rights." Id. at 149 (emphasis added). Indeed, it would
have been difficult for the Court to avoid concluding that Myers' interest in this speech was a
matter of substantial public interest. See Risa L. Lieberwitz, Freedom of Speech in Public
Sector Employment: The Deconstitutionalizationof the Public Sector Workplace, 19 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 597, 645 (1988).
471. Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
472. Id. at 139.
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anced her unprotected speech against that speech's asserted adverse
impacts. 473 It would have been more logical, conceptually, as well as
more consistent with Picketing, Mt. Healthy, and Givhan, if the Connick Court had simply balanced Myers' interest in her speech regarding political pressure against the effects of that speech on governmental interests, and then remanded to the finder of fact the task of
determining whether Connick would have fired Myers anyway because
of her constitutionally unprotected conduct. Evidently the Connick
majority wished to make it easier for governmental superiors to inhibit
or punish public employee speech.
It was not until 1987, four years after Connick, that the Supreme
Court revisited public employee First Amendment speech rights. PostConnick Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence will be examined shortly. The
Court's 1987 decision and its contributions to the evolving analytical
framework will be considered first.
B.

474
Rankin v. McPherson

Mr. Rankin served as Constable in Harris County, Texas. The
constable's office had as its primary mission serving process and
executing warrants issued by courts with misdemeanor jurisdiction.
Ms. McPherson, a young black, worked for the office as a clerk-secre4 75
tary at a computer terminal in a back room closed to public access.
On March 30, 1981, during the lunch hour, McPherson and
a coworker, after hearing of an assassination attempt on
President Reagan, engaged in a brief, private conversation
about their opposition to the President's policies on welfare
and unemployment. [McPherson] concluded the discussion
with the statement: "I hope if they go for him again, they
476
get him.
Another office employee overheard the statement and reported it to
Rankin. Rankin called McPherson into his office and asked if she had

473. The majority nowhere mentions Myers' interest in her speech on political pressure or
the government's interest in suppressing or punishing that speech in its actual balancing. Id.
at 149-54. It concluded that Myers' litigation was merely an "attempt to constitutionalize [her]
employee grievance." Id. at 154.
474. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
475. McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233, 1236-37 (5th Cir. 1986), affd 483 U.S. 378 (1987);
see also McPherson v. Rankin, 736 F.2d 175, 177 n.2 (5th Cir. 1984) (vacating the district court's
grant of summary judgment for Rankin); Rankin, 483 U.S. at 378-79 (1987).
476. McPherson, 736 F.2d at 177.
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made the statement. She admitted doing so, and Rankin then fired
her.

47

The Fifth Circuit found that McPherson had been fired because of
the content of her speech, and that this speech had addressed a matter
of public concern 4 78s namely, "the life and death of the President,"
and/or "the President's policies. '47 Proceeding to balancing, the Fifth

Circuit focused on the context in which McPherson spoke. Rankin
conceded that he had not fired McPherson because of any disruption.
Moreover, the evidence did not show that her speech threatened office
efficiency or morale in the future. The court believed that the only
possibly affected governmental interest was what it characterized as
Rankin's contention that McPherson's views, read as espousing lawless
conduct, were inconsistent with the "law enforcement" mission of the
constable's office.4 ° Because McPherson's responsibilities did not involve law enforcement, and because she herself had no contact with
the public or with "sensitive" files, the court concluded that her role
had only minimal potential for "undermining" the office's mission.4sl
It therefore held that under these circumstances, the government's
interests did not outweigh McPherson's First Amendment speech
rights.48

A divided Supreme Court affirmed.4 In doing so, the Court extended some of Connick's additions to Pickering analysis. The main
changes introduced by Rankin will be noted within the analytical
framework used previously in this article.
1. Protected Employee Speech: Matters of Public Concern
Earlier Supreme Court case law had left somewhat open the question whether, in order to be protected, a public employee's speech

477. Id.
478. The court read Connick to mean that a government employee's speech would be
accorded First Amendment protection only if it addressed "matters of public concern." McPherson, 786 F.2d at 1235.
479. Id. at 1236, 1238. The court devoted a full page to puzzling over the "precise fit of
the clearly erroneous standard of review" and its own "duty to make 'an independent constitutional review of the facts of the case."' Id. at 1237-38. Apparently this discussion focused only
on determining whether McPherson's speech addressed a matter of public concern. Id.
480. Id. at 1238, 1239.
481. Id. at 1239.
482. Id. at 1238-39.
483. 483 U.S. 378 (1987)(Opinion by Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, Blackmun, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.).
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must address a "matter of public concern. '' 41 The Rankin Court all

but closed this question by stating that whether McPherson's speech
related to "a matter of public concern" was "the threshold question."4
The Court failed to indicate what kinds of subjects were to be deemed
matters of public concern. One would have expected some general
guidelines in view of the fact that the Court maintained that whether
a speech addressed a matter of public concern is a question of law.4

To be sure, the Rankin Court noted that Connick had intimated that
"in the most unusual circumstances" employee speech on other matters
might also be protected.4 7 But in neither Connick nor Rankin did
the Supreme Court indicate what might constitute such circumstances.
For all practical purposes, Rankin said that only speech regarding
matters of public concern would now be protected under the First
Amendment.4
2. Interests on the Side of Employee Free Speech
Possibly because of the content of McPherson's speech, the Court
did not attribute to it any social utility.- Though it did not identify
or describe them further, however, the Court did refer to "McPherson's First Amendment Rights. ' ' 49 Moreover, the Court enunciated a
general principle that seemed to underscore the importance of employee speech interests: "Vigilance is necessary to ensure that public
employers do not use authority over employees to silence discourse,
not because it hampers public functions, but simply because superiors
disagree with the content of employees' speech.

' 491

Under this doctrine, it might be thought that the threshold question
should be not whether speech addressed a matter of public concern,

484. See supra text accompanying notes 407-14.
485. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384.
486. Id. at 386 n.9 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7). Would topics so qualify only if
they were in fact discussed at public meetings or in the media? Or would topics be included if
they were matters that, in the court's view, probably would attract public interest if brought
to public attention? What about topics that, in the court's view, the public should find interesting
or important?
487. Id. at 384.
488. Id.
489. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43. In determining whether McPherson's speech
dealt with a matter of public concern, however, the Court did emphasize the importance of
"uninhibited . . . and wide-open" debate on public issues, including "sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials." Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387 (citing New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
490. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388 ("the free speech rights of the public employee").
491. Id. at 384.
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but whether it hampered public functions. 4 9 These statements could
be read to imply that public employees have a proper First Amendment
interest in their own speech, whether or not it has any social utility.
By elevating the "matters of public concern" factor to the status of
"threshold question," however, the Rankin Court effectively precluded
any meaningful consideration of the interests an employee herself
might have in her right to free expression. 493 Superior employees could
now punish subordinate employee speech to their hearts' content
whether or not such speech hampered public functions, so long as that
speech did not relate to matters of public concern. Only speech that
did so relate would be deemed worthy of being weighed against purported governmental interests.
3. Government Interests in Suppressing or Punishing Employee Speech
At the outset, the Court for the first time stated expressly that
in cases where an employee had been discharged because of her speech,
the government had the burden of justifying its action "on legitimate
grounds. ' ' 49 In Givhan, it will be recalled, the Court suggested that
when a public employee had personally confronted her immediate
superior, the "manner, time, and place" in which she spoke might be
considered in appraising the impact of her statement on agency efficiency. 495 The Connick Court applied these factors in assessing the
impact of Myers' questionnaire, even though the questionnaire had
not personally confronted any of her superiors. 4- Moreover, in Connick, the Court invoked an entirely new factor, the "context in which
the dispute arose. ' 497 The Rankin Court proceeded to declare that
manner, time, place, and context were to be used as factors in all

492.

Some commentators have suggested that the latter, not the former, should be the

threshold test. Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an

Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 52-53, 55 (1990); Masarro,
supra note 101, at 67-68 (1987); Cynthia K.Y. Lee, supra note 457, at 1136-38.
493. See supra text accompanying notes 484-88; see generally Madeline E. Cox, Note, ConstitutionalLaw - FirstAmendment - PublicEmployees' Right to Free Speech in the Workplace
Expanded - Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987), 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 380-405(1989).
494. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. The Court cited Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, which had
articulated a sliding scale for balancing, "[T]he State's burden in justifying a particular discharge
varies depending upon the nature of the employee's expression." Id. Arguably, Rankin thereby
receded sub silentio from this sliding scale. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149.
495. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., U.S. 410, 415 n.4 (1979).
496. See supra text accompanying notes 375-83, 458-62.
497. Connick, 461 U.S. at 153. See supra text accompanying notes 463-65.
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"balancing" analysis, without regard to whether employees had personally confronted their superiors, and whether or not their speech had
any connection with an on-going employment dispute. 49 Here, consideration of these factors led the Court to hold in the employee's,
McPherson's, favor.
Unlike Connick, where the Court sometimes seemed to say that
matters such as "discipline" and "working relationships" as such constituted governmental interests, 49 the Rankin Court reduced these
and other Pickering "considerations" to a common denominator: the
question whether the employee's speech interfered with "efficient" or
"effective functioning of the public employer's enterprise."501 The Court
noted that there was no record evidence that McPherson's speech had
so interfered.- Moreover, it found that there was no danger that
McPherson might somehow have "discredited the office," since her
speech took place in a room with no public access, and in the context
53
of a private conversation. 0
4. Balancing Considerations
The Rankin Court read Connick's "sliding scale" for balancing to
mean that in any case where a public employee was discharged for
her speech, the government agency or superior would have to adduce
"legitimate grounds" for such retaliation.5 Possibly the Court meant
to abandon that sliding scale. In its place, Rankin offered a different
sliding scale:
[I]n weighing the State's interest in discharging an employee
based on any claim that the content of a statement made by
the employee somehow undermines the mission of the public
employer, some attention must be paid to the responsibilities
of the employee within the agency. The burden of caution
employees bear with respect to the words they speak will
vary with the extent of authority and public accountability
the employee's role entails. Where, as here, an employee
serves no confidential, policymaking, or public contact role,

498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.

Cf. Connick, 461 U.S. at 153.
See supra text accompanying notes 437-46.
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
Id.
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. at 386; see supra text accompanying notes 466-67.
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the danger to the agency's successful function from that employee's private speech is minimal. 5
Here again, the "place" and "context" factors are operative.
How all the new factors, tests and doctrines created, extended,
and modified in Connick and Rankin would be understood by the
lower federal courts remained to be seen.' Their impact on Fifth
Circuit's case law has been considered elsewhere.57 Here attention
turns to developments in the Eleventh Circuit.

IV.

SUBSEQUENT AND CURRENT ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT JURISPRUDENCE

The Eleventh Circuit experienced considerable difficulty in determining what Connick meant and how it should be applied. Rankin
appeared to settle the question where the court should begin its
analysis, namely, by deciding whether the speech in question addressed a matter of public concern. But what matters were of public
concern? What were the next analytical steps? And what factors should
be considered as the court went about its balancing analysis? The
Eleventh Circuit was now obliged to braid together three strands of
precedent: the Supreme Court's new rulings in Connick and Rankin,
Fifth Circuit case law up to October 1, 1981, and its own prior decisions. As a convenience, the basic analytical framework followed previously in this article will be used to outline the Eleventh Circuit's
emerging public employee free speech jurisprudence, with two exceptions. One is that because the pre-Connick Fifth Circuit already determined that knowingly or recklessly false speech would not merit First
Amendment protection,5 that question is not considered further. The
other is that the emerging question of qualified immunity will be
considered after discussion of post-Connick Eleventh Circuit first and
second level Mt. Healthy causation analysis.

505. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390-91.
506. Commentators have noted that these courts have experienced considerable difficulty
construing Connick in particular. See, e.g., Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: the
Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43 (1988); Grover J.
Rees, The FirstAmendment, 16 TEX. TECH L. REV. 187, 188 (1985); D. Gordon Smith, Note,
Beyond "Public Concern": New Free Speech Standards for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 249, 257-62 (1990).
507. See Hiers, supra note 37, at 771-824.
508. See supra text accompanying notes 274-84.
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A. The Analytical Model or Framework
Shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Connick, the
Eleventh Circuit devised the following analytical model. First, the
plaintiff must demonstrate Mt. Healthy first level causation: namely,
that the speech in question was a "substantial or motivating" cause
for the employer's adverse action. 5°9 Second, the court balances to
determine whether the speech was protected; whether it addressed
"public issues" was "a factor" in this balancing.51° Third, if the plaintiff
succeeds in these first two steps, the burden then shifts to the defendant for Mt. Healthy second level causation proof, namely, to try to
show that it would have taken the same adverse action even in the
absence of plaintiffs speech.5 "
Two years later, in Holley v. Seminole County School District,512
the court formulated another model. Now the first step was to determine whether the plaintiffs speech was protected under the First
Amendment.5 13 Second, the plaintiff has the burden of proving Mt.
Healthy first level causation; and third, the defendant employer then
has the burden of proof as to Mt. Healthy level-two causation, namely,
that it would have taken the same action anyway. 14 Somewhat later,
the Eleventh Circuit set out a still different order of analysis. First,
it is to be determined whether the employee's speech addressed a
matter of public concern. If so, the second step is to consider whether
the plaintiff had shown first level Mt. Healthy causation. 51 6 If this had
been done, the court then took the third step of balancing, in order
6
to determine whether the adverse employment action was "justified." 5

509. Leonard v. City of Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
468 U.S. 1204 (1984). See Hatcher v. Board of Public Educ. & Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546, 1556
n.19 (11th Cir. 1987).
510. Id.
511. Leonard, 705 F.2d at 1303-1305. The case concerned black officers who had been
discharged for removing American flag emblems from their uniforms while demonstrating offduty against what they perceived as the police department's racially discriminatory practices. Id.
512. 755 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985).
513. The Holley opinion did not discuss matters of public concern inquiry or balancing,
evidently because the dispositive issue was causation. Id. at 1500-06.
514. Id.; see Hatcher, 809 F.2d at 1557 n.19; Berry v. Bailey, 726 F.2d 670, 674 (11th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1101 (1985).
515. Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d 1546,1552(11th Cir. 1988); Hatcher,809 F.2d at 1557 n. 19.
516. Hatcher, 809 F.2d at 1557 n.19; Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1512 (11th Cir. 1986);
see also Schneider v. Indian River Comm. Coll. Found., 875 F.2d 1537, 1542 (11th Cir. 1989).
In both Schneider, 875 F.2d at 1544, and Hatcher, 809 F.2d at 1539, the Eleventh Circuit
remanded the balancing step to the district court.
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The final step - if analysis proceeded
this far - would be Mt. Healthy
517
second level causation inquiry.
Still more recently, the court seems to have reverted to a four-step
version of the Holley format. Current inquiry proceeds as follows.
First, did the speech pass the Rankin "public concern" "threshold
test"? If so, second, does it survive Pickering balancing? If it does,
third, can the plaintiff show that her speech played "a substantial
part" in the superior's decision to punish or restrict it? And fourth,
if so, can the "government" or agency superior prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it "would have reached the same decision
. .. even in the absence of the protected conduct. ' 5' 18 The last two of
these steps have been referred to, respectively, as the Mt. Healthy
first level or "substantial part," and the Mt. Healthy second-level or
"but for" causation inquiries.
The main problem the court faced after Connick, however, was
not what analytical framework to follow, but rather how to construe
and apply Connick's various doctrines and dicta. The matter of public
concern question was perhaps the most problematic area.
B. The "Matters of Public Concern" Test
The earliest Eleventh Circuit post-Connick cases did not identify
the "matter of public concern" test as a sine qua non for First Amendment protection. 19 Soon, however, the Eleventh Circuit began to construe Connick to mean that only speech related to matters of public
concern would be protected.52 Once Rankin was decided, of course,
the Eleventh Circuit necessarily treated the "matters of public concern" issue as the "threshold question." 521 But what kinds of matters

517. The court set out yet another variation in Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562,
1565-66 (11th Cir. 1989). The variation was: (1)public concern analysis; (2) Pickering balancing;
(3) Mt. Healthy "substantial factor" or first-level causation determination; and (4) Mt. Healthy
"but for" or second-level causation test. Id.
518. Id. at 1564-65; Kurtz v. Vickrey, 855 F.2d 723, 730-31 (11th Cir. 1988).
519. See Holley, 755 F.2d at 1492; Berry v. Bailey, 726 F.2d 670, 678 (11th Cir. 1984);
Leonard v. City of Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 1983).
520. Eiland v. City of Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953, 955 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1020 (1987); Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1512, 1515 (11th Cir. 1992); Renfroe v.
Kirkpatrick, 722 F.2d 714, 715 (11th Cir. 1984); Cf. Ballard v. Blount, 581 F. Supp. 160, 162
(N.D. Ga. 1983), affd 734 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir.) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1086 (1984). As to Ballard's value as precedent, see infira note 573. Ferrara and Ballard
characterized this issue as "the threshold question."
521. Harris v. Evans, 920 F.2d 864, 867 (11th Cir. 1991); Kurtz v. Vickrey, 855 F.2d 723,
726 (11th Cir. 1988).
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would be considered "of public concern"? Numerous post-Connick and
post-Rankin cases turned on this issue.
1. A Question of Law; de novo Review
Which label should the court apply in a given case? It is entirely
up to the court to decide, for whether or not an employee's speech
addressed a matter of public concern. is considered a question of law
subject to "independent" or de novo review.52 Consequently, the dis23
trict court can grant a motion for summary judgment on this issue.5
Likewise, it can order either a directed verdict524 or judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict. 5 Such grants or orders may then be
reviewed by appellate courts under the de novo standard. Not surprisingly, a great deal of the Eleventh Circuit's attention has been devoted
to identifying and applying "matter of public concern" parameters.
The court often has indicated that certain topics are generally to be
regarded as matters of public concern. In those cases, the court considered mainly the speech's content. In other cases, the form or context
is the critical factor.
2. Content: Topics Ordinarily of Public Concern
Several Eleventh Circuit decisions have resolved the "public concern" issue primarily by analysis of the content factor. Certain subjects
have been found to be "of public concern." Whether that is so because
the court believed the public is concerned about such topics, or because
the court believed the public should be so concerned is not clear.
The Eleventh Circuit's earliest post-Connick opinion in the area
of government employee speech rights held that police officers' symbolic expression regarding "a widely held perception of racially discriminatory practices" by the city's police department concerned "matters
of interest to the community at large. "' 2 6 The Connick Court itself
had characterized racial discrimination as "a matter inherently of public

522. See Myers, 507 F. Supp. at 760; Eiland v. City of Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953, 957 n.5
(11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987).
523. See, e.g., Pearson v. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth., 952 F.2d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.
1992).
524. See, e.g., Deremo v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 908, 910 (11th Cir. 1991).
525. See, e.g., Renfroe v. Kirkpatrick, 722 F.2d 714 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823
(1984).
526. Leonard v. City of Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
468 U.S. 1204 (1984) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-50).
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concern."'' 7 More recently, in dicta, the Eleventh Circuit commented
that an employee's complaint to an agency superior reporting sexual
harassment or other wrongful conduct by a public official "would ordinarily be a matter of public concern." 528
Corruption in public office is clearly "a matter of public concern." ' 9
This conclusion accords with the Fifth Circuit's pre-partition "whistleblower" decisions which emphasized the public's need or right to know
about such corruption.5 Likewise, an employee's statement warning
about a safety hazard has been held to constitute speech on a matter
of public safety.-1 Communications by corrections facility employees
to parole boards regarding advisability of releasing particular convicted
criminals are deemed "of great public concern." 2
Topics relating to public expenditures and political campaigns
likewise have been found of public interest. In Stewart v. Baldwin
County Board of Education,- a school board employee's expression
opposing the Superintendent's views on a pending tax referendum was
found to implicate public concern. Stewart accords not only with Pickering- but also with pre-partition Fifth Circuit political speech jurisprudence. Similarly, in Kurtz v. Vickrey, the court held that a university professor's criticisms of his institution's spending priorities
addressed a matter of public concern.-6 Another panel's decision,
Maples v. Martin,07 released a few weeks later, found that a publica-

527. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8. By "inherently," the Court evidently meant that it
believed the public should be concerned about the matter. Id.; see also Sims v. Metropolitan
Dade County, 972 F.2d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 1992).
528. Deremo v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 908, 912 (11th Cir. 1991).
529. Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708, 712 (11th Cir. 1992); Bryson v. City of
Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989); Morales v. Stierheim, 848 F.2d 1145, 1149 (11th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Leon v. Avino, 489 U.S. 1013 (1989); Berry v. Bailey, 726
F.2d 670, 676 (11th Cir. 1984).
530. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
531. Finch v. City of Mt. Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1502 (11th Cir. 1989). The pre-Connick
Eleventh Circuit had also found safety an "important issue for public scrutiny." Swilley v.
Alexander, 629 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1980)(physical safety and well-being of school children).
See supra text accompanying notes 190-93.
532. Harris v. Evans, 920 F.2d 864, 867 (11th Cir. 1991).
533. 908 F.2d 1499, 1506 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Stough v. Gallagher, 967 F.2d 1523,
1527-28 (11th Cir. 1992).
534. Id. at 1506.
535. See supra notes 250-55 and accompanying text; see also Nicholson v. Gant, 816 F.2d
591, 599 (11th Cir. 1987); Sykes v. McDowell, 786 F.2d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir. 1986)(endorsing
public employees' right not to speak on behalf of their superiors' political campaigns).
536. 855 F.2d 723, 730 (11th Cir. 1988).
537. 858 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1988).
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tion by several Auburn University faculty regarding the adequacy of
its Mechanical Engineering Department addressed matters of public
concern insofar as the publication referred to "substantive issues that
could influence the public's perception of the quality of education provided by the Department. '" These issues included "weaknesses in
the curriculum, inadequate facilities, a low faculty-to-school ratio and
the poor performance of Auburn graduates on ... professional licensing exams" all of which endangered the department's ability "to prepare students for professional engineering careers." ' 9 The court also
held that the "status of an academic department's accreditation is the
type of subject usually held to be of interest to the general public. "540
3. Context: Indicia of Public Concern
As the Eleventh Circuit itself observed, the term "public concern"
is "not without ambiguity,"' despite Connick's addition of the "content, form, and context" factors.- The context factor has been especially problematic. What features of the context are relevant in determining whether a given instance of employee speech addressed a matter of public concern? Is it important and is it possible for a court to
identify the speaker's "role" or motivation? Does and should it matter
whether the employee tried to bring her concern to public attention?
Are questions relating to internal agency operations, such as efficiency
and employee morale, matters of public concern? Does or should the
public care if employees are fired or otherwise punished for merely
filing grievances?
a. The Employee-Speaker's "Role"
In Kurtz v. Vickrey, the Eleventh Circuit tacitly criticized decisions
in other circuits which turned on whether the plaintiffs speech was
made primarily in his role as citizen, or in the role of employee.-

538. Id. at 1553. The Maples court went on to say, "[T]eachers whose speech directly
affects the public's perception of the quality of education in a given academic system find their
speech protected." Id. (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571). But see infra text accompanying
notes 573-78.
539. Maples, 858 F.2d at 1553.
540. Id. (citing Johnson v. Lincoln Univ., 776 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1985)).
541. Kurtz, 855 F.2d at 726.
542. Id. at 727.
543. Id. (citing Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414, 417 (7th Cir. 1987)); Terrell v. University of Tex., 792 F.2d 1360, 1362 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064 (1987). On Terrell
and other "role" cases, see hiers, supra note 37, at 790-95, 813-14.
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Kurtz urged that the central consideration is the speech's content, and
noted that in Rankin, the Supreme Court "focused even more closely
on the content of the employee's speech in determining that it related
to a matter of public concern. '"" Recently, however, another Eleventh
Circuit panel misread Kurtz to say "[T]here must be an initial determination of whether the spokesperson has spoken in his or her role
as an employee or as a citizen. ''1S Moreover another panel has stated
incorrectly, in dicta, that Connick's "content, form and context" test
"has directed courts to consider whether the speech at issue was made
in the employee's role as citizen or as employee." 6 The precise significance of the employee's role as identified by the court in determining
whether his speech related to matters of public concern therefore
remains somewhat uncertain in current Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence.
b. The "Going Public" Factor
The Kurtz court also criticized decisions that focused on whether
the employee had sought to bring the matter in question to public
attention.547 Focusing solely on such conduct or on the employee's
motivation- in speaking, the court insisted, overlooks the content of
the speech.- 9 As noted above,-n in many instances the court found
the content of speech the critical consideration in determining whether
it addressed a matter of public concern.
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit has held that whether an employee Attempted to bring her concern to public attention "is still a
relevant factor in the 'public concern' analysis."' 1 Recently, however,
the court seemed to regard the question whether the speaker attemp-

544. Kurtz, 855 F.2d at 727, 728.
545. Goffer v. Marbury, 956 F.2d 1045, 1049 n.2 (11th Cir. 1992).
546. Deremo v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 908, 910 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at
146-47). Connick says otherwise. See supra text accompanying notes 403, 413-14.
547. Kurtz, 855 F.2d at 727 (citing Terrell v. University of Tex., 792 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir.
1986); Gomez v. Texas Dept. of Mental Health, 794 F.2d 1018, 1022 (5th Cir. 1986); Linhart v.
Glatfelter, 771 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1985)). On Gomez, see Hiers, supra note 37, at 795-97,
812-13.
548. Cf. Goffer v. Marbury, 956 F.2d 1045, 1049 (11th Cir. 1992)("[m]otive, though not
determinative, is relevant to the public concern inquiry"); see also Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d
1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1988)(noting both the content of employees' speech and their motivation
to alert public officials and the public).
549. Kurtz, 855 F.2d at 727. It also, the court noted, neglects the Supreme Court's holding
in Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979). See supra text
accompanying notes 124-42.
550. See supra text accompanying notes 526-40.
551. Deremo, 939 F.2d at 911, n.3 (emphasis added).
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ted to "go public" as virtually dispositive. The plaintiff in Pearson v.
Macon-Bibb County Hospital Authoritys 2 was a senior staff nurse
who, with three other nurses, had been reprimanded for leaving a
bundle of contaminated surgical instruments in the hospital's operating
room. While attending a hospital seminar afterwards, Ms. Pearson
criticized her superiors for failing adequately to supervise the O.R.
nurses' cleaning responsibilities. Then, in a written response to her
reprimand, she stated that the O.R. nurse-technician initially on duty
was ultimately to blame for the incident, and suggested that "assignment of O.R. duties be clarified in the future. '" Pearson's employment
was subsequently terminated. The Eleventh Circuit panel concluded
that Pearson's comments which "touched on conditions that might be
potentially hazardous to patients" were made in response to, and thus
essentially concerned only "circumstances of her own employment."In contrast to instances where employee plaintiffs had "gone public,"
"Pearson's speech in no way draws the public at large or its concerns
into the picture. "- The court seemed to suggest that Pearson could
have preserved her First Amendment speech right if she had called
the problems of inadequate allocation of responsibilities and supervision to the attention of state health officials or the media. Such a
result, however, appears contrary to the doctrine enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Givhan: "Neither the [First] Amendment itself nor
our decisions indicate that . . . freedom [of speech] is lost to the public
employee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer
rather than to spread his views before the public. '" The Pearson
court makes no reference either to Givhan or to its own prior cases
holding that attempting to go public was only a factor in public concern
analysis. Arguably, the public health interests to which Pearson's
speech referred - just like Givhan's comments about racial discrimination - were "inherently" matters of public concern, whether she
7
intended to bring them to public attention or notY5

552. 952 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1992).
553. Id. at 1276.
554. Id. at 1278-79.
555. Id. at 1279; see also Ayoub v. Texas A & M Univ., 927 F.2d 834, 837 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 72 (1991).
556. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415-16; see Berry v. Bailey, 726 F.2d 670, 674 (11th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1101 (1985)("If Berry were discharged for exercising a protected speech
right, [the fact] that he exercised it in private . . . rather than in public . . . would not prevent
a decision in his favor"); Berdin v. Duggan, 701 F.2d 909, 912 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 893 (1983) (pre-Connick case applying Pickering and Givhan).
557. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
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It appears that, notwithstanding Givhan's explicit language as to
First Amendment protection for private communication, the "going
public" test has come back into "public concern" analysis through the
"context" window opened by Connick.5 The new theory seems to be
as follows: if the plaintiff-employee has not yet attempted to communicate her concern to the public, the concern must have been only a
matter of personal interest. This theory rests upon the palpably faulty
premise that public employees do not or should not try to address
matters of public importance internally or through channels. The unfortunate policy consequence of this theory is to encourage public
employees to air agency problems (including the "dirty linen") at public
forums or through the media.
c. Internal Agency or Office Affairs and Purely Personal Interests
Some of Connick's ambiguous and hyperbolic language could be
read to mean that the Court intended to deny First Amendment protection to employee speech that related only to internal agency operations. 559 On the other hand, Connick's actual holding declared that
First Amendment protection would be denied only when a public employee speaks "as an employee upon matters only of personal interest. "56 Could some matters relating to internal office operations
also be matters of public concern?
The Eleventh Circuit's earliest post-Connick decision understood
the Court to have said there that the First Amendment "affords less
protection to complaints concerning purely internal office affairs of
public offices than it accords to [speech regarding] matters of 'public
concern'."' 1 Later decisions, however, have generally tried to determine whether speech regarding internal office policy also implicated
matters of public concern. If so, that speech was entitled to full protection - subject, of course, to further causation and balancing
analysis. If the speech was prompted by "pursuit of purely private

558. See supra note 417 and accompanying text. The Connick majority, itself, suggested
that Myers' questionnaire "might have been of general interest" if she had communicated it to
"the public." Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8. The Court assumed that she was interested only
in "another round of controversy with her superiors." Id. at 148. The Supreme Court, of course,
had no way of knowing whether Myers would have "gone public" with findings derived from
the questionnaire.
559. See supra note 420 and accompanying text.
560. See supra text accompanying note 403.
561. Leonard v. City of Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 1983).
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interests,"' it would fall outside First Amendment protection. The
form or context in which the employee spoke about such matters was
likely to be determinative.
In general, following Connick, the Eleventh Circuit has held that
employee grievances regarding internal agency policies or practices
do not implicate public concern, and therefore do not merit First
Amendment protection.6 3 The court has even held that employees
may be terminated or otherwise disciplined merely for filing grievances
regarding work assignments or salary increases.As has been seen, the court sometimes decided that employee
speech addressed matters of public concern on the basis of its content. r5 But where the court decided that employee speech that might
otherwise be of public concern arose out of contexts in which the
plaintiff-speaker's own interests were at stake, it has often held that
such speech was only personal, notwithstanding its content. Thus in
Pearson, the court held that Ms. Pearson's complaints about "conditions that might be potentially hazardous to patients" were prompted
by her concern as to "the assignment of cleaning responsibilities in
the O.R. and the allocation of blame" for occasions when such responsibilities were neglected, and that her speech, therefore, was "private
and self-interested. " Likewise, in Deremo v. Watkins567 the plaintiff
appellants alleged that they had been terminated for asking compensation from their agency superior in return for having carried out
their part of an agreement with him that they would keep quiet about
instances in which they had been sexually harassed by a former supervisor.- The court held that their speech dealt with "matters of personal grievance and not public concern" since their "claims for compensation were purely personal and unrelated to ... serv[ing] the public
goal of insuring that public offices are free of sexual harassment. ' 69
The court observed that ordinarily sexual harassment by a public
official would be a matter of public concern; but here, in the court's

562. Goffer v. Marbury, 956 F.2d 1045, 1050 (11th Cir. 1992).
563. See, e.g., Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1515-16 (11th Cir. 1986).
564. Renfroe v. Kirkpatrick, 722 F.2d 714, 715 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984);
Ballard v. Blount, 581 F. Supp. 160, 163-64 (N.D. Ga. 1983), affd 734 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir.)
(unpublished opinion), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1086 (1984); but see infra note 573.
565. See supra text accompanying notes 526-40.
566. Pearson v. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth., 952 F.2d 1274, 1278-79 (1992).
567. 939 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1991).
568. Id. at 909-10.
569. Id. at 910, 912.
570. Id. at 912.
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view, the plaintiffs were only seeking personal gain.570 In Ferrara,a
high school teacher was disciplined for speaking against the school's
registration process and against the practice of filling teaching vacancies in social studies courses with physical education teachers and
athletic coaches, and for stating that such "out-of-field placement"
contributed to "civic illiteracy. '' 571 Arguably, such matters are of public
concern in a democratic society whose well-being, indeed, survival,
depend on an informed electorate. Perhaps because Ferrara conceded
that his own interests were involved in speaking about these matters,
the court concluded that they could not be characterized as constituting
572
speech on matters of public concern.
The Eleventh Circuit's most sweeping decision holding that speech
on matters of internal agency policy is not of public concern was its
unpublished affirmance of the district court's opinion in Ballard v.
Blount.5 73 The district court apparently read Connick to say that matters relating to internal office policy are, per se of less than public
concern., 74 Ballard, a tenured professor at Georgia State University,
alleged that he was penalized by university authorities, among other
reasons, for (1) objecting to a decision recommending that a colleague
be denied tenure, (2) questioning the manner in which he and his
colleagues were assigned teaching responsibilities, and (3) challenging
a proposed course syllabus that restricted teachers' latitude in conducting the class. 575 All these instances of speech, the court concluded,
concerned "matters of internal college affairs," not matters of public
concern, and consequently were unprotected.576 Perhaps the court believed that the public did or should have no interest in the role of
university faculty in institutional governance and academic course development. Curiously, the Ballard court referred to a 1983 Kansas
District Court decision for authority,5 77 but ignored binding Fifth Cir-

571. Ferrara,781 F.2d at 1510.
572. Id. at 1515-16. The court did not evidently consider that Ferrara's remarks could have
been both public and personal interest. See infra text accompanying notes 582-96.
573. 581 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1983), affd 734 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir.) (unpublished opinion),
cert. denied 469 U.S. 1086 (1984). Ballard's significance as precedent is in serious doubt. The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed, but apparently did not adopt the district court's opinion. The unpublished per curiam, one-sentence opinion states, in its entirety, "AFFIRMED on the basis of the
order of the Honorable Robert L. Vining, Jr., United States District Judge, December 12,
1983." Ballard v. Blount, No. 84-8041 (11th Cir., May 22, 1984). (Non-Argument Calendar).734
F.2d at 1480. Presumably only the result was affirmed.
574. Ballard, 581 F. Supp. at 162-64.
575. Id. at 162.
576. Id. at 164-65.
577. Id. at 162, 163.
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cuit case law concerning faculty speech on "internal" collegiate matters. 57s
In many of these cases, such as Ballard, Ferrara,Deremo, and
Pearson, the court was unwilling to find that the employees' speech
addressed both personal interests and matters of public concern. On
the basis of Connick's context factor, it felt justified in determining
that these speakers were concerned with their own interests. It is
not apparent, however, that they were concerned only with their own
interests. The court's determination that the subordinate employees'
concerns were purely self-serving appears forced, artificial, and unduly
deferential to employee superiors. Connick's stated holding had limited
the unprotected speech category to that "only of personal interest. "5
Rankin, perhaps unintentionally, expanded the realm of unprotected
speech to all speech outside the realm of matters of public concern. °
But neither Connick nor Rankin held that employee speech on matters
of internal agency policy was necessarily beyond the pale of public
concern. Indeed, Connick specifically stated that such concerns as
"discipline and morale in the workplace" do relate to the efficient
performance of an agency's duties, and could, in different circumstances, be matters of public interest sl Moreover, neither Connick nor Rankin held that employee speech had to be of exclusively
either personal or public interest. In fact, the Connick Court found
that one item of Myers' speech did relate to public concern, though,
in its view, the rest of her speech did not. A number of Eleventh
Circuit decisions likewise have recognized that an employee's speech
could address both matters of personal and of public concern.
4. Employee Speech of both Personal and Public Interest
The first such case after Connick was Renfroe v. Kirkpatrick.5
Ms. Renfroe, a public school teacher, was not rehired after she filed
a grievance. In it, she contended that she should not be required to
share a full-time teaching position with a teacher who was less senior
and experienced than herself.5 At her oral hearing before the School

578. See supra text accompanying notes 179-86.
579. Connick, 461 U.S. at 145.
580. See supra text accompanying notes 484-88.
581. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148, 148 n.8. See Williams v. Roberts, 904 F.2d 634, 638 (11th
Cir. 1990) (employee's published editorial urging that county employees whose performance was
superior be given pay raise as reward and boost to morale held to address matters of public
concern).
582. 722 F.2d 714 (l1th Cir. 1984).

583. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 5

Board, she contended that her objection to the proposed job-sharing
was motivated not only by her personal interest, but also by concern
for the welfare of the students. 584 In conclusory terms, the Eleventh
Circuit panel held that "[u]nder such circumstances," her "reference"
to student welfare was insufficient to qualify her grievance as a matter
of public concern.5 Evidently the panel meant that her grievance
might have been seen as related to both personal and public concern
if she had raised the question of student welfare earlier in the grievance procedure. Possibly the court doubted that Renfroe was really
concerned about student welfare because she did not raise this issue
sooner; or it may have thought her personal interest was greater than
the public aspect of her speech, and so felt justified in discounting or
ignoring the latter.5 Likewise, in another case four years later, the
court found that the plaintiff-employee's speech "centered largely
around matters that were not of public concern," but failed to indicate
587
how speech in each category should be analyzed.
The Eleventh Circuit's first systematic treatment of employee
speech involving both personal and public concerns was Kurtz. 588 Mr.
Kurtz, a tenured faculty member at an Alabama public university,
had engaged in numerous controversies with the university's president
over a number of years. Kurtz alleged that he was denied promotion
to full professor partly in retaliation for his criticisms of the president
and university policy.- 9 The district court determined that Kurtz's
expressions related "primarily" to his personal interest, 59° and that his
speech as a whole, therefore, was not related to matters of public
concern. 591 The Circuit Court reversed and remanded with instructions

584. Id. at 715.
585. Id.
586. Alternatively, the court might have been thinking of Fifth Circuit precedent to the
effect that it would not ordinarily consider an issue raised for the first time at oral argument.
Richard Hiers, Issues on Appeal: The Perils of Inadvertent Waiver or Abandonment, 9 FIFTH
CIRCUIT REP. 971-81 (1992). Because the Renfroe court failed to explain its rationale, its value
as precedent and guidance for teachers, attorneys, and Eleventh Circuit panels and district
courts within the jurisdiction in subsequent situations is quite limited.
587. Harden v. Adams, 841 F.2d 1091, 1092-93 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, sub nom.
Harden v. Paul, 488 U.S. 967 (1988). In this peculiarly oblique opinion, the court hints that the
case was decided on the basis of Mt. Healthy "but for" or second level causation considerations.
Id. at 1094.
588. 855 F.2d at 723.
589. Id. at 724-26.
590. Id. at 728.
591. Id. at 726.
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for the district court to separate the instances of expressions unrelated
to matters of public concern from those that were, and to proceed to
92
Pickering balancing and Mt. Healthy causation inquiry accordingly.5
Thus, for purposes of Mt. Healthy first level causation, Kurtz could
not argue that his expressions which were unrelated to matters of
public concern showed that the university retaliated against him because of his speech. 593 Such expressions were constitutionally unprotected. 594 Conversely, the court seems to have meant that the university could not claim for purposes of balancing that its interests had
been adversely affected by, or that it had an interest in suppressing
those unprotected expressions either. But then, for purposes of Mt.
Healthy second level causation proof, the university could attempt to
show that it had properly sanctioned Kurtz for reasons unrelated to
his constitutionally protected speech. These reasons might include his
unprotected speech s95 Kurtz therefore stands for the proposition that
where a public employee has been sanctioned for separate instances
of speech on different occasions, 5 the court's analysis should distinguish the items that relate to matters of public concern from those
that do not. The former are to be considered in connection with first
level Mt. Healthy causation inquiry and Pickering balancing analysis,
while the latter are relevant only at the second level of Mt. Healthy
causation proof.
Kurtz also provided guidance as to analysis of instances where the
same speech relates to both public and private concern. "[S]uch instances of speech should not be broken down into separate pieces of
protected and unprotected speech, but should be treated as protected
speech for the purposes of the Pickering balance and the causation

592.
593.

Id. at 732.
Id. at 733.

594. In Kurtz, as in some earlier cases, the Eleventh Circuit attempted to clarify the
meaning of "constitutionally protected." In effect, if the court found the employee's speech
related to a "matter of public concern," it was "constitutionally protected." "The outcome of the
Connick public interest test determines whether speech is constitutionally protected; the outcome
of the Pickering balancing test determines whether the public employer's interests override the
employee's interests in the constitutionally protected speech." Id. at 730-31 n.5 (emphasis added)
(quoting Eiland v. City of Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953, 956-57 n.4 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1020 (1987)). The pre-partition Fifth Circuit had likewise so determined. See supra
note 153 and accompanying text. See also infra text accompanying notes 904-22 as to the
implications of this issue for determining qualified immunity.
595. Kurtz, 855 F.2d at 733-34.
596. Id. at 733.
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determination." 59 Apparently Kurtz meant that in analyzing a single
unit of "mixed" speech, the court should balance the adverse effects
of the employee's speech as a whole upon governmental interests
against the employee's interests in the entire speech. This meaning
was articulated explicitly a few weeks later in Maples v. Martin:5 8
"[T]his Court has recognized that the entire document at issue must
be weighed against its disruptive impact on the workplace." 's This
doctrine applies, however, only to a single identifiable unit of mixed
speech, such as the published document at issue in Maples. Where
an employee speaks on different occasions, these instances are not to
be treated as a single unit, but separately, not only in deciding whether
they relate to matters of public concern and in Pickering balancing,
but also in determining causation. 6° 1
5. Matters of Public Concern and Freedom of Association
Pre-Connick Fifth Circuit precedent had indicated that public employees who exercised their First Amendment right of association
need not show that this exercise related to matters of public concern
in order to be protected from retaliatory sanctions.6 2 After Connick,
courts tended to construe its language to mean that the First Amendment protects only employee speech that relates to matters of public
concern. Does this limitation also apply to public employees' First
Amendment freedom of association? The Eleventh Circuit expressly
held that government employees' associational activity need not relate
to matters of public concern for First Amendment protection to
apply.- Thus even if an employee's speech did not - in the court's
view - relate to a matter of public concern, her right to free association will remain protected from retaliation by administrative
superiors.

597. Id. The court cites Eiland as authority. Id. But the Eiland court determined that the
entire poem focused on criticizing the mayor and his political campaign and was, therefore,
constitutionally protected. Eiland, 797 F.2d at 958.
598. 858 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1988). Maples does not refer to Kurtz. Id.
599. Id. at 1554 (citing Eiland, 797 F.2d at 957).
600. Id. at 1549-54; cf. Eiland, 797 F.2d at 957-60.
601. Goffer v. Marbury, 956 F.2d 1045, 1047-50 (11th Cir. 1992).
602.

See supra note 168.

603. Schneider v. Indian River Com. College Found., 875 F.2d 1537, 1543 n.6 (11th Cir.
1989); Hatcher v. Board of Pub. Educ., 809 F.2d 1546, 1556-58 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Smith
v. Arkansas St. Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979)); Wilson v. Taylor,
733 F.2d 1539, 1542 (11th Cir. 1984).
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6. The Anomalous Character of the Public Concern Requirement
The fact that a governmental employee's First Amendment right
of association is protected whether or not its exercise relates to matters
of public concern prompts anew the question why her speech must do
so in order to be similarly protected. Is speech inherently more detrimental to agency efficiency than association? What is it about speech
that poses such a threat that it need be tolerated only if it relates to
public concerns, and then can be vindicated only if the employee's
interest in it "outweighs" governmental interests in its suppression?
The function of the public concern requirement is to enable superior
employees to punish subordinates for speech they find objectionable
without even having to allege that such speech had or might have had
any adverse effects on agency or workplace operations. 604 The public
concern requirement also functions to make it easier for courts to
dispose of public employee retaliation claims, for all a court has to do
is determine, as a matter of law, that the speech in question did not
address what the court considers a matter of public concern, and then
grant summary judgment. This may be one reason courts often take
a peculiarly narrow view of the matters about which the "public" is
or ought to be concerned. The effect of the public concern requirement
has been to chill the right of government employees to speak freely
about work-related or other concerns that courts might consider unworthy of public interest and thus constitutionally unprotected. And,
conversely, has made it easier for public employees in superior administrative positions to abuse their subordinates, whether or not
doing so advances governmental interests of any kind.
Neither the- Supreme Court nor the Fifth nor Eleventh Circuits
at any time attempted to articulate any significant social policy considerations that might justify a public concern requirement. Pickering
considered the question whether an employee's speech related to a
matter of public concern merely a factor in balancing the employee's
speech interest against the government's interest in the efficient performance of the agency's services to the public. °5 Mt. Healthy and
Givhan said nothing about any public concern requirement.6 Nor did
Connick itself expressly hold that a government employee's speech7
would be protected only if it addressed a matter of public concern. -

604.
605.
606.
607.

See
See
See
See

supra text
supra text
supra text
supra text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes
notes
notes
notes

552-78, 582-87; Hiers, supra note 37, at 784-91.
35-40.
83-110, 124-38.
403-05, 414.
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Some of Connick's language could be so construed, however,6 and
after some initial uncertainty, the Eleventh Circuit decided that Connick had intended a "matters of public concern" requirement as "the
threshold test" in public employee free speech analysis.
Then in
Rankin, the Supreme Court - without any explanation or apparent
consideration - likewise designated the public concern factor as "the
'
threshold test. 16
This threshold test has been criticized by commentators, several
of whom suggest its elimination in favor of the more critical question,
whether there is any basis for concluding that the employee's speech
had some actual adverse effect on governmental interests.6 1 Perhaps
the Supreme Court will sometime visit this issue. The current
"threshold test" appears to presume that speech which for any reason
agency officials wish to punish necessarily impinges on significant governmental interests and should not be tolerated unless it relates to
matters of public concern. The courts too readily tend to assume that
the interests of governmental officials or superiors - who themselves
are public employees, whether elected or appointed - are identical
with those of "government. 6 12 Governmental interest in efficient performance of public services is not necessarily enhanced when thin-skinned employee-superiors who have difficulty handling perceived criticisms cut off in-house discussion of agency policies and practices. Nor
are such interests advanced by encouraging office dictators to achieve
psychic gain by punishing subordinates who dare to express ideas in
their presence. Workplace democracy need not be denied merely because public officials or courts can imagine horrible scenarios in which
such democracy takes the form of perpetual "roundtable discussions"
or S.D.S. meetings,613 or, worse yet, proletarian revolts, complete
with defenestrations, tumbrels, and guillotine. As the Supreme Court
itself stated in its latest relevant pronouncement: "Vigilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions, but
simply because superiors disagree with the content of employees'

608. See supra text accompanying notes 408-10.
609. See supra text accompanying notes 519-20.
610. See supra text accompanying notes 484-88.
611. See supra note 492 and accompanying text.
612. In contrast, Pickering referred specifically to the interests of the State as an employer.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
613. As to differing models of democracy, see ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? (1970).
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speech. ''614 Unfortunately, the public concern threshold test under-

mines effectuation of this objective.
In the meantime, public employees are under great pressure to
keep their thoughts to themselves lest their utterances prompt retaliation by insecure or authoritarian superiors. Likely consequences of
such internalized thought control include added stress on employees
as they "stifle themselves," and reduced morale in the workplace.
Employees cannot even confidently suppose that they may safely
suggest ways of improving workplace efficiency. Agency superiors do
not always take kindly to such suggestions, especially if they feel it
important to let everyone know "I'm-the-one-who-is-in-charge-aroundhere"; and courts may decide that such suggestions do not relate to
matters of public concern. 615 Even if an employee is willing to bear

the expense of going to court to vindicate her speech rights, and the
court finds that her speech addressed a matter of public concern and
was, therefore, "protected," she will still face the risk that the court
may decide that her speech right was "outweighed" by countervailing
governmental interests. Moreover, in order to prevail, she will have
to survive her superiors' efforts to prove that they would have
sanctioned her anyway; and may also have to confront their claim of
qualified immunity. 616 Under these circumstances, a reasonable, prudent public employee might well decide to limit her workplace discourse to such expressions as "Yassuh boss," or "Whatever you say."
We turn now to the next hurdle she may confront: balancing.
C. Eleventh Circuit Balancing after Connick
Balancing requires at least three steps. The first is to identify the
interests on the side of the employee's speech interests. These include
both the speaker's own interests, and any public interest in the subject
addressed. The next is to identify the nature of the governmental
interests affected by the speech and the extent to which the speech
either did, or likely would interfere with those particular interests.
Finally, the court undertakes to "weigh" or balance these competing
interests. As will be seen, Eleventh Circuit cases often omit part or

614. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987); see also Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d
770, 779 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The First Amendment ensures that under most circumstances even
the most junior government clerk typist can criticize the speech and acts of the top officials in
her office as freely as any citizen can.").
615. See, e.g., the fact situations described supra text accompanying notes 303, 552-53;
Hiers, supra note 37, at 786-90.
616. See infra text accompanying notes 889-944.
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all of the first step, focus primarily or exclusively on the second, and
omit the third altogether. The court has emphasized special factors
or considerations of importance in connection with certain types of
speech, and also certain contexts in which employee speech occurs.
1. The Employees' Free Speech Interests
As has been seen, Pickering failed to identify the nature of the
employee-speaker's "interests" - other than in his "role as a citizen,
in commenting upon matters of public concern. '167 But the Pickering
Court did indicate that when it came to "balancing," the speech's importance to the public would be weighed on the speaker's side of the
scale to offset any governmental interests in efficiency that had been
adversely affected by the speech at issue. 618 Perry, Mt. Healthy, and
Givhan likewise made no effort to define the nature or scope of public
employees' speech interests. Perhaps this was so because in these
cases the Court continued to assume that public employees enjoyed
the right to speak on any topic and for any reasons, so long as their
speech did not interfere with the effective functioning of their respective agencies. Givhan, for instance, stated simply, "The First Amendment forbids abridgment of the 'freedom of speech."'619 That this right
obtained only with respect to matters of public concern had not yet
been decreed.
A few pre-partition Fifth Circuit cases did attempt to identify some
specific employee-speaker interests. The court indicated that employees have the right to express opinions regarding the propriety of their
superiors' conduct, to speak out against superiors' corrupt or illegal
practices in order to avoid becoming implicated in them, and an interest
in performing their own work as conscientious public servants.- ° An
early pre-Connick Eleventh Circuit decision reiterated forcibly that
under the First Amendment, public employees have a "strong interest"
in speaking their mind without governmental censorship or retaliation,
6 21
without regard to the public value or social worth of their statements.

617. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
618. See supra text accompanying notes 37-45, 52-59; see also Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d
770, 779 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Pickeringstates that the First Amendment requires the government
not just to show that certain employee speech injures the government, but to show that the
benefits of preventing the injury actually outweigh the profound benefits of free speech in this
society.").
619. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch., 439 U.S. 410, 415 (1979); see supra text accompanying note 136.
620. See supra text accompanying notes 198-203.
621. See supra text accompanying notes 295-97, 311-19.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' SPEECH RIGHTS

Taken together, these pre-partition Fifth, and pre-Connick Eleventh
Circuit cases articulated a number of definite interests a public employee might have in, or as aspects of, his "fundamental interest in
6 22
speaking as he chooses.
Although Connick ignored such interests, it did not overrule prior
cases that defined them. These cases remain binding precedent for
the post-Connick Eleventh Circuit.- Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit has said little about such interests since Connick was decided.
But some important patterns may be seen.
In Eiland v. City of Montgomery,6 the court stated that a police
officer had an interest in criticizing the mayor "in the heat of a political
campaign in which the running of the police department" was an
issue.62 5 Officer Eiland had posted a satirical poem criticizing the
mayor's use of certain officers as body guards.62 6 Perhaps the court
meant that Eiland had an important interest in his freedom to express
political views, as well as an interest in protecting the integrity of
the department where he worked against abuse or exploitation by the
mayor. Later in the opinion, the court refers to "individual interests
in free speech, '627 and specifically to appellant's interest in expressing
his views. 628 On the other hand, the court indicated that the outcome
of its balancing would have been different if Eiland's speech had neither
occurred in the context of the mayoral campaign nor related to "an
issue of public concern in that campaign." 6- The court said, in effect,
that Eiland's own speech interests would not have been enough to
outweigh governmental interests in its suppression, but that when
the public concern factor was weighed on the side of his speech interest, the two, together, did counter-balance any adverse effects the
speech might have had. This balancing analysis appears true to the
model implicit in Pickering0 ° by placing public interest on the side of
the scales representing the employee's speech interest. At the same
time, the Eiland court remained faithful to its own binding precedents
by at least acknowledging that the employee-speaker himself had a
speech right apart from his speech's social utility.

622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.

See supra text accompanying note 314.
See supra note 8.
797 F.2d 958 (11th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 953.
Id. at 954.
Id. at 959.
Id. at 960.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 35-45.
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In two 1991 decisions, however, the court failed to distinguish
clearly between employee-speakers' own interests in, or right to freedom of, expression and public interest in that expression. Harris v.
Evans presented the court with an unusual standing question.-, Harris, a Georgia prison inmate, challenged a Department of Corrections
policy prohibiting corrections staff from communicating directly with
the state Pardons and Parole Board regarding parole recommendations.62 His pro se complaint alleged that Corrections personnel who
.might otherwise have written the Board on his behalf had told him
they feared they would lose their jobs if, following Department policy,
they wrote such letters in care of the warden "for his endorsement"
and subsequent forwarding to the Board.- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Harris had standing to assert
such Corrections employees' speech rights. It also affirmed the lower
court's holding that, in regard to Pickering balancing, the Corrections
employees' interest in commenting on the suitability of inmates for
parole prevailed in the absence of any showing, or even contention,
by the Department that its interests in efficient operation would be
in any way impaired.6 Perhaps the court meant to say here that
prison staff who comment on parole decisions have a right to exercise
their sense of social responsibility by speaking on matters they deem
of public importance, such as waste of tax dollars resulting from unneeded incarcerations, or public safety considerations.-6 The Circuit
Court agreed with the district court that "decisions made by parole
boards regarding the release of convicted criminals . . . are of great
public concern.' ' 6 7 But the court makes this statement only in the
addressing the question whether such speech related to matters of
public concern or was "purely personal." When it turned to the balancing phase of analysis, the court referred only to employees' interest
in commenting on such matters.6 Thus, unlike Pickering, the Harris
court did not include the public's great concern about such matters in
its balancing. Consequently, if the Department had been able to show

631. 920 F.2d 864 (11th Cir. 1991).
632. Id. at 865.
633. Id. at 866, 867.
634. Id.at 866-67.
635. Id. at 867-68.
636. Id. at 867. "Citizens who comment on individual parole decisions are offering input on
the working of the state's criminal justice system." Id.
637. Id.
638. Id.
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any loss of efficiency as a result of permitting direct staff communication with the Board, it is likely that its interest in suppressing such
communication would have been found to prevail over mere employees'
interests - absent the court's placing the public's "great interest" on
the scales as well.
Thus an indirect consequence of Connick's implicit promotion of
the public concern factor to the status of "threshold test" 9 has been
to remove this factor from the balancing phase of analysis.64 This
consequence is illustrated also in Busby v. City of Orlando.64 , Among
other things, Ms. Busby had charged some of her superiors with
malfeasance. Yet in identifying the interests on Busby's side of the
scale, the court referred only to "her interest in expressing her opinion
on the alleged malfeasance of her superiors. '" The public's interest
in such malfeasance was not even mentioned. This omission of public
interest from the balancing scale contrasts noticeably with pre-partition Fifth Circuit and pre-Connick case law.
Typically, neither the Supreme Court, nor the Fifth or Eleventh
Circuits have devoted much attention to interests on employees' side
of the Pickering balancing scale. Instead, they have been much more
concerned with purported governmental interests adversely affected,
or potentially affected, by sanctioned employee speech. We now turn
to the Eleventh Circuit's post-Connick analysis of such interests and
effects.
2. Government Interests in Punishing or Suppressing Employee Free Speech
As has been seen,6 ' Pickering articulated the basic governmental
interest that was to be weighed against employee (or the public's)
interest in free speech: namely, "promoting the efficiency of the public

639. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 150; supra text accompanying notes 403-22.
640. The Connick Court had cautioned that "the State's burden in justifying a particular
discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee's expression." Connick, 461 U.S.
at 150. But here the Court failed to indicate clearly that the importance of the matter to the
public was a factor to be weighed on the side of, qnd in addition to, the employee's own interest
in her speech. Id.
641. 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1991).
642. Id. at 774. Without explanation, the court ignored Busby's claim that she had been
fired in retaliation for complaining about gasoline fumes emitted from the vehicle she was
required to drive. Id. at 769, 773. See also Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972 F.2d 1230,
1237 (11th Cir. 1992) dismissively characterizing the employee's speech on racial tensions in
Miami as merely his "interest in his homiletics."
643. See supra text accompanying notes 198-201, 239-41.
644. See supra text accompanying notes 28-61.
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services it performs through its employees. "645 In this connection, the
PickeringCourt took note of various situations where employee speech
could adversely affect relationships with superiors or coworkers to
the detriment of agency efficiency.6 6 Later decisions presented some
further additions and qualifications.
The pre-partition en banc Fifth Circuit held that when an employee's speech might potentially damage relationships with superiors or
coworkers, agency officials need not wait until actual disruption occurred before taking preventive measures.647 However, the court insisted that officials' "mere fear" of prospective disruption would not
justify denying employees freedom of expression; there must be "an
adequate objective foundation" for so believing.- The Supreme Court
likewise concluded in Connick that officials could act to limit or punish
employee speech in advance of any actually disruptive effects.649 Although Connick hinted that such officials' fears of disruption must be
"reasonable," the Court did not specify that such fears must be
grounded upon "an adequate objective foundation." In fact, the Court's
majority was willing to credit Connick with such reasonable fears even
though at trial he denied that he had fired Myers because of the
questionnaire.- It is unclear whether Connick tacitly overruled the
pre-partition, en banc Fifth Circuit's insistence on "an adequate objective foundation" for pre-emptive denial of employee free speech. Arguably, the Supreme Court's comment that Connick had "reasonably
believed" Myers' questionnaire would result in disruption accords with
the en banc Fifth Circuit standard. Later, in Maples, the Eleventh
Circuit paraphrased Connick's holding in this connection as follows:
"[B]ecause employers must act to avert crises, [the] probability of
future disruption may be considered."' 1 Here "probability" could be
read as equivalent to "an adequate objective basis," but Maples does
not cite to Fifth Circuit precedent. 52 In another post-Connick case,

645. See supra text accompanying note 35.
646. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
647. See supra text accompanying notes 206-08; Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833 (11th Cir.
1982); supra text accompanying notes 337-38.
648. See supra text accompanying notes 207-08.
649. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51; see supra text accompanying notes 447-50.
650. See supra notes 433, 434 and accompanying text.
651. Maples, 858 F.2d at 1554.
652. Maples was decided on the basis of present, not possible future disruptive effects of
the employee's speech on agency efficiency (id. at 1554-55), so its language in this connection
may be only dicta. See Williams v. Roberts, 904 F.2d 634, 638 (11th Cir. 1990) which evidently
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the Eleventh Circuit was unimpressed with the defendant's concern
for potential disruption, noting that the supporting testimony consisted
"almost uniformly" of "assumption and speculation" as to how others
"might" have perceived the speech.r Arguably, the Eleventh Circuit
is still bound to apply the "adequate objective foundation" standard
when determining the reasonableness of agency superiors' fears regarding potential disruption.
Fifth Circuit binding precedent prior to Connick had specified that
in order to justify taking retaliatory or preventive action, government
officials would have to show that an employee's speech either "materially and substantially" interfered with agency operations, or "materially and substantially" impeded the employee's performance of her
own duties as an employee.- The Supreme Court's opinion in Connick
does not mention these standards, even though the district court had
applied them. 6 5 The Supreme Court accepted the district court's finding that Connick had failed to show that Myers' questionnaire had
impeded her own performance, but overruled the lower court's finding
6
that the questionnaire had not interfered with office relationships. The Connick Court did not say how seriously Myers' speech had so
interfered. It is not even clear whether the Court meant to say that
Myers' questionnaire had adversely affected office relations, or only
that it had the potential for doing so. It is not apparent that Connick
intended, sub silentio, to overrule the Fifth Circuit's "materially and
substantially" interfered or impeded standards.- 7 At any rate, Connick
did not explicitly overrule these standards. Moreover, Rankin's insistence that the government must justify its action in suppressing employee speech "on legitimate grounds" 65 implies that the speech in

does require "objective" evidence, not simply the superior's "subjective apprehension" as to the
speech's possible adverse effects.
653. Eiland v. City of Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953, 959 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1020 (1987). But see Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972 F.2d 1230, 1235, 1237-38
(11th Cir. 1992), which makes no mention of the objective evidence requirement. Indeed, the
dissenting judge criticized the majority for crediting the defendants' speculation as to the possible
effects of the employee's statements in the absence of any evidence. Id. at 1238 (Hatchett, J.,
dissenting).
654. See supra text accompanying notes 217-34.
655. See supra text accompanying notes 393-94.
656. See supra text accompanying notes 435-65.
657. The Connick Court did, however, "caution that a stronger showing [presumably as to
the prospect of future disruption] may be necessary if the employee's speech more substantially
involved matters of public concern." Connick, 461 U.S. at 152.
658. See supra text accompanying note 494.
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question must be shown to have had some significant, if not substantial,
detrimental impact on agency efficiency. Nevertheless, relatively few
post-Connick Eleventh Circuit decisions applied the "materially impeded" or "substantially interfered" tests.6 9
Even though Connick seemed to view such matters as "discipline"
and "office relationships" as ends in themselves,6 the Rankin Court
re-established "efficient" or "effective functioning" of the governmental
"enterprise" as the central governmental value or interest for "balancing" purposes.6 1 Post-Connick and post-Rankin Eleventh Circuit case
law likewise focuses on this central value. For instance, in Leonard
v. City of Columbus,'6 2 the Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant's
mere assertion of "the need for 'discipline'," and insisted on identifying
the agency's "true interest," if any, in suppressing the employee-officer's speech. The court found that the speech in question "had no
relation to the efficient performance of police duties. '" Similarly, in
another police officer case, Eiland, the Eleventh Circuit held, "[T]he
need for discipline as an abstract concern should not be allowed to
overshadow individual interests in free speech unless the department's
'true interest' in suppressing the speech in this regard can be isolated
and verified."
Nor has the Eleventh Circuit been satisfied with a defendant's
mere recitation that governmental "efficiency" was somehow impaired.
Like the pre-partition Fifth Circuit, the post-Connick Eleventh Circuit
has taken occasion to weigh the effect of an agency superior's retaliatory action on efficiency: "There is no suggestion in the record that
the [employee's] discharge . . . promoted the efficiency of the public
services performed by the [agency]. '"

659. Those that did include, e.g., Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1567 (11th
Cir. 1989); Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d 1546, 1554 (11th Cir. 1988).
660. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151, 152; see supra text accompanying notes 437-62.
661. See supra text accompanying notes 499-501.
662. 705 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1983).
663. Id. at 1305. The post-Connick Fifth Circuit reached a similar result in a case involving
speech by a fire-fighter. Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1003 (1989). See Richard Hiers, Normative and Ostensibly Norm-Neutral Conventions in
Contemporary Judicial Discourse, 14 LEGAL STUDIES FORUM 107, 118-19 (1990).
664. 797 F.2d at 959; accord, Berdin v. Duggan, 701 F.2d 909, 912-13 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983).
665. Nicholson v. Gant, 816 F.2d 591, 599 (11th Cir. 1987); see Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d
770, 780 (5th Cir. 1979). In Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708, 712 (11th Cir. 1992),
the court held that, rather than impeding governmental efficiency, the employee's speech actually
enhanced it.
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In certain contexts, some particular governmental interests have
been accorded special importance or "weight": for instance, where
public interest in law enforcement may require greater "discipline"
for the sake of effective performance of agency duties; or where the
efficiency of agency performance may require that appointive officials
be especially co-operative with elected superiors. These, and other
special situations can best be examined in connection with the court's
procedures in "balancing" the various interests involved.
3. Balancing Free Speech and Governmental Interests After Connick
As has been seen, the Eleventh Circuit recently determined that
when an employee spoke on different occasions, only those instances
of her speech that related to matters of public concern should be
Conversely, when
considered for purposes of Picketing balancing.
of both public
matters
a single unit of employee speech relates to
concern and other matters not so identified, the effects, if any, of the
speech as a whole on governmental interests are to be weighed against
the free speech interests involved.6 7 Not all Eleventh Circuit panels
remained mindful of these distinctions, however.Pre-Connick case law had not made altogether clear whether Pickering "balancing" was a question of mixed law and fact, or entirely
one of law.- 9 Connick stated that balancing was subject to review
under a rather ambiguous standard: "independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case. '' 67- The Eleventh Circuit eventually
concluded that balancing was entirely a matter of law, and that factual
findings by the jury relative to balancing were "only advisory. ''671 The
district court's balancing, like its determination whether the speech
in question addressed a matter of public concern, would then be subject
to de novo review by the appellate courts. This meant that the appellate court would have occasion to function as a super trier-of-fact with
regard to the extent of actual (or reasonably anticipated) detrimental
impacts of given items of employee speech on particular "working
relationships" or specific governmental operations. In reconstructing

666.

See supra text accompanying notes 588-96, 601.

667. See supra text accompanying notes 597-600.
668. See infra text accompanying notes 707-15.
669. See supra text accompanying notes 157-59.
670. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150 n.10.
671. Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1566 n.2 (11th Cir. 1989); Morales v.
Stierheim, 848 F.2d 1145 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, sub nom. Leon v. Avino, 489 U.S. 1013
(1989).
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such impacts, the court would, presumably, make use of facts already
established in the record evidence.
Both in pre- and post-Connick "balancing," the Eleventh Circuit
has had no trouble vindicating employee speech where defendant officials failed to show that such speech had any, or more than slightly,
672
adverse effects upon agency efficiency in delivering public services.
Once more, the difficult cases are those where the employee's speech
was found to have had some adverse effect on governmental operations. Post-Connick Eleventh Circuit decisions no longer regularly
invoke the "materially and substantially" interfered or impeded test,
though probably they should do so.6 73 The extent of interference the
court will consider tolerable as a matter of social policy varies both
with the type of speech674 and with the contexts in which it is spoken.
As has been seen, pre-partition Fifth Circuit decisions identified special
considerations that were to be weighed in such instances: notably, in
the case of "whistle-blower" speech, speech by school and college
teachers, speech by police officers, and political speech.67s How did
the Eleventh Circuit view these considerations following Connick?
a. "Whistle-blower" Speech
The pre-partition Fifth Circuit held that employee speech regarding
possible illegal or corrupt practices by fellow-workers or agency
superiors particularly deserved First Amendment protection because
of the importance to the public of knowing about such conduct.676
Punishing or suppressing such speech could not be justified by showing
677
that it caused unhappiness, disruption, or disharmony in the office.
On the other hand, it could be relevant if the employee might have
"achieved his purposes by speaking in some less disruptive way.''67s
While continuing to credit whistle-blower speech with special importance, post-Connick Eleventh Circuit decisions generally found that

672. See, e.g., Harris v. Evans, 920 F.2d 864, 867 (11th Cir. 1991); Leonard, 705 F.2d at
1305; Berdin, 701 F.2d at 912-13; Nicholson v. Gant, 816 F.2d 591, 599 (11th Cir. 1987). In
Nicholson, the court concluded that the plaintiff-employee's speech was protected because there
was no evidence that his discharge "promoted the efficiency of the public services performed
by the [agency]." Id.
673. See supra text accompanying notes 217-34. Some, however, do refer to "substantial"
interference. See supra note 659 and accompanying text.
674. See supra text accompanying notes 526-40.
675. See supra text accompanying notes 239-73.
676. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
677. Id.
678. Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 773 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979); see supra note 239.
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the disruptive effects of such speech outweighed free speech interests,
and held its suppression justified.6 - There may be several reasons for
this surprising turn-around.68 For one thing, in contrast to earlier
Fifth Circuit balancing in whistle-blower cases, most Eleventh Circuit
panels failed to include, or accord significance to, the public's interest
in possible corruption by agency officials in their balancing. This omission may be traceable to Connick's implicitly shifting "matters of public
concern" consideration from its place as a balancing factor under Pickering to its new status as the "threshold test."-1 For another, to date,
the Eleventh Circuit's whistle-blower cases have come up only in contexts where, as will be seen, it has otherwise held that special deference is due to superiors.68 Finally, in some of these cases, the court
seemed more interested in reaching a particular result than in specifying clearly the basis for its decision.
Berry v. Bailey- concerned a Florida deputy sheriff who "performed his job well," but was fired because of "his unwillingness to
favor" some of Sheriff Bailey's political supporters.- On one occasion,
Deputy Berry recorded evidence implicating Judge Smith, a leading
Bailey-backer, in illicit dogfight gambling operations.6 The critical
e. ent occurred when Berry, with other deputies, arrested a "rowdy"
group of persons for using profanity in public and assaulting the officers.6 One of those arrested was Smith's daughter. Bailey asked
Berry to drop the charges; Berry said he would not do so. Under
pressure from the judge and other supporters, Bailey then asked Berry

679. See, e.g., Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1991); Bryson v. City of
Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1989); Morales v. Stierheim, 848 F.2d 1145 (11th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, sub nom. Leon v. Avino, 489 U.S. 1013 (1989); Berry v. Bailey, 726 F.2d 670
(l1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1101 (1985). But see Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971
F.2d 708 (11th Cir. 1992).
680. See Hiers supra note 37, at 773-75 reviewing post-Connick Fifth Circuit "whistleblower" cases.
681. See supra text accompanying notes 639-40. Rankin was the first Supreme Court
decision to so characterize this test explicitly. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384-85.
682. Three such cases involved speech by police officers. The pre-partition Fifth Circuit
considered "discipline" an important, though not dispositive consideration in that context. See
supra text accompanying notes 247-49. Another case involved interactions between upper level
administrative officials, in which context, as will be noted, the Eleventh Circuit has strongly
emphasized the importance of co-operative relationships. See infra text accompanying notes
860-77.
683. 726 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1984).
684. Id. at 671.
685. Id.
686. Id. at 672.
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to resign. Berry refused, and the sheriff fired him.6 7 The Eleventh
Circuit panel found that Berry's refusal to drop charges was unprotected: "While corruption in the Sheriffs office is a matter of legitimate
public concern, it is not so vital a matter that it would justify our
protection of an employee's flagrant defiance of his direct supervisor. "6 The court found that Berry's "statements" in which he refused
to drop the charges "are the kind that Pickeringdescribed as implicating the government's interest; they threaten office discipline and harmony in the day-to-day close working relationships with immediate
superiors necessary for efficient office functioning. Under the Pickering analysis, they are not protected speech."' The Berry Court may
have been influenced by Connick's exaggerated deference to official
authority. 690 At any rate, its conclusory statement that "corruption"
in public office was "not so vital" a matter of public concern contrasts
sharply with supposedly binding Fifth Circuit precedent which gave
great weight to the public's need to know about officials' misconduct.691
The Berry court makes no mention of this or any other pre-partition
Fifth Circuit precedent. Moreover, its "balancing" fails to include any
reference to Berry's own interests in his speech. 6 9
Morales v. Stierheim,69 four years later, had to do with a situation
involving relations between an agency head, and an elective official.
The plaintiff, Mr. Morales, was principal planner with responsibility
for the Melrose area project for the municipal Office of Community
and Economic Development (OCED). Mr. Barrios was the elected
chair of the Melrose volunteer neighborhood Community Advisory
Board (the Board). In various ways, Barrios allegedly undermined the
effectiveness of Morales' work with the Board, pursuant to a "personal
vendetta" against Morales for refusing Barrios' "requests for kickbacks

687. Id.
688. Id. at 676 (emphasis added).
689. Id.
690. "[W]e cannot encourage employees to defy their employers and refuse to perform their
duties every time they think that the employer is running the office improperly." Id.
691. See supra notes 240, 241 and text accompanying notes 239-41.
692. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 620-38. The structure of the Berry court's analysis
is far from lucid. Apparently the court meant that, as a result of its Pickering balancing, it
held that Berry's speech was not protected. Nevertheless, some of the court's language suggests
that it based its holding on Berry's failure to prove Mt. Healthy first level causation. At the
outset, the court stated that the question before it was "whether Berry's exercise of protected
speech . . . caused the firing." Berry, 726 F.2d at 673 (emphasis added). And, the court
concluded, "Berry has not met his burden under Mt. Healthy as a matter of law." Id. at 676.
693. 848 F.2d 1145 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Leon v. Avino, 489 U.S. 1013
(1989).
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and a political campaign contribution."69 At one Board meeting controversy erupted over reasons for delay in implementing a planned garbage clean-up campaign. Barrios and Morales each blamed the other
for the delay. Barrios charged that Morales' explanation was untrue.
"Morales replied that he was not lying, and that, 'The one who is
lying is you."' 695 Dr. Stierheim, the OCED director, re-assigned
Morales to another neighborhood project with no loss of salary, responsibility, or benefits. 696 Morales sued in federal district court claiming
that the re-assignment impinged upon his first amendment speech
rights. The district court entered judgment for Morales, awarded at6 97
torney's fees, and enjoined his transfer from the Melrose target area.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed on the basis of its Pickering balancing,
which, it held, tilted in favor of Stierheim and the OCED.
The Morales court's balancing was clearly influenced by Connick,
to which it referred several times in its analysis.698 Morales was decided
before Kurtz and Maples 699 and so treated Morales' statements as a
single unit for "balancing," even though Morales had spoken on different occasions. Though it did not explicitly characterize his statements
as "whistle-blower" speech, the court found that in making his accusations, "Morales was clearly concerned with bringing to light an 'actual
' '7°
or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust' . . . by Barrios.
Morales' statements, the court went on, "sought to inform OCED or
other members of the Board that by disrupting the community development process, Barrios was not discharging his responsibilities as
Chairman to the Melrose Board."7 1 However, the court made these
observations only in connection with its determination that Morales'
speech related to matters of public concern. When it came to balancing, the court considered only the adverse effects of Morales' speech
on orderly public administration. The court found that Morales' statements destroyed "the necessary close working relationship between
Barrios and Morales," thereby bringing "the community development
process in Melrose to a virtual halt."7 2 Moreover, by criticizing Barrios
in public, "Morales risked associating OCED with statements bound

694. Id. at 1146-47.
695.

Id. at 1147.

696.
697.
698.
699.
700.
701.

Id.
Id. at 1147-48.
Id. at 1149-50.
See supra text accompanying notes 588-601.
Morales, 848 F.2d at 1149.
Id.

702.

Id. at 1150.
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to strain relations with the Board. ' 70 3 Yet the court made no effort
to balance or weigh such adverse effects against either Morales' own
interests in his speech, or against the public's need to know about
official wrongdoing. Not surprisingly, the balance swung in favor of
the purported governmental interest. Where controversies arise between upper level agency officials, the court may be inclined to equate
the interests of those in higher authority with the interests of "government," even though responsibility for detrimental effects on "necessary
close working relations" rests as much (or more) upon the higher
officials. 704 In Morales, the court may have been influenced by, two
considerations not strictly within the scope of Pickering analysis. One
could have been that, whoever was at fault, in order for the Melrose
project to go forward, either Barrios or Morales would have to go.
Stierheim had authority to transfer Morales, but, not to remove Barrios. The other could have been that even though the transfer might
technically have violated Morales' speech rights, it did not cause him
any tangible damages. Considerations of "practical politics" and fairness very likely go into judicial "balancing," though they are rarely
identified as such in the opinions.
Perhaps Berry was wrongly decided. 70 5 The court failed to consider
binding precedent that would have accorded great weight to public
interest in official corruption; it neglected to include the deputy's own
speech interests in its balancing; and it too simply identified Sheriff
Bailey's interest in appeasing corrupt political supporters so that he
might remain in office as "the government's interest."'- Similarly, in
Morales the court conceded too much to practical politics. In two more
recent cases in which police officers alleged official corruption, the
court attended more closely to relevant balancing factors.
One was Bryson v. City of Waycross. 70 7 Mr. Bryson, a police captain, had formally complained to the city manager that police chief
Taylor, some years earlier, had stolen whiskey from the department's
evidence room, and committed other improprieties. The charges were
investigated and determined to be unfounded. Taylor then re-assigned
Bryson to other duties at the same salary. 7° Bryson proceeded openly
to investigate Taylor, interviewing other members of the police force,

703.
704.
705.
706.
707.
708.

Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 860-77.
See supra text accompanying notes 683-92.
See supra text accompanying note 689.
888 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1564.
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and tape-recording conversations. Taylor then placed Bryson on administrative leave. 7°9 The district court found that Bryson's "whistleblower" speech addressed matters of public concern, but ruled in favor
of the city on the basis of its Pickeringbalancing. The Eleventh Circuit
710
affirmed.
Implicitly, the Circuit Court took cognizance of Bryson's own interest in his speech, noting that his speech would have been protected
"had he confined his complaint to the proper time, place, and manner."711 The court did not expressly weigh public interest in Bryson's
speech; however, since Bryson's specific allegations of corruption had
been investigated and found ungrounded, the court may have considered public interest in them only minimal. For whatever reason, the
court explicitly considered only the adverse effects of Bryson's speech
in its "balancing" analysis.712 In contrast to Berry, however, the court
particularized those effects clearly so that it could be seen that they
were not merely superficial. "Bryson's bitter complaints to all who
would listen in the police department and his active investigation of
Chief Taylor severely undermined the morale of the police department.
Some officers even avoided the police station because of Bryson's
animosity toward the chief. ' 71 3 The Bryson court also implicitly took
account of another balancing factor: Bryson could have found less
disruptive means for expressing his concerns: "Although Bryson could
not have been lawfully demoted or terminated for expressing his displeasure with the chief under the proper circumstances, his speech
was not protected when it disrupted the efficient functioning of the
'' 7
police department. 14
The Bryson court arguably reached the proper result. However,
it would have done so on firmer theoretical grounds if it had decided
the case (or remanded to the district court for decision) on the basis
of Mt. Healthy causation analysis. Under Kurtz and Maples, the court
should have separated the various instances of Bryson's speech. Unpro-

709. Id.
710. Id.
711. Id. at 1567 (citing a pre-Connick case, Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833 (11th Cir.
1982)) (officer's remarks in derogation of police chief made while off-duty and privately to a
friend).
712. Id. at 1567.
713. Id. The court also implicitly applied the Fifth Circuit's "substantially interfered" test.
It noted record testimony to the effect that Bryson's speech had "substantiallyinterfered" with
police department operations. Id. (emphasis added).
714. Bryson, 888 F.2d at 1567; cf. Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 773 n.4; see supra text
accompanying note 240.
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tected speech should not have been "balanced," but could have been
considered in determining whether the City would have similarly
sanctioned Bryson for reasons other than those involving his protected
speech.

715

The court's balancing in Busby v. City of Orlando716 also resulted
in an adverse holding for the employee-speaker. Ms. Busby was an
Airport Safety Officer for the Orlando Police Department (OPD). While
under investigation for possible criminal activities herself, Officer
Busby wrote letters and memos to various public officials and bodies
charging her superiors with malfeasance. Major Mays warned Busby
to stop making public accusations since these violated department
policy. After Busby continued making public complaints, Mays drafted
a letter to her summarizing the department's policy regarding complaint procedure.717 In effect, the letter stated that "before an employee
[may] complain publicly about the OPD, the employee must first give
the department the opportunity to investigate the matter internally."71s

Busby was ordered to sign the letter "as 'received, read, and understood."' She twice refused to sign, and Mays then terminated her
employment .719 Busby sued, claiming that she had been fired "in retali'
ation for publicizing malfeasance by her supervisors."720
In its balancing
analysis, the Eleventh Circuit noted that Busby's "interest in expressing her opinion on the alleged malfeasance of her superiors" belonged
on her "side of the Pickering scale,"721 but made no mention of the
public's interest in such matters. The court did not say how Busby's
speech adversely affected the OPD's performance, but instead mentioned general considerations "on appellees' side of the scale," such as
their interests in loyalty, discipline, good working relationships among
employees, and the OPD's reputation. 722 The critical consideration, in

715. See supra text accompanying notes 588-601. On appeal, Bryson himself contended that
the district court "erred by adding . . . non-protected instances of speech into the [balancing]
equation." Bryson, 888 F.2d at 1566. Curiously, the appellate court did not address this contention, and made no reference to its prior holdings in Kurtz and Maples regarding analysis of
speech that took place on separate occasions.
716. 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1991).
717. Id. at 769.
718. Id. at 770.
719. Id.
720. Id. at 773.
721. Id. at 774.
722. Id. Like Bryson, the Busby court made no effort to distinguish between protected
and unprotected speech for balancing purposes, and made no reference to Kurtz or Maples. Id.
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the court's view, was that the defendants had not prevented Busby
from "voicing her complaints." Instead, they had "merely sought to
delay her access to a public forum until after the OPD's internal affairs
division could investigate" them.7 2 In effect, the court found that
Busby should have been content with this less disruptive avenue for
expressing her concerns.7 - Although the Busby court did not say so
in as many words, it also suggested that Busby's superiors had attempted to use less intrusive means to counter any disruptive or potentially
disruptive effects of her speech. 7 They had warned her, suspended
her briefly, disciplined her again, and given her two opportunities to
signify her willingness to abide by department policy before finally
discharging her.7 Other cases involving police officer-speakers will
be considered shortly. Next, however, we turn to the court's post-Connick consideration of special balancing factors appropriate in the context of schools and colleges.
b. Speech by School and College Faculty
All of the first Supreme Court decisions regarding First Amendment speech rights of government employees had to do with speech
by college professors and secondary school teachers: Keyishian, Pickering, Perry, Mt. Healthy, and Givhan.77 Keyishian was especially
emphatic in stressing the importance of academic freedom as a First
Amendment right not only for teachers, but for the sake of the nation
and "our civilization. '"- Academic freedom was "a special concern of
the First Amendment," at any rate with respect to "the classroom."72
Several pre-partition Fifth Circuit decisions likewise focused on
speech by teachers and professors. Some of these suggested special
factors that should be considered in Pickering balancing. These cases
made it clear (as had Pickering and Perry) that First Amendment
protection was not limited to classroom speech. 730 A teacher's speech

723. Id.
724. See supra note 239.
725. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
726. Busby, 931 F.2d at 769-70.
727. See supra text accompanying notes 1-110, 121-139.
728. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
729. See supra text accompanying note 26.
730. D'Andrea v. Adams, 626 F.2d 469 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1980); Lewis
v. Spencer, 468 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1972). In-class speech was the issue in Kingsville Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980), and Pred v. Board of Pub. Instr., 415 F.2d
851 (5th Cir. 1969).
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interests could, however be outweighed by governmental interests,
which were, sometimes, stated in abstract and conclusory language.7 31
In one school case, the Fifth Circuit construed Pickering and its
progeny to say that "a state agency may not restrict an employee's
freedom of expression by discharge or other means unless that employee's statements are shown to substantially impede the legitimate operations of that agency."7 In some school cases the court applied its
"materially and substantially" interfered or disrupted test;73 in others
it focused more on whether such disruption "overbalanced" or "clearly"
overbalanced the instructor's "usefulness as an instructor. '" Either
way, school officials had to do more than assert that some disruption
occurred.
The Eleventh Circuit eventually came to read Connick to say that
only speech on matters of public concern deserved First Amendment
protection. 73 Consequently, speech by teachers or professors on matters of academic policy was sometimes found not even worthy of balancing. 736 But some cases did reach the balancing phase of analysis. What
effect, if any, did Connick have on the weight to be assigned to
teachers' (or professors') and the public's interest in academic free
speech?
Two recent Eleventh Circuit cases involved balancing analysis:
Maples v. Martin, 77 and Bishop v. Aronov. 73s In both, the court found
that government interests outweighed the speakers' First Amendment
speech rights. The speakers in each case were university faculty in
Alabama. Maples was the earlier decision.
In 1983 Auburn University was looking for a new "Head" for its
Mechanical Engineering Department (the Department). Professor
Maples and three other tenured members of the Department "cam-

731. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
732. Roane v. Callisburg Indep. Sch. Dist., 511 F.2d 633, 640 (5th Cir. 1975).
733. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
734. Kaprelian v. Texas Woman's Univ., 509 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1975.); Ferguson v. Thomas,
430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970); see supra text accompanying notes 243-45.
735. See supra text accompanying notes 519-20.
736. Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1986); Renfroe v. Kirkpatrick, 722 F.2d 714
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984); Ballard v. Blount, 581 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga.
1983), affd 734 F.2d 1480 (l1th Cir.) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1086 (1984);
see also Harden v. Adams, 841 F.2d 1091, 1092-93 (1lth Cir.) (vaguely characterizing plaintiff's
speech as "centered largely around" matters not of public concern), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967
(1988).
737. 858 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1988).
738. 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).
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paigned aggressively" for the candidacy of the then acting Head. The
University appointed another candidate, Dr. Crocker, to the position.
Maples, the three other faculty and another member of the Department
(the appellants) later opposed many of Crocker's decisions. "Specific
issues of debate included salaries, allocation of resources, and the
'undemocratic' management style of Dr. Crocker. ' 739 In 1986, the De°
partment was reviewed by an outside accrediting board. Appellants7
surveyed the Department faculty and distributed the results in a published report (the Review) to other Auburn faculty, students, alumni,
and administrators. The Circuit Court characterized the Review as
follows:
While it contained a discussion of problems such as the critical need for new faculty, additional funding and more physical space, a main concern of the authors was the lack of
faculty involvement in administrative decision making and
the "morale problem" in the Department. The tone of the
Review was extremely critical of the Department Head. 741
President Martin concluded "that years of in-fighting were injuring
the Department," and reassigned the appellants to other University
departments, with no loss of income, rank, or tenure. 742 One appellant,
Professor Turner, appealed the district court's ruling that the Review
did not address matters of public concern. The Eleventh Circuit read
Pickering to mean that teachers' speech addressing matters of public
concern is protected when only it "directly affects the public's perception of the quality of education in a given academic system."-7 The
court noted that, following Connick, "courts have found [that] speech
that concerns internal administration of the educational system and
'7
personal grievances will not receive constitutional protection." " It
found that some of the issues presented in the Review did affect such
public perception, and that appellants' motivation in publishing it had
been, at least in part, to bring the Department's problems in providing
students adequate collegiate education to the attention of the Univer-

739. Maples, 858 F.2d at 1548.
740. They were joined by one other Department member. Id. at 1549 n.4.
741. Id. at 1549.
742. Id. at 1549, 1549 n.4.
743. Id. at 1553.
744. Id. at 1552. The only case involving speech cited for this proposition is Ballard v.
Blount, which was decided without regard for binding Fifth Circuit precedent. See supra note
573 and text accompanying notes 573-78.
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sity's administration and the public. 745 In what appears to be an endorsement of the special First Amendment status of academic speech,
the court added, "Speech by members of an academic community,
even when critical in nature, should not be easily denied constitutional
protection. '746 These considerations, however, are noted only in the
court's discussion of its rationale for finding that the appellants' speech
addressed matters of public concern and might, therefore, be placed
on the Pickering balancing scales.
Once placed there, however, the court gave no consideration at all
to either the appellants' speech rights74 7 or the public's interest in "the
quality of education in a given academic system." 74 Following the
model implicit in Connick, the court again found that the governmental
interest in suppressing appellants' speech outweighed their speech
interests.749 Something, after all, is more than nothing.
Though the Maples court made no mention of prior Fifth Circuit
case law on this point,750 it implicitly applied the "substantial interference" test: "The publication of the Review contributed to a lack of
harmony among the faculty and interfered substantially with the regdlar operation of the ME Department. It severely hampered communi75
cation between members of the faculty and the Department Head. '
The court did not, however, say whether it found that such interference "overbalanced" the appellants' "usefulness" as members of the
Department faculty - again evidently ignoring binding Fifth Circuit
precedent.72 As in Morales,73 the court's conclusion may have been
influenced by extra-Pickeringconsiderations. For one thing, the appellants were not injured tangibly, since they retained the same income,
rank and tenure status they had enjoyed prior to transfer. In addition,
the court may have believed it more expedient for University officials

745. Maples, 858 F.2d at 1553.
746. Id. The court cites to Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969), a student free speech case, but not, strangely, to Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 589.
See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
747. The court correctly stated that Pickering "requires the Court to balance the rights of
public employees to speak on matters of public concern with the government's need to maintain
the efficient performance of the public services it provides." Maples, 858 F.2d at 1553-54. But
the court then became completely silent as to employees' First Amendment rights or interests
while doing its balancing analysis. Id. at 1554-55.
748. See id. at 1553.
749. Id. at 1554.
750. See supra text accompanying notes 217-34.
751. Maples, 858 F.2d at 1554 (emphasis added).
752. See supra text accompanying notes 242-45.
753. See supra text accompanying notes 704-05.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' SPEECH RIGHTS

to transfer the faculty appellants to other departments than to remove
the Department Head, even if he had contributed more to Department
disruption than had appellees. Like the Connick majority, the Maples
court evidently believed, as a matter of social policy, that governmental interests are better served by supporting hierarchical authority
than by allowing underlings to engage in robust critical debate as to
internal policies. If those in higher positions of authority "can't stand
the heat," they should toss their critics "out of the kitchen." The
court's implicit endorsement of a command-control management model
in the University context conflicts with traditional emphasis upon the
7 54
role of faculty in institutional governance.
The net result of Maples is to confine First Amendment protection
for faculty speech regarding institutional governance to those expressions "directly [affecting] the public's perception of the quality of education in a given academic system. "' 7M The court will determine, as a
matter of law, whether a given expression has that character. Even
then, such "protected" speech may be curtailed if, in the court's view,
it interferes too much with faculty "harmony," "regular operation" of
a department, or "communication" between faculty and a department
chair. Academic freedom came into question again, three years later,
in Bishop v. Arnov.7Assistant Professor Bishop taught exercise physiology at the University of Alabama. Occasionally, in class, he would express his religious beliefs, noting that these were his personal "bias." Sometimes
he related his religious beliefs to his understanding of human physiology. 757 One time, near the end of the term, Bishop scheduled an afterclass meeting for students and others who might be interested, in
which he discussed "Evidences of God in Human Physiology." Attendance was optional, and did not affect students' grades. Some students
complained to the department "Head" about the in-class religious statements and about the after-class meeting.75 University officials advised
Bishop that both types of expression were "unwarranted at a public
institution," and asked him to refrain from "1) the interjection of
religious beliefs and/or preferences during instructional time periods

754.

See the various statements included under College and University Government, in

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS

103-122 (1984).
755. Maples, 858 F.2d at 1553.
756. 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).
757. Id. at 1068.
758. Id. at 1069.
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and 2) [conducting] optional classes where a 'Christian Perspective' of
an academic topic is delivered. ' ' 759 Bishop sued seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief for violation of his First Amendment speech rights.
The University denied any First Amendment violation, and raised the
Establishment Clause as an affirmative defense. 76° The district court
granted summary judgment for Bishop. "The University has no interest sufficient to justify restricting a professor's freedom to make
occasional classroom comments about personal religious beliefs or to
restrict him from holding after-class meetings with students on state
university property to discuss a Christian perspective on academic
topics. ' ' 761

The Eleventh Circuit reversed.

The Circuit Court began its analysis of the speech issue by quoting
Pickering's balancing formula. 762 The court also quoted Pickering's
statement that: "Teachers cannot suffer reprisal for speaking on a
matter of public concern by speech they would be entitled to make
as private persons unless that speech 'impeded [their] proper performance of. . . daily duties in the classroom or ... interfered with the
regular operation of the schools generally. ' '' 763 Because, the Bishop
court reasoned, Pickering "addresses only out-of-school speech by
'764
teachers," it meant only that "some balance must be reached.
It is at this point that the Bishop court's analysis begins to go off
the rails. Thereafter, it makes no effort to engage in Pickering-Connick-Rankin analysis. Its discussion completely ignores the question
whether Bishop's speech at any point related to matters of public
concern. 765 It refers to Bishop's "interest in academic freedom and free
speech, ' ' 76 but does not mention public interest in such freedom or
speech. The court identified the University's "chief concern" to be
"that its courses be taught without personal religious bias unnecessarily infecting the teacher or the students, ' ' 767 but fails to discuss how

759. Id.
760. Id.
761. Id. at 1070.
762. Id. at 1072 (citing Ryan v. Tinsley, 391 U.S. at 563, 568 (1968)).
763. Id. at 1072 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73).
764. Id. at 1072.
765. Under both Rankin and earlier Eleventh Circuit case law, inquiry on this question
was to be 'the threshold" test in public employee free speech analysis. Id; see supra text
accompanying notes 484-88, 520-21.
766. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1076.
767. Id. What the nature of this interest may have been is only vaguely intimated. Here,
and elsewhere in its speech analysis, the court implies, but never directly states, that the
University had an interest in avoiding violating the First Amendment Establishment Clause. Id.
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or to what extent Bishop's speech may have interfered with those
interests. Instead of "balancing" the competing interests, the court
merely announced its conclusion: "[W]e find that the University's interests in the classroom conduct of its professors are sufficient, in the
balance we have suggested, to
warrant the reasonable restrictions it
'76
Bishop."
Dr.
on
imposed
has
The court's failure to apply appropriate analysis in part derives
from its neglect of binding precedent. It seemed unaware that the
Supreme Court itself applied Pickering balancing (not merely some
kind of balancing) in a subsequent case involving in-school speech by
a teacher: Givhan. 769 The Bishop court does not even mention this
case, nor, stranger still, does it even refer to Connick or Rankin.
The court likewise failed to recall that pre-partition Fifth Circuit cases
also had used Pickering balancing in analyzing in-school speech by
teachers.77 Though the court cites to Pred v. Board of PublicInstruction 771 it did not seem to notice that Pred concerned in-class speech
by teachers. The only post-Pickering Fifth Circuit case on teacher
speech the Bishop court does mention was decided in 1969.772 The
court's neglect of relevant Fifth Circuit precedent is also illustrated
in its conclusion that the "material and substantial interference test"
77
applies only to student expression, but not expression by teachers. 3
Binding Fifth Circuit case law had applied that test in Pickering
balancing to speech by a wide range of persons including teachers or
professors.774 Moreover, the Bishop court makes no mention of prior
775
Eleventh Circuit academic speech cases.
Most of the Bishop court's analysis relates either to student speech
or to teacher speech implicating Establishment Clause concerns. It is
unclear why the court based its decision (purportedly) on Bishop's
First Amendment speech claim rather than on the University's Establishment Clause defense.76 The court's failure to analyze the relevant

768. Id.
769. See supra text accompanying notes 83-110, 124-39.
770. See supra text accompanying notes 242-46.
771. 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969).
772. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1072 n.6 (citing Pred v. Board of Pub. Instr., 415 F.2d 851 (5th
Cir. 1969)).
773. Id. at 1073.
774. See supra text accompanying notes 218-22, 242-46.
775. See supra note 736 and text accompanying notes 737-52. This apparent indifference to
prior Fifth and Eleventh Circuit case law may in part result from the fact that the author of
the Bishop opinion was sitting by designation from another circuit. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1067.
776. Id. Possibly the court thought this defense insufficient. "[W]e do not reach the estab-
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interests properly in terms of Pickeringand its progeny, 777 and particularly its tendency to assume that student expression cases somehow
necessarily applied to professorial speech, 778 yielded some conclusory
dicta which, taken out of the cases's Establishment Clause context,
could be read to undermine the special place accorded academic free779
dom in First Amendment jurisprudence from Keyishian to Maples.
For instance, the Bishop court states, flatly, "[W]e do not find support
to conclude that academic freedom is an independent First Amendment
right. And, in any event, we cannot supplant our discretion for that
of the University. Federal judges should not be ersatz deans or
educators. ' '780 The court apparently read "educators" to mean deans
and other school administrators, rather than faculty. 78 '
This language, together with Bishop's analysis of faculty speech
as a whole, is aberrational. It does not, and cannot, of course, overrule
78 2
prior Supreme Court, Fifth Circuit, or Eleventh Circuit precedent.
But it could be a source of confusion to educators (both faculty and
administrators) and to subsequent judicial reflections on the nature
and relative importance of teacher expression and governmental interests in restricting it.
c. Speech by Law Enforcement Officers
Special circumstances or factors relating to police officers and
sheriffs deputies were considered by both the pre-partition Fifth Circuit and the pre- and post-Connick Eleventh Circuit. It may or may

lishment questions raised by Dr. Bishop's conduct. The University can restrict speech that falls
short of an establishment violation." Id. at 1077.
777. Id. Under Rankin, the court readily could have held that Bishop's speech was only
personal, not of public concern, and therefore failed the "threshold test." If it had found his
religious beliefs a matter of public concern, it could easily have concluded that the University's
interest in avoiding transgressing the Establishment Clause outweighed Bishop's interest and
any possible public interest in his speech. There was no reason for the court to become entangled
in student speech cases or to indulge in dicta on academic freedom. Id.
778. See, e.g., id. at 1074. The court simply interpolates "[or professor]" into Supreme
Court language about restrictions on student speech in Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 266-67 (1988) (censorship of student speech in high school newspaper). Id. The court
did not seem to notice that the quoted language from Kuhlmeier goes on to state that teachers
(along with parents and school officials), in contrast to students, have primary responsibility
for "the education of the Nation's youth." Id.
779. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26, 746.
780. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1075.
781. See id. at 1075 (citing Virgil v. School Bd., 862 F.2d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1989)); see
also id. at 1077 (describing "the University as an employer and educator").
782. See supra note 8.
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not be significant that the court(s) more often found officers' speech
rights vindicated in the earlier decisions than in more recent ones.
The cases are reviewed here in chronological order under each of two
headings: first those in which officers' speech rights were affirmed,
and then those where Pickering balancing favored governmental interests.
i. Officers' Speech Rights/Interests Vindicated
In Williams v. Board of Regents, 783 the pre-partition Fifth Circuit
stated that discipline is "a necessary component of a smoothly operating police force," and one "which must be maintained among police
officers during periods of active duty. ' "7 4 Officer Williams's speech
concerned misconduct by superior officers. The Williams court held
that the public importance of whistle-blower speech outweighed its
intrusion upon the police department's "discipline" and the department's need to avoid "disharmony" in working relationships.- s
Waters v. Chaffin,7s6 a pre-Connick Eleventh Circuit decision, held
that a police officer's off-duty, private remarks in derogation of the
police chief were constitutionally protected where the department was
unable to show "actual harm or a reasonable likelihood of harm to its
efficiency, discipline, or harmony. "787 Here the court suggested that a
public employee's speech could be restricted only if "a compelling
''7s8
state interest outweighs the citizen's interest in speaking freely.
The Waters court emphasized the importance of the officer's own
speech rights: "Policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated
to a watered-down version of constitutional rights." 78 9 A few post-Connick Eleventh Circuit decisions refer to a "compelling state interest"
requirement, but most do not. And one or two of the later cases do
"water-down" police officers' speech rights both by neglecting to include them in Pickering balancing and by assigning greater weight to
"discipline" and other asserted department interests.
Leonard v. City of Columbus79° was decided only a month after
Connick. Appellants were several former black police officers who

783. 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, sub nom. Saye v. Williams, 452 U.S. 926
(1981); see supra text accompanying notes 187-89.
784. Williams, 629 F.2d at 1003; see supra text accompanying note 248.
785. See supra text accompanying notes 241, 249.
786. 684 F.2d 833 (11th Cir. 1982); see supra text accompanying notes 294-301, 311-27.
787. Waters, 684 F.2d at 840.
788. Id. at 838 n.l1 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying note 322.
789. Waters, 684 F.2d at 836 (citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967)).
790. 705 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984).
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had been discharged for removing American flag emblems from their
uniforms while picketing the police station to protest the department's
racially discriminatory practices. The picketing officers were in uniform and off-duty, and the picketing was conducted peacefully.791 In
its Pickering balancing, the court took cognizance of the officers' own
"substantial" interest in expressing their views.792 It reiterated "that
a police officer does not receive a 'watered-down version' of constitutionally protected rights by virtue of his public employment on the
police force."7 - The court also weighed the public importance of such
speech: "[C]ertain types of speech traditionally are accorded greater
protection in our society by virtue of the fact that the speech goes to
the heart of our democratic process." 79 It applied this theory specifically to speech in the police department context:
[A]ppellants publicized a perception of discriminatory hiring
of police officers, and a concern that beat assignments were
being made along racial lines . . . .For a police force to be
effective, it must have the respect and support of the community as well as its officers; our system of government
demands that support be garnered through informed evaluation of circumstances, and not through the suppression of
dissent. 795
The Leonard court rejected the City's assertion of an abstract "need
for 'discipline' in 'paramilitary' or 'quasi-military' organizations."-7 Instead, there must be a demonstrably adverse impact on genuine governmental interests in order to justify suppressing such speech. The
court found no evidence that wearing the "patches" had any "relation
to the performance of police duties." Moreover, the court noted that
other officers "invariably were without the patches," and concluded
that if the City had had a compelling interest in having its police
conform to a flag patch requirement, "discipline should have followed
every violation."- The court easily concluded that the officers were
entitled to relief.

791. Id. at 1300-1301.
792. Id. at 1304.
793. Id. at 1305.
794. Id. at 1304.
795. Id. at 1305.
796. Id.
797. Id. at 1306. The court is not here making an equal protection judgment, but rather
finding that a possible "compelling interest" argument would fail on the record facts. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit again held in favor of a police officer's speech
rights in Eiland v. City of Montgomery.798 This was the case in which
an officer had posted at the police station copies of a satirical poem
criticizing the mayor's use of officers as body guards. Here, as has
been indicated, 79 the court took into account both Eiland's interest in
his speech and the fact that the mayor's current political campaign
was an issue of importance to the public. Even though Eiland's speech
might have had some adverse consequences, considerations on the
side of his free speech interests tipped the Pickering balance in his
favor. Again, the court insisted that, to prevail in such balancing, the
government's interest in "discipline" must be more than "abstract, '"800
and repeated Waters' admonition that "police officers need not suffer
a 'watered-down version' of their constitutional rights. '" ° The court
noted that state interest "in regulating its police force can be especially
compelling,"s- but found no evidence of actual disruption- and insufficient evidence of potential disruption.80 The court stressed that the
officer's speech was entitled to special deference because of its political
content and context: "Clearly matters directly affecting an electoral
campaign go directly to the heart of the democratic process. . ., which
requires that we give the utmost deference to the speech that is possible. "so
These cases where the court upheld law enforcement officers'
speech rights involved a number of special balancing considerations.
Though no single factor was necessarily dispositive, several have been
important. In Williams, the court was particularly impressed with
the importance to the public of "whistle-blower" speech, that is, information about officials' corruption.w In Waters, the critical point was
that the officer's speech had no adverse effect or likely such effect on
the department's actual functioning.- In Leonard, the importance to
the public of speech regarding racially discriminatory practices was
certainly a major factor. 08 Eiland turned on the importance to the

798. 797 F.2d 953 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987).
799. See supra text accompanying notes 624-30.
800. Eiland, 797 F.2d at 959.
801. Id. at 958.
802. Id.
803. Id. at 960.
804. Id. at 958.
805. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
806. See supra text accompanying note 241.
807. See supra text accompanying notes 337-38, 786-87.
808. See supra text accompanying notes 790-97; see also Stough v. Gallagher, 967 F.2d
1523, 1527-29 (11th Cir. 1992).
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public of free political speech in a democratic society." Where such
considerations were lacking, or where, due to its reading of Connick,
such considerations were devaluated or omitted altogether, the court
was more inclined to find in favor of governmental interests in suppressing law officers' speech.
ii. Government Interests Prevail
In four cases, the Eleventh Circuit's Pickeringbalance has swung
against sheriffs' or police officers' speech rights. Sometimes the court
neglected to include, or accord significant weight to, factors that would
have been considered important in its earlier, or the Fifth Circuit's
pre-partition, balancing. Some cases also involved additional considerations. In most, the court nevertheless probably reached the right
result.
The obvious exception was Berry v. Bailey,810 which has been reviewed above in connection with analysis of post-Connick "whistleblower" speech. 811 In Berry, unlike Williams, the court down-played
the importance to the public of speech regarding corruption in public
offices;8 12 failed to include Berry's own speech interest in its "balancing"; simply assumed that Bailey's interest in retaining his office
through help from corrupt supporters constituted "governmental in4
terest";813 and failed to inquire whether that interest was compelling.'8
In contrast, the "speech" at issue in McMullen v. Carson815 had
demonstrably serious adverse effects on the operations of the law
enforcement agency. Mr. McMullen was a clerical employee in the
Jacksonville, Florida, sheriffs office. Mr. Carson was sheriff. McMullen, together with Mr. Wilkinson, who was then Imperial Wizard of
the Invisible Empire, held a news conference interview in which they
disclaimed Ku Klux Klan involvement in a recent cross-burning incident. During the interview, McMullen identified himself both as a
recruiter for the Klan and as a Sheriffs office employee. 816 The interview was given wide media coverage. Carson immediately dismissed
McMullen, who then sued claiming violation of his First Amendment
rights.

809.
810.
811.
812.
813.
814.
815.
816.

See supra text accompanying notes 624-30, 798-805.
726 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1101 (1985).
See supra text accompanying notes 683-92, 705-06.
See supra text accompanying note 691.
See supra text accompanying note 706.
See supra text accompanying notes 322-27, 786, 788, 802.
754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 936-37.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' SPEECH RIGHTS

The district court held in favor of defendants, and the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed. The latter noted two "critical factors." The first was
record evidence showing "the nature, both actual and perceived, of
the Klan as a violent, criminal, and racist organization dedicated to
the sowing of fears and mistrust between white and black Americans.",' '7 The second was "that [McMullen] was employed by a law
enforcement agency, the members of which are subject to greater
First Amendment restraints than most other citizens."' s5 For this latter point, the court relied, strangely, on Kelley v. Johnson.s19 The
relevance of Kelley, which concerned a police commissioner's order
requiring hair grooming standards for male police officers for First
Amendment free speech analysis is not at all clear.2 ° The McMullen
court should have cited its own relevant (indeed, binding) precedent
which affirmed the full value of law officers' speech rights.82
In its Pickering balancing, the court properly took account of
McMullen's own "rights to free speech and political expression."
Implicitly, the court also placed the public importance of the speech
on the side of his speech interest, for, it noted, "Connick cautioned
that 'a stronger showing [of adverse effects] may be necessary if the
employee's speech more substantially involved matters of public concern."'s The court found that "such a showing" had been made. In
language reminiscent of Leonard's," the court articulated governmental interests jeopardized by public awareness of McMullen's Klan participation:
The Sheriffs office is charged with securing the safety of
persons and property, and enforcing the law. Under our
system of Government, that duty can be performed effectively only with the consent of the vast majority of those
citizens policed by the Sheriffs office. Efficient law enforcement requires mutual respect, trust, and support. 85

817. Id. at 938.
818. Id.
819. 425 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1976).
820. In Kelley, Mr. Justice Rehnquist himself observed that the hair length issue implicated
only "the more general contours of the substantive liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Kelley, 425 U.S. at 245.
821. See supra text accompanying notes 789, 793, 801.
822. McMullen, 754 F.2d at 939.
823. Id. (citation omitted).
824. See supra text accompanying note 795.
825. McMullen, 754 F.2d at 939.
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Moreover, the court pointed out, Sheriff Carson had "no less restrictive
means" for limiting the adverse effects of McMullen's avowed Klan
membership since it would not have alleviated the black community's
mistrust if he had merely transferred McMullen to another section of
his office.82 6 Though the court did not characterize the government
interests at stake as "compelling," it is clear it regarded them as very
serious, and that it considered McMullen's speech and/or associational
activity sm to constitute a severe threat to the agency's abilities "to
perform effectively its public duties."8 2
Bryson v. City of Waycross- has already been considered in connection with whistle-blower speech.- ° Ordinarily, as in Williams, the
court has been inclined to accord special importance to such speech
because of the public's need to know about corruption in public offices. 1 The Bryson court's analysis is oddly silent as to the main
factors noted in prior law officer speech cases. It mentions neither
the repeated theme that police officers need not settle for "a watered
down version" of their first amendment rights,8 2 nor the doctrine that
"discipline" is especially important in law enforcement agencies as
paramilitary or quasi-military organizations.- Nor does the Bryson
court refer to the "compelling interest" standard.- The only law officer
speech case to which the court refers is Waters. 3 5 Its analysis is based
primarily on Morales, which had nothing to do with such speech.3 6
Nevertheless, the Bryson court's balancing analysis is implicitly faithful to the Pickering model. The court at least tacitly considered Bryson's own speech interest.3 7 Conceivably, it minimized (or excluded)
public interest in Bryson's speech because his substantive allegations
of corruption had already been investigated; and it carefully detailed

826. Id.
827. Id. It is unclear whether the court treated McMullen's First Amendment claim in
terms of freedom of speech, freedom of association, or both.
828. See McMullen, 754 F.2d at 940.
829. 888 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1989).
830. See supra text accompanying notes 707-15.
831. See supra text accompanying notes 187-89, 241.
832. See supra text accompanying notes 789, 793, 801.
833. See supra text accompanying notes 662-64, 796; Williams v. Board of Regents, 629
F.2d 993, 1003 (5th Cir. 1980).
834. See supra text accompanying notes 788, 797, 802.
835. Bryson, 888 F.2d at 1567.
836. See supra text accompanying notes 693-704.
837. See supra text accompanying note 711.
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its finding that Bryson's speech (and other activities) had interfered
with police department operations.
Busby v. City of Orlando3 9 likewise involved whistle-blower speech
in a police department context.80 The court invoked the doctrine that
"courts should... give weight to the need for maintaining [discipline
and] a close working relationship in quasi-military organizations like
police departments."~4 But it did not repeat the Waters-Leonard-Eiland insistence that police officers need not settle for "watered-down"
speech rights. Nor did the Busby court indicate that, in order to
justify its suppression, the government would have to show that the
officer's speech substantially interfered with a compelling state interest. In its balancing, the court did give some weight to Busby's
own interest in her speech,84 but omitted any possible public interest
in her superiors' alleged malfeasance. Because the issue on appeal was
whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, the court did
not feel obliged to engage in "precise" balancing.- The court's decision
was based primarily on its finding that the defendants had not kept
Busby from speaking, but had only insisted on her withholding public
statements until her complaints could be investigated internally.a 5
d. Political Speech
In
the Supreme Court declared that public employees
should be able to contribute their "informed and definite opinions" to
"free and open debate" necessary for "informed decision-making by
the electorate.847 The pre-partition Fifth Circuit applied this doctrine
in Hobbs v. Thompson, which involved city restrictions against firemen's displaying political bumper stickers on their cars.us "Absent
exceptional circumstances," the court concluded, "'debate on public
Pickeing846

838. See supra text accompanying notes 712-13.
839. 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1991).
840. See supra text accompanying notes 716-26.
841. Busby, 931 F.2d at 774.
842. See supra text accompanying notes 789, 793, 801.
843. See supra text accompanying note 721.
844: Busby, 931 F.2d at 774.
845. Id. There apparently was no allegation that such investigation was or would be in any
way biased or unduly delayed. The court also hinted that Busby's superiors had attempted though unsuccessfully - to limit Busby's speech by less restrictive means. Id.
846. See supra text accompanying notes 28-61.
847. See supra text accompanying note 41.
848. See supre text accompanying notes 250-56.
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issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open"' . 4 9 The government could restrain employees' political speech only if it directly interfered with the proper performance of their duties.850 Subsequently,
however, in McCormick v. Edwards, which concerned a public employee's participation in a political campaign, the Fifth Circuit seemed to
give less weight to such speech.-5 The McCormick court made no
mention of Hobbs, neglected Pickeringbalancing, and otherwise failed
to articulate a coherent legal rationale for its decision in favor of the
governmental defendants. Both Hobbs and McCormick were binding
2
precedent for the Eleventh Circuit when its doors opened in 1981.5
It is therefore surprising that Eleventh Circuit political speech
opinions refer to neither Hobbs nor McCormick. Nevertheless, these
later decisions, like Hobbs, view public employees' political speech as
particularly worthy of protection, and insist that to justify its suppression, such speech must clearly be shown to have interfered with important, if not compellingm governmental interests. The court has been
particularly solicitous as to public employee speech relating to political
campaigns or pending elections.5
In two cases involving election campaigns, the court held that
public employees had the right not to speak in support of their agency
superiors.8- Moreover, employees had a First Amendment right to
walk out on an agency superior's after-hours campaign speech.8 In
all cases involving election campaigns, the Eleventh Circuit found that
the employees' First Amendment interests outweighed any slightly
adverse effects their expressions (or silence) might have had on governmental interests.
Three political speech cases involved police or sheriffs' employees.
In Leonard and Eiland the court took account of both the officers'
own, and the public's interest in political speech, and held that such
speech should be accorded great deference in a democratic society,

849. See supra text accompanying note 254.
850. Id.
851. See supra text accompanying notes 261-73.
852. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
853. Eiland v. City of Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953, 958 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1020 (1987); Leonard v. City of Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299, 1306 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984).
854. See, e.g., Eiland, 797 F.2d at 958; see supra text accompanying notes 798-805. See
also Stough v. Gallagher, 967 F.2d 1523, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1992).
855. Nicholson v. Gant, 816 F.2d 591, 599 (11th Cir. 1987); Sykes v. McDowell, 786 F.2d
1098, 1104 (11th Cir. 1986).
856. Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499, 1503-06 (11th Cir. 1990).
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notwithstanding the general need for "discipline" in law enforcement
agencies. 857 The only case where the court found that governmental
interests outweighed employee and public interest in political speech
was McMullen. s There, as has been seen, the court found that the
speech had, and probably would have had further seriously adverse
effects on important government interests. 9
e. Co-operation by Appointive Agency Officials
It has been seen that the court generally recognized the heightened
importance of "discipline" and "good working relationships" in the law
enforcement context - even though these considerations were not
necessarily dispositive in its Pickering balancing. The court has emphasized the importance of a slightly different governmental interest
in one other context: that involving relationships between upper-level
agency officials and their superiors. Here, it has stressed the importance of co-operation and a close or harmonious working relationship
between such officials. This emphasis was anticipated by the pre-par2
tition Fifth Circuit in Abbott v. Thetford.86, There, as has been noted,6
the court focused on Pickering's suggestion that "close working relationships" important for agency efficiency could be adversely affected
where speech is directed toward a person with whom the speaker
"would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work" and
where "personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper
functioning. "s
The Eleventh Circuit Morales case, which illustrates this emphasis,
has already been examined.86 There, the need for "close working
relations" was found to outweigh the importance of Morales' speech,
notwithstanding its whistle-blower content.- As in Morales, so in
other cases involving speech by higher-level agency officials, the court
has taken the position that it is up to such officials to defer to their

857. See supra text accompanying notes 783-805.
858. McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1985).
859. See supra text accompanying notes 815-21.
860. See supra text accompanying notes 662-64, 783-818.
861. 529 F.2d 695, 702-08 (5th Cir.) (Gewin, J., dissenting), adopted as the majority opinion
on rehearing, 534 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976)(en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977).
862. See supra text accompanying notes 206-16.
863. Abbott, 529 F.2d at 707 (Gewin, J., dissenting) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-70).
864. See supra text accompanying notes 693-704.
865. Abbott, 529 F.2d at 707.
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superiors in order to preserve the necessary, co-operative working
relationship.
In Hamm v. Board of Regents,8 the court held that such deference
should have taken the form of performing only assigned duties within
the framework established by the agency. Ms. Hamm had been appointed affirmative action officer to assist higher University of South
7
Florida officials promote equal employment opportunities there.1
"[D]espite repeated admonitions as to the procedures her supervisors
wished her to follow in resolving discrimination complaints, [Ms.
Hamm] persisted in 'going public' rather than first going through her
supervisor, the person with the ultimate decision-making authority. "8
Citing Abbott for authority, the court concluded, "Such activity is not
protected by the First Amendment." 869 The court also stated that
'
Hamm was in "a position which required loyalty to her supervisor. 870
Unfortunately, this kind of statement could be understood to mean
that "loyalty" is an end in itself. Pickering was concerned with "personal loyalty" only in connection with maintaining those close working
relationships that ultimately contribute to agency efficiency in delivering public services.8 71 The Hamm court failed to indicate whether or
to what extent Hamm's speech had in any way adversely affected
either her working relationship with her superiors or the University's
efficiency. Since the court apparently decided the case on the basis
of Mt. Healthy second level causation,8 72 its reference to "loyalty"
should be disregarded as mere dicta. Here, as in other cases where
the court ventures unnecessarily into balancing considerations, 873 there
is the danger that casual dicta may later be mistaken for authority.
The court's requirement that higher-level officials defer to their
superiors in order to maintain close working relationships does not
mean that they must always agree with them. What is critical is how
they disagree. Whether or not the Morales court struck the proper
Pickering balance, it was undoubtedly correct in finding that Morales'
choice of words and his speaking them at public meetings served to

866.
does not
867.
868.
869.
870.
871.
872.
873.

708 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1983). Hamm was decided a few weeks after Connick, but
refer to it.
Id. at 651.
Id. at 653.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 35, 51-57.
Hamm, 708 F.2d at 653-54.
See supra text accompanying notes 777-82.
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alienate, and thus seriously damage his working relationship with,
Board chairman Barrios.874 Likewise, in Dartland v. Metropolitan
Dade County,875 the court found that the "manner" in which a lowerlevel official spoke of his superior was "rude and insulting," and that
it could "undermine the proper functioning" of the agency.8 76 Where
such lower officials' disagreed in more respectful terms, the court
8
would, presumably, uphold their right of expression. 7
In summary, it appears that the post-Connick Eleventh Circuit
continues to accord special importance to whistle-blower and political
speech, and to speech by school teachers and college professors on
matters of public concern. Such speech is important not only to the
speakers but to the public which, in one way and another, is benefited
by it. In its Pickering balancing, however, the court has not always
explicitly weighed the speaker's or the public's interests, but has often,
instead, discussed only the speech's adverse effects on governmental
interests. In two contexts, the court has been especially sensitive to
governmental interests: in the case of speech by police officers, where
"discipline" is important to the effective functioning of law enforcement
agencies, and in the case of speech by upper-level agency officials that
undermines necessary working relationships with their superiors. The
court has sometimes, but not always, been careful to state that "discipline," "loyalty," and "close working relationships" are not governmental interests per se or in the abstract, but have importance
only to the extent that they relate to an agency's actual performance
of its public service functions.
Under the Eleventh Circuit's current analytical model,8 7 an employee-plaintiff who claims that her speech rights were violated is not
necessarily vindicated even when she has shown that her speech addressed matters of public concern, and that her speech interest (along
with public interest in it) outweighed governmental interest in its

874. Morales, 848 F.2d at 1149-51; see supra text accompanying notes 702-03.
875. 866 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1989).
876. Id. at 1324. The County Consumer Advocate was quoted in the Miami Herald as saying
that the County Manager "was a paid lackey" and had a "total misconception" of a Consumer
Advocate's responsibilities. Id. at 1322. The Dartland court did not engage in full Pickeing
balancing because the issue on appeal was whether the defendant's motion for summary judgment
on his claim to qualified immunity had been properly denied. Id. at 1322, 1325.
877. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1140 (1986); see supra note 37 at 802-03.
878. See supra text accompanying notes 509-18.
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suppression. She still may confront both first and second level Mt.
Healthy causation inquiry. Eleventh Circuit case law in this connection
can be summarized briefly.
D. Mt. Healthy CausationAnalysis in the Eleventh Circuit
The Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Mt. Healthy City School
District Board of Educationv. Doyle87 focused on causation,a consideration not specifically addressed in Pickering. Mt. Healthy identified
two distinct causation steps. First, the plaintiff-employee has the burden of showing that his speech was a "motivating" or "substantial"
factor in his agency superior's decision to penalize him. If he succeeds, the defendant-superior (or "government") then has the burden
- or opportunity - to prove that she would have taken the same
adverse personnel action even if the employee had not exercised his
speech right.s 1 The first step frequently has been called the "substantial factor" or first level causation test. The second is sometimes called
the "but for" or second level causation question. Both tests were often
applied in pre-partition Fifth Circuit, and pre-Connick Eleventh Circuit decisions, but were rarely dispositive in post-Connick Eleventh
Circuit determinations.
1. First Level Causation Analysis
Pre-partition Fifth Circuit case law established that an adverse
personnel action violates an employee's constitutional rights "even if
it is only 'partially in retaliation' for the exercise of those rights. '" 2
In general, post-Mt. Healthy Fifth and Eleventh Circuit opinions distinguished carefully between its two levels of testing or "prongs. '"
Such opinions also cleared up a point that prior Supreme Court decisions had left in some doubt: "Proof of causation under the Mt. Healthy
test is a question of fact," subject to review under the clearly erroneous
rule.8
Connick did not address the causation steps in public employee
free speech analysis, and had little direct effect on subsequent

879. 429 U.S. 274 (1977); see supra text accompanying notes 83-107.
880. See supra text accompanying note 95.
881. See supra text accompanying note 96.
882. See supra text accompanying note 115.
883. See supra text accompanying notes 114-22, 356-60.
884. Allen v. Autauga County Bd. of Educ., 685 F.2d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing
two earlier Fifth Circuit decisions).
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Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence in this regard. In Leonard, an early
post-Connick case, the Eleventh Circuit correctly observed that Mt.
Healthy presented the plaintiff with "the initial burden of proving that
his speech or [expressive] conduct was a substantial or motivating
factor" prompting his superior's adverse action.8 Applying this standard, the court rejected the defendants' contention that they also had
other reasons for firing them. As if to leave no possible doubt as to
the meaning of "substantial factor," the court explained, "Mt. Healthy
clearly contemplates that a decision may be the product of more than
one substantial factor. ''18 7 Any other factors might be raised at the
second level of analysis, but not at the first.
2. Second Level Causation Analysis
The principal effect of Mt. Healthy's second level causation test
was to allow agency superiors to violate public employees' free speech
rights with impunity provided the superiors could convince the court
that they might have taken the exact same personnel actions for constitutionally permissible reasons. Thus a superior may act to punish
an employee for reasons which in substantial part are constitutionally
impermissible. This result has been criticized for unnecessarily curOf course, agency
tailing employees' First Amendment rights.superiors should be able to take personnel actions against employees
for appropriate reasons that do not violate constitutionally protected
rights. The ambiguous holdings of some pre-Mt. Healthy Fifth Circuit
cases reflect these conflicting concerns.8' The Supreme Court's mistake (in terms of logic, constitutional construction, and social policy)
was in failing to require that agency superiors base adverse personnel

885. To the extent that the Eleventh Circuit, and then later, the Supreme Court in Rankin,
construed Pickering/Connick "public concern" inquiry as the 'threshold test," a number of cases
in which causation might have been analyzed were ruled out at the start. See supra text
accompanying notes 552-87.
886. Leonard, 705 F.2d at 1303-04. Such proof could, of course, consist entirely of circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708, 712 (1 th Cir. 1992).
887. Id. at 1304 (quoting Bower v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979, 984-85 (5th Cir. 1982)).
888. See supra text accompanying notes 588-601. The court has affirmed lower court factual
determinations rejecting as pretextual, e.g., defendants' claims that they discipline employees
for "insubordination." Williams v. Roberts, 904 F.2d 634, 638-39 (l1th Cir. 1990).
889. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285.
890. See supra note 101 and text accompanying notes 101-10.
891. See supra note 112 and text accompanying notes 112-13.
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decisions solely on considerations that do not violate employees'
rights.8
The consequences of this mistake were mitigated somewhat in that
under Mt. Healthy, agency superiors have the burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that they would have reached the
same personnel decision even in the absence of the employee's protected expression.8s The Supreme Court did not specify whether such
determination is a question of fact or one of law. The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that it is a question of fact for the jury or the court as
finder-of-fact.Connick had no direct effect on Eleventh Circuit second level Mt.
Healthy causation analysis, but relatively few decisions have been
based on such analysis since Connick. Two are of particular interest.
Both avoided saying that a public employee could be punished for
constitutionally impermissible reasons.
Harden v. Adams 5 concerned the dismissal of a tenured professor
at Troy State University. Evidently referring to second level analysis,
the court stated, "Mt. Healthy applies regardless of whether a teacher
has tenure."'
However, the court cautioned, "When a teacher is
tenured, 'a university [must] make a considerably stronger showing
than the appellees did in Mt. Healthy' to justify dismissal. ' ' 897 Here,
too, the court was referring to second level causation proof. The Harden court found that the University had met its burden by making
such a stronger showing.5s The court's reading of Mt. Healthy emphasized that an employee could not be penalized for both permissible
and impermissible reasons: '.[R]eliance on impermissible factors does
not, in and of itself, render a termination unconstitutional, if there
were other, permissible reasonsfor the terminationwhich were sufficient to support the decision.'"' Earlier, in Marshall v. City of Cape
Coral," the court held that the defendant City had established that

892. See supra text accompanying notes 101-10.
893. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
894. Holley v. Seminole County Sch. Dist., 755 F.2d 1492, 1500-01 (11th Cir. 1985); Paschal
v. Florida Pub. Employment Relations Comm., 666 F.2d 1381, 1384-85 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1109 (1982).
895. 841 F.2d 1091 (11th Cir. 1988).
896. Id. at 1094.
897. Id.
898. Id.
899. Id. (emphasis added).
900. 797 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1986).
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it 'clearly had compelling independent reasons for not continuing
[plaintiffs] employment.'' 1 In both Harden and Marshall, the court
was satisfied that the respective employees were dismissed solely for
constitutionally permissible reasons.
The structure of the Eleventh Circuit's framework for analyzing
public employee free speech claims may still be in flux. For some
time, the official first step or "threshold question" has been to determine if the employee's speech addressed a matter of public concern.
If so, the court would then (supposedly) balance the employee's along
with the public's interest in that speech against the government's
interest in suppressing it for the sake of efficiency in delivering services to the public. Then the court would consider first and second
level Mt. Healthy causation matters °2 There appears to be no particular reason to insist that these steps be followed in this (or any other)
exact sequence. It might be just as well to begin with first level
causation analysis,9 or any other factor that may be dispositive. In
any event, Connick implicitly, Rankin explicitly, and most subsequent
Eleventh Circuit decisions proceeded to analysis following, in one order
or another, some or all of these four considerations. Recently, however, a few Eleventh Circuit decisions have found another issue dispositive: the defendant's claim to qualified immunity. In these cases,
this has become, in effect, a new or pre-threshold question.
E. Qualified Immunity: Another Threshold Question
In the course of the last two decades, a series of Supreme Court
decisions created an evolving doctrine of qualified immunity for government officials whose acts may have violated statutory or constitutional
law. The main decisions were Wood v. Strickland9 in 1975, Harlow
v. Fitzgerald905 in 1982, and Anderson v. Creighton9 in 1987. The
rationale for such immunity was to balance the public's interest in
deterring unlawful conduct by officials and in compensating victims of
such conduct with the need for public officials to carry out legitimate

901. Id. at 1561 (citing Montgomery v. Boshears, 698 F.2d 739, 743 (5th Cir. 1983)). On
the other hand, the court has rejected defendants' second level Mt. Healthy claims where
defendants failed to offer relevant probative evidence. Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d
708, 713 (11th Cir. 1992); Williams v. Roberts, 904 F.2d 634, 639 (11th Cir. 1990).
902. See supra notes 509-18 and accompanying text.
903. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
904. 420 U.S. 308 (1975); see supra note 349.
905. 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see supra note 349 and accompanying text.
906. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
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duties without risk of personal liability. Thus, for example, in setting
out its criteria, the Harlow Court stated:
The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in
compensation of victims remains protected by a test that
focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official's
acts. Where an official could be expected to know that certain
conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he
should be made to hesitate; and a person who suffers injury
caused by such conduct may have a cause of action. But
where an official's duties legitimately require action in which
clearly established rights are not implicated, the public's interest may be better served by action taken "with independence and without fear of consequences." 907
In Anderson, the Court emphasized that a "clearly established right"
is one that has been, to some degree "particularized," not one stated
only in broad, general terms.
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right. This is not to say that an official action
is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in
question has previously been held unlawful, . . . but it is to
say that the unlawfulness must be apparent.None of the Supreme Court cases dealing with public employees'
speech rights mentioned the qualified immunity issue.- However, the
pre-partition Fifth Circuit considered a defendant's claim for qualified
immunity in Williams v. Board of Regents, 91° as did the pre-Connick
Eleventh Circuit in Berden v. Duggan.91' In both cases, the court(s)

907. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819. Several Eleventh Circuit opinions have also articulated policy
rationales for granting qualified immunity. See e.g., Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972
F.2d 1230, 1240-41 (llth Cir. 1992) (Hatchett, J., dissenting); Stough v. Gallagher, 967 F.2d
1523, 1525 (11th Cir. 1992).
908. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. Notwithstanding Harlow's (see supra note 349) and Anderson's insistence on such an objective standard, in another case, in a moment of rhetorical
hyperbole, the Court re-introduced extraneous subjective considerations, "As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 457 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
909. "Qualified ... immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant
official." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815. Defendants may not have raised this defense in these cases.
910. 629 F.2d 993, 1004-05 (5th Cir. 1980); see supra text accompanying notes 187-89 and
note 394.
911. 701 F.2d 909, 913 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied. 464 U.S. 893 (1983); see supra text
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found that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. In
Duggan, the court apparently understood that the constitutional violation occurred at the time the Mayor fired Berdin, since the former
should have known that discharging an employee "for exercising his
First Amendment right to speak, clearly contravenes established

law. 11912
Under Harlow and Anderson, the central question for purposes of
qualified immunity is whether the government official claiming that
913
privilege violated a right that was clearly established at the time.
The critical inquiry, then, is what was the established law with respect
to public employee speech rights at the time of the alleged violation.
In the absence of controlling decisions by the Supreme Court, the
914
Eleventh Circuit undertook to clarify this matter in Kurtz.
The Kurtz court observed that both Supreme Court and some
earlier Eleventh Circuit decisions left room for confusion as to when
public employees' speech might be said to be "constitutionally protected.''915 It noted that Mt. Healthy had indicated that whether or
not a government employee's speech is constitutionally protected depends on the outcome of a court's Pickeringbalancing,916 but concluded
that Connick's elevation of public concern inquiry meant that speech
was "constitutionally protected" if it was found to address a matter
of public concern. Connick had explicitly characterized the question
"[w]hether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern"
as "inquiry into the protected character of speech. ' ' 91 7 Rankin likewise
91
so understood Connick. 8

accompanying notes 302-08, 348-55. The Eleventh Circuit developed its own version of such
qualified immunity inquiry in Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1562 (11th Cir. 1988).
912. See supra text accompanying notes 351-52.
913. See supra text accompanying notes 907-08.
914. 855 F.2d at 723; see supra note 594 and text accompanying notes 588-97.
915. Kurtz, 855 F.2d at 730 n.5; see supra text accompanying notes 351-55.
916. Kurtz, 855 F.2d at 730 n.5 (citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 283-84). Some previous
Eleventh Circuit opinions had spoken similarly, e.g. Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1513 (11th
Circuit 1986); Leonard v. City of Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 1983). Both Ferrara
and Leonard ignore pre-partition Fifth Circuit precedent. See supra note 153 and accompanying
text.
917. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 148 n.7.
918. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 150 n.10 in the context of its
inquiry as to whether McPherson's speech addressed a matter of public concern). "'[W]e are
compelled to examine ... the statements ... to see whether or not they ... are of a character
which the principles of the First Amendment ... protect."' Id.; see also Ferrara v. Mills, 781
F.2d 1508, 1512 (11th Cir. 1986). Ferrararead Connick to say, "[W]hether a public employee's
speech is constitutionally protected turns upon whether the speech related of public concern or
to matters of merely personal interest to the employee." Id.
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Summarizing and quoting its own post-Connick decisional law on
point, the Kurtz court carefully detailed its position:
[T]his circuit has stated that "whether a public employee's
speech is constitutionally protected turns upon whether the
speech related to matters of public concern or to matters of
merely personal interest to the employee. . . . The first
inquiry under Connick, therefore, is to determine whether
the speech touches matters of public concern and is constitutionally protected solely by consideration of "the content,
form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the
whole record. . . ." If speech is constitutionally protected
under that test, then the court's task is to weigh the employer's interest in the efficient operation of the public office
against the employee's interest in the constitutionally protected speech utilizing the Pickering equation. . . [T]he
outcome of the Pickering test [does not determine] whether
the speech was "constitutionally protected." The outcome of
,the Connick public interest test determines whether speech
is constitutionally protected; the outcome of the Pickering
balancing test determines whether the public employer's interests override the employee's interests in the constitutionally protected speech." 919
Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, then, Pickering balancing does not
determine whether the employee's speech was constitutionally protected; it determines whether the superior's violation of her protected
speech right was justified. 9 0 According to Rankin, "It is clearly established that a State may not discharge an employee on a basis that
infringes that employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom
of expression."-, Under this decisional law, public employees, therefore, have a clearly established constitutional right to expression that

919. Kurtz, 855 F.2d at 731 n.5 (citations omitted). The pre-partition Fifth Circuit had held
likewise. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. Curiously, Kurtz did not cite these cases
for authority.
920. Connick arguably held accordingly. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149. "Because one of
the questions in Myers' survey touched upon a matter of public concern and contributed to her
discharge, we must determine whether Connick was justified in dismissing Myers." Id.; see also
supra note 155 and accompanying text.
921. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 383 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)); see
also Perry, 408 U.S. at 598 ("[T]his Court has specifically held that the nonrenewal of a non-tenured public school teacher's one-year contract may not be predicated on his exercise of First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.").
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addresses a matter of public concern, for such speech is "constitutionally protected." It should logically follow that if an agency superior
retaliated against an employee for exercising her constitutionally protected speech right, he would thereby violate that right. Whether the
violation was justified would then be determined by Pickeringbalancing.
On the basis of this binding Eleventh Circuit precedent9 and Rankin, it could have been expected that agency superiors who discharged
or otherwise disciplined employees on the basis of speech that addressed matters of public concern would not be held entitled to qualified
immunity.
Yet less than six months after Kurtz, another Eleventh Circuit
panel construed Harlow and Anderson to mean that an agency superior
who punishes an employee for speaking on matters of public concern
is entitled to qualified immunity unless a "reasonable official" in his
place would "necessarily"know that Pickeringbalancing would "inevitably" lead to the conclusion that his retaliatory conduct was "unlawful." '- This remarkable new doctrine was announced in Dartland.m
Curiously, the Dartland court made no mention at all of either Kurtz
or previous Eleventh Circuit precedent which clearly established that
a public employee's speech is constitutionally protected if it addressed
a matter of public concern.m Instead, Dartland cited as authority a
post-partitionFifth Circuit decision, Noyola v. Texas Department of
Human Resources.96
The Noyola court noted that Rankin had found that McPherson's
"derogatory remark" about President Reagan9 7 was "constitutionally
protected," but failed to notice that Rankin had so determined prior
to doing its Pickering balancing. Rankin held McPherson's speech
"constitutionally protected" because its content addressed matters of
public concern.9 Pickering balancing essentially consists of weighing
the employee's constitutionally protected speech rights against gov-

922. See supra note 8.
923. Dartland, 866 F.2d at 1323-24.
924. Id.; see supra notes 875, 876 and accompanying text.
925. Kurtz, 855 F.2d at 730-31 n.5; see supra text accompanying notes 918-19. Kurtz cited
to and quoted from Eiland, 797 F.2d at 957, and Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1512 (11th
Cir. 1986).
926. 846 F.2d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1988).
927. See supra text accompanying notes 484-507.
928. Noyola, 846 F.2d at 1025.
929. See supranotes 490, 917, and accompanying texts; see also Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390.
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ernmental interests in suppressing that speech. 93° Without explaining
either its legal reasoning or attendant policy considerations, the
Noyola court declared that government superiors are entitled to qualified immunity unless the results of Pickeringbalancing would predictably tip in favor of the employee's speech rights.
One consequence of case-by-case balancing is its implication
for the qualified immunity of public officers whose actions
are alleged to have violated an employee's First Amendment
rights. There will rarely be a basis for a priori judgment
that the termination or discipline of a public employee violated "clearly established constitutional rights." 931
The Noyola court's theory was that since the results of balancing will
usually be unclear, government officials should always be given the
benefit of the doubt. The court failed to consider that the violation of
an employee's "clearly established constitutional rights" occurs when
the agency superior takes retaliatory action against her for exercising
such rights. To say that the violation does not occur until the court
completes its balancing is conceptually absurd on its face.
The Dartland court erred by failing to follow its own binding precedent as to when public employees' speech is constitutionally protected. 932 Under Kurtz, it was clearly established that a public employee's speech was constitutionally protected if it addressed a matter of
public concern. The speech right is violated when an agency superior
retaliates against the employee for exercising that constitutionally
protected right. To hold otherwise would make a nullity of the expression "constitutionally protected." Dartland failed to recognize the distinction between a superior's violating an employee's clearly established constitutionally protected right and the question whether such
violation is justified because of the importance of countervailing gov9
ernmental interests. M
As a matter of sound public policy, a government official "should
be made to hesitate" ' " before violating an employee's speech rights.

930. See, e.g., Rankin, 483 U.S. at 392. "[W]e are not persuaded that Rankin's interest in
discharging [McPherson] outweighed her rights under the First Amendment." Id. "At some
point, [marginal governmental] concerns are so removed from the effective function of the public
employer that they cannot prevail over the free speech rights of the public employee." Id.
931. Noyola, 846 F.2d at 1025.
932. See supra note 8 and text accompanying notes 913-19.
933. See supra note 155 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 918-19.
934. See supra text accompanying note 904-07.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' SPEECH RIGHTS

If he chooses to do so, he should be prepared to show that legitimate
or "true" governmental interests in suppressing or punishing such
speech actually do outweigh the employee's speech rights. Otherwise,
government officials should refrain from punishing employees for
speaking on matters of public concern. In normal circumstances, such
officials ought to be able to carry out their responsibilities without
punishing employees for exercising their First Amendment speech
rights.
The Dartland court's position amounts to a blanket or plenary
indulgence for public officials who violate employees' constitutionally
protected rights. In effect, it is equivalent to a presumption that such
officials are entitled to qualified immunity. 9 "Because no bright-line
standard puts the reasonable public employer on notice of a constitutional violation, the employer is entitled to immunity except in the
extraordinary case where Pickeringbalancing would lead to the inevit''9 7
able conclusion that the discharge of the employee was unlawful.
Arguably, the Connick-Rankin "public concern" threshold test unnecessarily excludes from protection harmless public employee speech
which, absent this gloss, should be protected under the First Amendment. 938 However, this test does clearly establish the range of a public
employee's constitutionally protected speech rights. Where the agency
superior is in reasonable doubt as to whether the courts, as a matter
of law, will find that an employee's speech addressed a matter of
public concern, that superior, under Harlow and Anderson should be
entitled to qualified immunity. The Connick Court evidently intended

935. See supra text accompanying notes 660-64.
936. Rankin and Connick, however, had stated explicitly that in balancing, the government
or agency superior "bears [the] burden of justifying the discharge on legitimate grounds."
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 150). Under the Noyola-Dartland Theory,
this burden would be assumed only when the justification was so obvious that a court would
not need to go through the actual balancing.
937. Dartland v. Metropolitan Dade County, 866 F.2d 1321, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 1898). Two
subsequent Eleventh Circuit decisions proceed on Dartland's theory that when the outcome of
balancing is less than inevitable, defendant officials should be granted qualified immunity. Busby
v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772-75 (11th Cir. 1991); and Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd.
of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499, 1502-06 (11th Cir. 1990). Busby held that the officials were entitled
to qualified immunity, but nevertheless engaged in extensive balancing analysis. Busby, 931
F.2d at 773-75. Stewart held the officers not so entitled, again, after considerable attention to
balancing. Stewart, 908 F.2d at 1505-06. In any event, qualified immunity is not available to
officials sued in their official capacitites, municipalities or other governmental entities represented
by such officials. See id. at 1502, citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985); see
also Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1985).
938. See supra text accompanying notes 604-14.
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its "public concern" and/or "only of personal interest" requirement 93 9
to serve the same function or policy considerations Harlow indicated
as rationale for granting government officials qualified immunity, 94°
namely, to permit such officials to carry out their responsibilities without incurring personal liability for lawful discretionary actions.941 In
effect, the Connick Court said that public officials would escape such
liability if, instead of addressing matters of public concern, the
sanctioned speech related only to matters of personal interest to the
employees.
But by holding that government officials will be entitled to qualified
immunity in all cases except those where reasonable officials will
"necessarily" know that Pickering balancing will "inevitably" favor
employee's speech rights, the Dartland court erected a formidable
new barrier at the beginning of what was already a difficult obstacle
course for public employees seeking to vindicate their First Amendment speech rights. As Noyola indicated, the consequence of this new
barrier is that employees are rarely likely to succeed in doing so.9 2
Under Dartland, courts need not proceed to balancing unless such
balancing would necessarily and inevitably show that the free speech
interests outweighed the governmental interests in suppression. It is
unlikely that Pickeringintended that balancing be limited to such rare
or extraordinary cases. It is doubtful whether Pickering, Doyle,

939. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983); see supra text accompanying notes 403-14.
940. See supra text accompanying note 907.
941. "To presume that all matters which transpire within a government office are of public
concern would mean that virtually very remark . . . would plant the seed of a constitutional
case." Connick, 461 U.S. at 149. "Our holding today is grounded in our . . . recognition that
the First Amendment's primary aim is the full protection of speech upon issues of public concern,
as well as the practical realities involved in the administration of a government office." Id. at
154. Both propositions are logically and legally questionable. The first fails to recognize that
constitutional litigation does not result from employees' speaking, but rather from their superior's
punishing them for doing so. The second does not explain the Court's basis for the novel idea
that the First Amendment's "primary aim" is [concern for?] "the practical realities" of government
administration. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the Court's intention here was to provide
agency officials with the equivalent of qualified immunity when employees' speech relates to
matters of interest only to the employees themselves. Id.
942. See supra text accompanying note 931. See e.g., Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County,
972 F.2d 1230 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming grant of summary judgement on qualified immunity
for defendants). On the other hand, notwithstanding Dartland,the court will not sustain the
qualified immunity defense where defendants presented no evidence that employee's speech
interfered with agency performance. Stough v. Gallagher, 967 F.2d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir. 1992);
Stewart v. Board of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499, 1506 (11th Cir. 1990).
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Givhan and McPherson themselves would have ever come before the
Court if their superiors had invoked the new Noyola-Dartlandimmunity defense. One effect of this new doctrine will be not only to chill
public employees' speech on matters of public concern, but to put such
speech into the deep freeze. Such a result is unlikely to serve either
agency efficiency or the public's interest in employee speech on matters
of public importance. Another effect would be to lock in place whatever
may have been until then the "established law" as to predictable outcomes in balancing. The courts will no longer have opportunity to
determine how the balance should be struck in new case-by-case
analysis, for there will be no need for the courts ever again to engage
in balancing except when the outcome of such balancing is necessarily
inevitable. In effect, the Noyola-Dartlandtheory would reduce public
employees' First Amendment speech rights to a virtual nullity. This
theory and its effect reveal an unjustified bias in favor of the imperial
authority of agency officials.
Apart from these constitutional and policy considerations, Dartland
was out of line by failing to take cognizance of either pre-partition
Fifth Circuit precedent, Kurtz's clear articulation of the meaning of
"constitutionally protected" speech in Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence,9 or the Supreme Court's language on this question in Connick
and Rankin.944 An Eleventh Circuit panel is not free to ignore binding
precedent.9 5
For these reasons, the en banc court should revisit the application
of Harlow and Anderson in Eleventh Circuit First Amendment free
speech jurisprudence. As has been suggested, the court should make
clear that public employee free speech is "constitutionally protected"
if it addresses a matter of public concern. Officials who may be uncertain whether an employee's speech does so should be entitled to qualified immunity. But such immunity ought not extend to officials who
violate employees' constitutionally protected speech rights. Officials
who do so should not be permitted to escape their burden of responsibility for justifying such violations simply by submitting that they
could not necessarily have second-guessed the inevitable outcome of
possible eventual judicial balancing.

943. See supra text accompanying note 918. As to pre-partition Fifth Circuit precedent on
this point, see supra notes 115 & 116, 153, 228 and accompanying text.
944. See supra notes 917, 919, 920 and accompanying text.
945. See supra note 8.
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V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

On the whole, the Eleventh Circuit has handled very well the
complex and difficult task of applying three sets of binding case law
in its public employee free speech jurisprudence. Not only was it
bound, necessarily, to construe and follow the sometimes ambiguous
pronouncements of the Supreme Court; it was also bound by prior
Fifth Circuit precedent and by its own decisional law. 946 The significance of the Supreme Court's 1983 Connick decision for this precedent
was especially problematic because the opinion was peculiarly opaque
at many key points. 947 In the great majority of cases, the Eleventh
Circuit was remarkably successful in finding its way through the
forest.
The observations that follow are intended only to point out certain
instances where the court may have lost track of important issues and
relevant precedents. Some suggestions are offered as to questions the
court may wish to revisit either through its panels or en banc. In
order to review these issues more readily, they will be considered in
the same basic sequence followed above in analyzing post-Connick
Eleventh Circuit cases: (1) matters relating to the "public concern"
question; (2) balancing considerations; (3) causation; and (4) the qualified immunity problem.
A. Matters of Public Concern: The Threshold Test
Although the "matters of public concern" requirement may unnecessarily limit perfectly harmless employee speech which arguably
should be entitled to First Amendment protection,9 it is undoubtedly
here to stay until or unless the Supreme Court itself decides otherwise.
A few Eleventh Circuit cases take a strangely narrow view of what
constitutes "matters of public concern."'9 9 In some of these, the court
ignored relevant and possibly binding Fifth- or Eleventh Circuit case
law.951 In emphasizing the "role" in which an employee spoke, 952 or
the importance of whether she attempted to "go public," a few panels
evidently overlooked the Supreme Court's holding in Givhan9- and

946.

Id.

947.
948.
949.
950.
951.
952.
953.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra text accompanying notes 401-14, 417-22, 428-29, 434, 437, 442, 444, 452-72.
supra text accompanying notes 604-14.
supra text accompanying notes 552-65, 561, 566-78, 582-87, 735-36, 744.
supra text accompanying notes 517-18.
supra note 744 and text accompanying notes 556-57.
supra text accompanying notes 543-46.
supra text accompanying notes 124-39.
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the Circuit's own prior holdings.9s On the whole, however, the court
has construed "matters of public concern" broadly, as it should, given
the nature of citizen interest in the proper functioning of government
in a democratic society.
Eleventh Circuit decisions established that when an employee
spoke on different occasions, only those instances of her speech that
related to matters of public concern should be "weighed" for purposes
of Pickering balancing.9 - Subsequently, however, another panel of the
court neglected to separate the plaintiffs speech in accordance with
that precedent. 95 Here as in other instances, the more recent panel
9 7
seemed to be unaware of the court's own earlier precedent. 5
B. Balancing
As has been seen, Pickering balancing involves identifying three
major components and then "weighing" or prioritizing their relative
importance - a task it would seem more for moralists or philosophers
than for the courts. 95 On one side of the scale are the speaker's own
interest in her speech, and also the public's concern about the matter
addressed. On the other side, is the government's, which in a democracy means, ultimately, the public's interest in the efficient performance of the given agency in serving them. A critical question here is
the extent to which the employee's speech adversely affected this
governmental interest, or reasonably could have been expected to do
SO.
A number of pre-partition Fifth Circuit and some later Eleventh
Circuit cases carefully placed the employee's interest in her speech
on the balancing scales.- 9 Curiously, a few Eleventh Circuit decisions
failed to do so.- One early Eleventh Circuit opinion emphasized that
an employee has a "strong" or "fundamental" interest in speaking as
he chooses.91 Pickering itself,- along with some pre-partition Fifth

954. See supra text accompanying notes 547-58.
955. See supra text accompanying notes 592-96, 601, 666.
956. See supra text accompanying notes 707-15.
957. See supra note 715.
958. More precisely, the task is one for judges in their capacity as judicial ethicists and
philosophers. See generally Richard Hiers, Normative Analysis in Judicial Determination of
Public Policy, 3 J. OF LAW & RELIGION 77-115 (1985).
959. See supra text accompanying notes 198-203, 311-17, 620-22, 624-28, 790-93, 822.
960. See supra text accompanying notes 692, 706, 747.
961. See supra text accompanying notes 313-14.
962. See supra text accompanying note 618.
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Circuit decisions, had specified that the public's interest in an employee's speech - or in the matter addressed - was an important, indeed,
the critical balancing consideration.9 A surprising number of Eleventh
Circuit opinions, however, failed to place the public's interest on the
balancing scales.- In some of these and other cases, Eleventh Circuit
panels failed to engage in any explicit weighing or "balancing," but
merely examined the extent to which the employee's speech may have
disrupted office operations, as if the importance of the speech interests
made no difference.9
By and large, both pre-partition Fifth and subsequent Eleventh
Circuit decisions attributed particular weight or importance to certain
types of speech, typically because of their importance to an informed
citizenry. Whistle-blower speech, speech by school teachers and college
professors, and political speech have been considered especially valuable. The speech rights of law enforcement officers have been held
worthy of full constitutional protection. Speech by upper-level agency
officials, however, has been somewhat constrained.
"Whistle-blower" speech is speech by public employees concerning
corruption sponsored or tolerated by government officials. The cases
generally regard such speech as especially entitled to First Amendment protection.9 At least one post-Connick whistle-blower decision,
however, failed to accord such weight, and ignored pre-partition Fifth
Circuit case law that did so.9 7 There is no basis in Connick for devaluing such speech. The Eleventh Circuit may wish to review precedent
to be sure that it is ascribing the requisite special importance to
whistle-blower speech.
In both Keyishian and Pickering9 the Supreme Court emphasized
the special importance of academic free speech. Pre-partion Fifth Circuit case law did so as well, at least implicitly.- 9 A recent Eleventh
Circuit opinion reiterated that importance.97 Two decisions, however,
in dicta, suggested that speech by college professors had no special
constitutional importance.91 These dicta may have been influenced by

963.
964.
965.
966.
967.
693-704.
968.
969.
970.
971.

See supra text accompanying notes 41, 187-94, 197, 241, 618, 630, 799.
See supra text accompanying notes 638, 642, 680-81, 701-02, 721, 747-48, 766, 843.
See supra text accompanying notes 345, 701-02, 712, 768.
See supra note 241 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 239-41, 676-77.
See supra text accompanying notes 683-92, 705-06; see also text accompanying notes
See
See
See
See

supra text
supra text
supra text
supra text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes 15-59.
notes 174, 176-77, 179-86, 242-46.
note 746.
notes 573-78, 765-81.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' SPEECH RIGHTS

the court's reading of Connick,92 but both opinions completely ignored
relevant prior Eleventh Circuit case law9r3 The Eleventh Circuit
should be careful in the future not to be misled by such dicta.
Before Connick, the Eleventh Circuit insisted that policemen, like
teachers, were entitled to full, not merely to "a watered-down version
of constitutional rights."' 4 Some post-Connick opinions repeat this
doctrine.9 75 But more recent Eleventh Circuit cases have been silent
on this point.97 6 Binding precedent cannot be overruled by silence. 9The Eleventh Circuit should continue to view law enforcement officers'
speech as fully worthy of constitutional protection. This is particularly
important, because there are special governmental needs, under some
9 8
circumstances, for regulating such officers' speech. 7
The Supreme Court has held political speech especially important
in view of the need for an informed citizenry in the functioning of
democratic self-government.9 A pre-partition Fifth Circuit decision
was particularly emphatic on this point.9 ° Post-Connick Eleventh Circuit decisions likewise consider public employees' political speech to
deserve special First Amendment protection.981 In these political
speech cases, the court has been faithful both to precedent and the
principles underlying such precedent.
Like the pre-partition Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit has stressed the importance of co-operation and close working relationships
between upper-level governmental officials in connection with governmental interest in effective performance of public services. Relatively subordinate officials in such relationships therefore may have
to be especially guarded, deferential, or "politic" in their speech with
superiors, even if these superiors are as much or more at fault in
jeopardizing their working relationships.92 In such cases, the court
has generally found that even where the plaintiff's speech addressed
public concerns, and was, therefore, constitutionally protected, it was

972.
973.
974.
975.
976.
977.
978.
979.
980.
981.
982.

See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra note 8.
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying

note 744.
notes 578, 764-65, 769-75.
note 789.
notes 793, 801.
notes 810-45.
note 841.
note 41.
notes 250-56, 848-50.
notes 790-805, 853-59.
notes 860-77.
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outweighed by the government's (or the public's) interest in conducting
agency business effectively. 91
Eleventh Circuit case law did not differ significantly from the Supreme Court's or the pre-partition Fifth Circuit's characterizations of
the nature of governmental interests. 984 The pre-partition en banc Fifth
Circuit determined that an agency superior could discharge an employee whose speech had the potential for disrupting working relationships necessary for the agency's effective functioning.
The court
specified, however, that in such a case the superior would have to be
able to demonstrate "an adequate objective foundation" for concluding
that disruption was likely to occur.9 Later, in Connick, the Supreme
Court also held that a superior might act pre-emptively to remove an
employee whose speech, she reasonably believed, might eventuate in
disruption.9 7 Connick did not say that the superior would have to
present an "adequate objective foundation" for so acting. It is unclear
whether that requirement survived Connick. Post-Connick Eleventh
Circuit decisions suggest that the court will require some showing
that the anticipated disruption was probable, and not a product of
mere fear or speculation on the part of the superior. 98
Both the pre-partition Fifth, and the later Eleventh Circuits insisted that in balancing, the government or agency superior must show
that "true" or bona fide interests were adversely affected by the
employee speech in question. 9 9 Rankin made the same point, referring
to "legitimate" governmental interests.9 The pre-partition Fifth Circuit had declined to decide whether governmental interests in suppressing or punishing employee speech must be "compelling."', An early
Eleventh Circuit decision seemed to say that the government's interest
must be "compelling," or at any rate, "significant."' 9 Some more recent
Eleventh Circuit decisions also suggest that to prevail in Pickering
balancing, the government's interests must be compelling.9 3 In gen-

983.
984.
985.
986.
987.
988.
989.
990.
991.
992.
993.
County,

See supra text accompanying notes 693-704, 860-77.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-57, 645, 660-65.
See supra text accompanying notes 206-16, 647-48.
See supra text accompanying note 207.
See supra text accompanying notes 440-50, 649-50.
See supra text accompanying notes 335, 651-53, 815-28.
See supra text accompanying notes 254-55, 660-64.
See supra text accompanying note 504.
See supra text accompanying notes 320-21.
See supra text accompanying notes 322-26, 788.
See supra text accompanying notes 797, 802, 901; see also Sims v. Metropolitan Dade
972 F.2d 1230, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 1992).
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eral, however, the court's decisions do not indicate that the government's interest must be compelling in order to outweigh public employee speech interests. The question evidently is still open in the
Eleventh Circuit.
Both Circuits have emphasized that government interests must
actually be harmed by employee speech in order to justify suppression
or retaliation.9 5 An Eleventh Circuit panel neglected to consider this
question in one case, but it was apparently decided on other grounds.9 9
Pre-partition Fifth Circuit decisions regularly required that in order
to justify retaliation or suppression, the employee's speech must have
"materially and substantially" impeded either her own performance
or that of the agency. 9 Connick did not overrule or even consider
the "materially and substantially" requirement.9 8 Some post-Connick
Eleventh Circuit cases evidently did require that the adverse effects
of an employee's speech must be "substantial," 9 but most did not.
The en banc court may wish to determine whether the "materially
and substantially" impedes or interferes test is still binding precedent.
Three other balancing issues may be mentioned briefly. First, some
pre-partition Fifth Circuit decisions had stated that in school contexts,
balancing would focus not on "whether substantial disruption occurs,"
but on whether such disruption "overbalances" or "clearly overbalances" the teacher's "usefulness as an instructor."1 This test was
even more protective of teacher's speech rights. It has not been specifically overruled either by the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit
en banc; thus presumably it remains binding precedent in school cases.
Second, there is the question whether, in balancing, the court
should consider the effects of the agency superior's retaliatory action
on the agency's efficient delivery of public services. It would seem
appropriate to do so. Moreover, both pre-partition Fifth and post-Connick Eleventh Circuit decisions have considered this factor in their
Pickering balancing.1°°1 If an employee-plaintiff raises this issue, the
court should be obliged by its precedent to consider it. Since the
court's balancing is a matter of law, should the court inquire as to
such effects sua sponte if there is adequate record evidence before it?
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supra text accompanying
supra text accompanying
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notes 814, 834, 842-44.
notes 255, 33740, 787, 807.
notes 866-73.
notes 217-34.
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1000. See supra text accompanying notes 242-45, 734.
1001. See supra note 238, 665, and text accompanying notes 237-38, 665.
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Finally, in its balancing, should the court take into account whether
the defendant agency or agency superior could have used less intrusive
means to protect its interests from the harmful effects of an employee's
exercise of his speech rights? The Pickering Court did so. 100 2 Post-Connick Eleventh Circuit decisions have done so as well.10 Since the
court balances de novo, as a matter of law, perhaps it should consider
this question too, whether or not the employee-plaintiff raises it.
C. Causation: Mt. Healthy Issues
Somewhat recently, the Eleventh Circuit established that when a
public employee had spoken on separate occasions, he could not claim
that his superior retaliated against him because of any instances of
his unprotected speech.100 For purposes of second level Mt. Healthy
causation proof, however, the superior could argue that she would
have disciplined the employee anyway because of his unprotected
1 5 The Eleventh Circuit has
speech. 00
not always kept this distinction
in mind, 1w but presumably will do so in future decisions.
In Mt. Healthy, the Supreme Court indicated that an agency
superior would not be liable for violating an employee's speech right
if the superior could prove that she would have disciplined the employee exactly the same way for constitutionally permissible
reasons. 1 o Mt. Healthy would allow agency superiors to punish employees for their speech if the superiors can persuade the court that
they dould have punished them for constitutionally permissible
reasons, even though they did, in fact, punish them for exercising
constitutionally protected speech rights. Some Eleventh Circuit cases,
on the other hand, seem to emphasize that the employees can be
punished only for constitutionally permissible reasons.
The distinction may be subtle, but it is important, at least in theory.
D. Qualified Immunity
The Eleventh Circuit recently held that an agency superior is entitled to' qualified immunity from all employee speech claims except
those where a reasonable official would necessarily have known that
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the court's ultimate Pickeringbalancing would inevitably have favored
the employee's speech interest over the government's interest in
punishing or suppressing it. This decision is open to serious criticism
on constitutional and public policy grounds. 01 0 It also was reached
without any attention to binding pre-partition Fifth Circuit, or even
prior Eleventh Circuit precedentoll which was, in turn, well-grounded
in binding Supreme Court decisions.1012
The Eleventh Circuit should recede from, or, en banc, overrule
panel holdings to the effect that qualified immunity is available in all
but the rare or extraordinary cases where an agency official would
necessarily know that the court would strike its Pickering balance
against him. Under present Supreme Court holdings, agency officials
should be entitled to qualified immunity if they violate employee's
01 3
clearly established right to speak on matters of public concern.
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